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Thesis abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the thesis I offer an analysis of the metaphysical underpinnings of the extended 
cognition thesis via an examination of standard views of metaphysical building (or, 
dependence) relations.  
In summary form, the extended cognition thesis is a view put forth in 
naturalistic philosophy of mind stating that the physical basis of cognitive processes 
and cognitive processing may, in the right circumstances, be distributed across 
neural, bodily, and environmental vehicles. As such, the extended cognition thesis 
breaks substantially with the still widely held view in cognitive science and 
philosophy of mind, namely that cognitive processes and cognitive processing take 
place within the skin-and-skull of individual organisms.  
The standard view of metaphysical building relations can be expressed as the 
conjunction of two theses. First, that a metaphysical building relation – such as 
composition, constitution, realization, supervenience or emergence – is a relation of 
ontological dependence, because if a metaphysical building relation holds between 
X (or the Xs) and Y, then it is in virtue of X (or the Xs) that Y exists. Second, 
metaphysical building relations are synchronic (durationless) relations of 
ontological dependence.  
In the thesis, I propose an alternative diachronic framework by which to extend 
the standard synchronic accounts of metaphysical dependence relations, and by 
which to reformulate the metaphysical foundation of the extended cognition thesis. 
The project fills an important gap between analytical metaphysics (in particular, the 
metaphysics of dependence relations) and naturalistic philosophy of mind 
(especially the extended cognition thesis). To my knowledge there has been no 
attempt to establish a robust diachronic account of metaphysical building (or, 
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dependence) relations such as, e.g., composition and constitution. However, this is 
precisely what I argue is required to properly advance and ground the metaphysics 
of extended cognition. Ultimately, my aim of reformulating the metaphysics of 
extended cognition consists in taking several steps toward a third-wave of extended 
cognition.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 5 
Statement by candidate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I certify that the work in this thesis entitled “Diachronic Metaphysical Building 
Relations: Towards the Metaphysics of Extended Cognition” has not previously 
been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a 
degree to any other university or institution other than Macquarie University.  
 
I also certify that the thesis is an original piece of research and it has been written 
by me. Any help and assistance that I have received in my research work and 
preparation of the thesis itself have been appropriately acknowledged.  
 
In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in 
the thesis.  
 
Signature:  
Date:  
 
Michael David Kirchhoff (42604524) 
 !!!!!
! 6 
Acknowledgements !!!!!!!!
I would like to thank the Australian Research Council (ARC) and in particular 
Richard Menary and David Simpson, because this PhD project has been funded by 
an ARC PhD scholarship, as part of an ARC Discovery Project Grant DP1095109 
awarded to Richard Menary and David Simpson. I am also grateful to Macquarie 
University for providing me with an International Macquarie University Research 
Excellence Scholarship (No. 2011180), while I was transferring my degree from the 
University of Wollongong to Macquarie University, for tuition fee support during 
my two years of postgraduate studies at Macquarie University, and for enabling me 
to carry out my research in a stimulating research environment.  
Thanks are due to many people for discussion of related issues and comments 
on earlier drafts, but especially to Richard Menary, John Sutton, Will Newsome, 
Julian Kiverstein, Shaun Gallagher, Dan Hutto, Ken Aizawa, Chris Winch, David 
Simpson, Dan Zahavi, Johanna Seibt, Henning Høgh Laursen, Patrick McGivern, 
Neil McDonnell, and to various members of the audiences on several occasions 
when some of the material in the thesis has been presented. Special thanks to Karen 
Bennett for the permission to read and cite her forthcoming book Making Things Up 
with Oxford University Press. I am also grateful to my former teacher and mentor, 
Steen Wackerhausen, without whom my interest in distributed and extended 
cognition might never have evolved. Finally, and much closer to home, thanks to 
Casey Gibson and the Gibson family for their support and for allowing me to spend 
many hours of efficient and undisturbed writing in their beautiful home in 
Currarong, NSW, Australia.  
Parts of chapters 1 and 8 are based on my treatment of the constitution relation 
and extended cognition, to be found in my papers “Extended Cognition & the 
! 7 
Causal-Constitutive Fallacy: In Search for a Diachronic and Dynamical Conception 
of Constitution” published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (DOI: 
10.1111/phpr.12039) and “Extended Cognition & Constitution: Re-evaluating the 
Constitutive Claim of Extended Cognition” published in Philosophical Psychology 
(DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.724394). Parts of chapter 4 are based on my 
treatment of the recent debate between Clark and Hutchins on the timescales over 
which cognition and culture may interact, to be found in my papers “Extended 
Cognition and Fixed Properties: Steps to a Third-Wave Version of Extended 
Cognition” published in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2012, 11(2), 
287-308), “Distributed Cognitive Agency in Virtue Epistemology” published in 
Philosophical Explorations (2012, 15(2), 165-180), and a paper that is currently 
under review in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Parts of chapter 6 are 
currently under review in Synthese, while parts of chapter 7 are based on my paper 
“In Search for Ontological Emergence: Diachronic, but Non-Supervenient” 
published in Axiomathes (DOI: 10.1007/s10516-013-9214-7). Thanks to the 
referees from each of these journals for valuable comments and suggestions for 
improvement. Thanks also to the examiners of the thesis for suggestions for 
improvement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 8 
For my mother and grandparents with thanks 
 
 
 
 
 
 !
 !!!
 !!!!
 !!!
! 9 
1. Introduction: DIACHRONIC versus SYNCHRONIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
My general concern in the thesis is with the idea that cognitive processes and 
cognitive systems may be instantiated by elements distributed beyond the brain 
and/or whole body of organisms to include environmental components. As one of 
the key exponents of this view has expressed this ontological claim: “Cognitive 
processes are not located exclusively inside the skin of cognizing organisms.” 
(Rowlands 1999, p. 22; see also Clark 1997, 1998a, 2003, 2008; Clark & Chalmers 
1998; Menary 2007, 2010b; Sutton 2010; Wheeler 2010; Wilson 1994, 2004a). This 
is the extended cognition thesis (EC). It provides arguments for the view that the 
boundaries of cognition are not bounded by either the brain or the organismic body 
but may, in the right circumstances, be broadened to include environmental 
resources (e.g., artifacts, people, social institutions, practices, and so on).   
The primary question that shall occupy me is the following: if the relationship 
between the physical machinery of cognition, on the one hand, and cognition, on the 
other, is one of non-identity (which is the received view in contemporary 
naturalistic philosophy of mind), what is the relationship between cognition1 and its 
physical substrate? Is the relationship a supervenience relation? Is the relationship a 
realization relation? Constitution? Emergence? Or, might it be a composition 
relation? Independent of which specific relation one opts for, these relations are all 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Here and throughout, I am using “cognition” as a catch-all term covering (i) 
processes such as remembering, learning, problem solving, perception, and so on, 
(ii) states such as beliefs and desires, and (iii) consciousness. However, I will be 
focusing predominantly on processes such as remembering, problem solving, 
perception, and learning.  
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relations of metaphysical dependence. I refer to these different relations as 
METAPHYSICAL BUILDING RELATIONS2. 
There are (at least) two different modes in which these metaphysical building 
relations may be put to use. The first is proprietary, which specifies that a relation 
like realization, say, holds only between “the physical” and “the mental”. The 
second is generic. In contrast to the proprietary sense of realization, the generic 
mode of realization implies that the relation of realization is a general relation that 
holds independently of the nature of the phenomena in question (Wilson 2004a, p. 
100)3. 
In the philosophy of mind, arguably the most familiar view of the relationship 
between mind and body comes from a position pioneered by Putnam (1960/[1975]). 
Putnam formulated the relationship between the mental and the physical as one of 
realization. According to this view, mental states or properties are realized by 
physical states or properties of the brain but are neither identical with nor reducible 
to such brain states or properties. Thus, Putnam used realization in its proprietary 
mode in order to express that the relationship between mind and body is one of 
realization. Supervenience has also been used to express the idea of the mental and 
the physical as being in a relation of dependence, from the physical to the mental, 
yet without that dependence relation being an identity relation or a relation of 
reduction (Horgan 1993). As such, both supervenience and realization have been 
used to underpin the view that mental states or properties metaphysically depend on 
brain states or properties but without being identical with or reducible to brain states 
or properties.  
Central to these proprietary senses of supervenience and realization, but also to 
relations such as composition and constitution, is the basic assumption that has been 
dominant in research located at the interface between metaphysics and philosophy 
of mind, on the one hand, and the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy 
of science, on the other, namely that mind or cognition is instantiated in the brain of 
individuals. This internalist view is usually referred to as metaphysical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The concept “metaphysical building relation” is due to Bennett (2011).  
3 I borrow the distinction between “proprietary” and “generic” relations from 
Kaplan (2012), although he employs the distinction with regards to the boundaries 
and scope of mechanisms. 
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individualism and is (or, at least was) the default view of almost everyone in 
philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. If one takes metaphysical 
individualism seriously, as, for instance, the critics of EC do (see e.g., Adams & 
Aizawa 2008), then one also endorses the view that the object of psychological 
science is on the inside of the organism (see e.g., Rupert 2004, 2009). This view is 
commonly referred to as methodological individualism4. 
In philosophy, the most notorious challenge to metaphysical individualism and 
methodological individualism arises from Clark & Chalmers’ seminal paper “The 
Extended Mind” (1998). They argue that mental states and cognitive processes can, 
in the right circumstances, occur in networks that spread across brain, body, and 
local environment. Against both forms of individualism, Clark and Chalmers’ 
radical hypothesis builds an active metaphysical externalism. Active externalism is 
different from traditional meaning externalism due to Putnam (1975) and Burge 
(1979), since it concerns the “active role of the environment in driving cognitive 
processes.” (Clark & Chalmers 1998, p. 7) As Clark, for instance, states:   
 
“I hope to convince you of at least this: that the old puzzle, the mind-body 
problem, really involves a hidden third party. It is the mind-body-scaffolding 
problem. It is the problem of understanding how human thought and reason is 
born out of looping interactions between material brains, material bodies, and 
complex cultural and technological environments. We create these supportive 
environments, but they create us too. We exist, as the thinking things we are, 
only thanks to a baffling dance of brains, bodies, and cultural and 
technological scaffolding.” (2003, p. 11; italics in original) 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 An influential example is Fodor’s “methodological solipsism” (1980). On this 
view, one can entirely disregard facts about the body and environment when 
attempting to understand how cognition works. In other words, although perceptual 
and motor systems are reasonable objects of study in their own right, they matter 
little to trying to understand cognition.  
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1.1. Main aims, ramifications and points of controversy 
 
The first aim of the thesis concerns the metaphysical underpinnings of EC, while 
my second aim is directed at research in analytical metaphysics concerning 
metaphysical relations such as constitution, composition, emergence, 
supervenience, and realization. Consequently, this thesis will have implications both 
for the metaphysical foundation of EC and for research in metaphysics. See figure 1 
for an overview of the two main aims and how they relate. But let me first say a 
little about what led me to construct the core project of the thesis. I began with the 
goal of furthering the projects of second- and third-wave EC (Menary 2007; Sutton 
2010). That is, to analyze cases of social as well as culturally distributed cognition, 
while arguing for the need to move away from the standard metaphysical 
articulations of EC turning on parity between “the internal” and “the external”. 
However, what I found was that if this project – fully developing second- and third-
wave articulations of EC – is to succeed, and if there are deep problems with the 
metaphysics of the EC project in general (a point often raised by the critics of EC), 
then one crucial ingredient is an appropriately grounded metaphysics of EC – the 
first main aim of the thesis.  
 
1.1.1. First aim of the thesis  
 
It will be argued that it is possible to radicalize EC even further than it already is 
considered to be. Despite being groundbreaking in so many respects, most 
articulations of EC, I submit, suffer from a failure to pay sufficient attention to the 
metaphysical issues their statements and theoretical concepts involve them in. It is 
evident from a read through the EC literature that exponents of EC use metaphysical 
concepts – such as constitution, composition, realization, supervenience, and 
emergence – to ground their metaphysical project. For example, consider these 
different passages from leading EC theorists:  
 
“EM is a claim about the composition or constitution of (some) mental 
processes.” (Rowlands 2009, p. 54; italics added)  
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“What is at issue, as far as the claims about cognitive extension are concerned, 
is simply which bits of the world make true (by serving as the local 
mechanistic supervenience base for) certain claims about a subject’s here-and-
now mental states or cognitive processing.” (Clark 2008, p. 118; italics added) 
 
“Bare causal dependency of mentality on external factors – even when that 
causal dependency is of the “necessary” kind […] – is simply not enough for 
genuine cognitive extension. What is needed is constitutive dependence of 
mentality on external factors, the sort of dependence indicated by talk of the 
beyond-the-skin factors themselves rightly being accorded fully paid-up 
cognitive status.” (Wheeler 2010, p. 246; italics in original)  
 
However, from more careful reading, it is equally clear that most defenders of EC 
use such metaphysical concepts without scrutinizing just what these different 
metaphysical building relations imply 5 . Because of this 6 , the metaphysical 
foundation of EC retains a certain theoretical and metaphysical modesty, resulting 
in keeping intact some of the assumptions of the tradition(s) that the defenders of 
EC see themselves as breaking with.  
This theoretical and metaphysical modesty normally comes about through a 
failure to recognize the real force or impetus of the metaphysical building relations !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 We should not find it too surprising that EC theorists fail to pay sufficient 
attention to foundational concepts and questions in metaphysics. For example, the 
audiences of EC and those of metaphysics do not read one another’s work that 
often. On the other hand, EC is a new and controversial approach in cognitive 
science and philosophy of mind, and is, as a result, still in a stage of maturing. Also, 
where I emphasize that the defenders of EC do not pay sufficient attention of the 
metaphysical issues their use of metaphysical concepts involve them in, other 
theorists argue that certain defenders of EC fail to pay sufficient attention to history, 
culture, and to practices (see e.g, Menary 2007, 2010b; Sutton 2010). Therefore, my 
specific attention to the metaphysics of EC is just one of a number of important 
other dimensions in which further scrutiny is required.  
6 To my knowledge, Hurley (2010) was the first to point to this lack of scrutiny in 
the EC debate.  
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that hold between temporally unfolding relata such as dynamically distributed 
cognitive processes, on the one hand, and temporally unfolding processes such as 
those looping back-and-forth between brains, bodies, and environments, on the 
other, from which (some) cognitive processes and systems are orchestrated. That is, 
when defenders of EC seek to advance the highly original claim that human thought 
and reason is built – viz., is realized by, supervenes on, is composed by, is 
constituted by, or emerges from – material parts distributed across brain, body, and 
world, they typically keep intact the highly unoriginal premise of the standard view 
of metaphysical building relations: that the metaphysical relation that holds between 
cognitive phenomena and their parts synchronically determine, and non-causally 
explain, what they build (Kirchhoff 2013a). Call this model of metaphysical 
building relations SYNCHRONIC. 
According to SYNCHRONIC, if an instantiation of a higher-level entity Y is 
synchronic, then the relation R that holds between Y and Y’s constituents, the Xs, is 
exhaustively present at a single time instant t or entirely present at each time slice 
over an interval t1, …, tn. For example, Michelangelo’s David is constituted by a 
piece of marble, Piece. This case, originally described in Gibbard (1975), is a 
standard in the literature on material constitution in metaphysics. To say that the 
relation R that holds between Piece and David exhaustively determines the 
existence of David at a synchronic instant t or over each point of an interval t1, …, tn 
is to say that David’s existence is determined in toto at an instant t, and, therefore, 
does not depend for its existence on unfolding over time. This follows, I submit, 
since it is the received view of SYNCHRONIC that the kinds of entities under 
discussion are (metaphysically) enduring entities, which are wholly present 
whenever they exist (Wasserman 2004b). As Horgan says about the relation of 
supervenience – although he may just as well have extended his claims to cover 
many other building relations:  
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“In philosophical contexts it is primarily used non-temporally to signify a 
metaphysical and/or conceptual determination-relation.” (1993, p. 555; italics 
added)7  
 
So, what I call SYNCHRONIC are atemporal (durationless) relations of 
determination between certain Xs and a specific Y, and where the relata themselves 
typically are understood as enduring entities which are wholly present when and 
where they exist.  
Alternatively to SYNCHRONIC, I develop a non-standard, generic view of 
metaphysical building relations according to which: if the relation R that holds 
between Y and the Xs is diachronic, then R can never be exhaustively present at a 
single instant t or at any single time slice over an interval t1, …, tn. Call this 
alternative view DIACHRONIC. According to DIACHRONIC, the relata – Y and 
the Xs – are ineliminably time continuous such that the relata cannot be wholly 
present within some particular instant t or at each stage across an interval t1, …, tn. 
If we apply the language of contemporary metaphysics, the relata in DIACHRONIC 
are not enduring; rather, insofar as the relata of DIACHRONIC are time continuous, 
these relata persist by (metaphysically) perduring8.  
In a nutshell, it is only by giving up SYNCHRONIC and adopting my 
alternative view, DIACHRONIC, that EC can properly ground its metaphysical 
foundation, because cognitive systems and processes are themselves perduring, 
time-continuous phenomena, that are made up of “tangles of feedback, feedforward, 
and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, 
body, and world.” (Clark 2008, p. xxviii) Thus, by adopting DIACHRONIC, the 
exponents of EC will be able to break with the philosophical tradition both 
concerning the width of the metaphysical foundation of cognition (which they do 
already) and in relation to SYNCHRONIC (which they do not already do).  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Or, as Gillett in this recent paper says about composition: “[…] Compositional 
relations are non-causal determination relations that are synchronous […].” (2013, 
p. 9; italics in original) 
8 I deal with the enduring-perduring distinction in chapters 3 and 5.  
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1.1.2. Second aim of the thesis  
 
The first aim of the thesis, then, is to radicalize the metaphysical underpinnings of 
EC by developing an alternative DIACHRONIC conception of metaphysical 
building relations. Although this may seem to focus exclusively on EC, developing 
DIACHRONIC ultimately speaks to wider issues than just the metaphysics of EC. 
Indeed, such a development has implications for research in metaphysics as well. 
Thus, the second aim of the thesis consists in broadening the boundaries of 
metaphysical theorizing about metaphysical dependence relations to include not 
only SYNCHRONIC but equally DIACHRONIC, because dynamical processes and 
dynamical systems are in need of a diachronically formulated metaphysics.   
 
1.1.3. Third-wave of extended cognition  
 
Sutton (2010) coined the term “third-wave EC,” and proposed a variety of 
explanatory targets for a third-wave version of EC to pursue. As he says:  
 
“If there is to be a distinct third wave of [EC], it might be a deterritorialized 
cognitive science which deals with the propagation of deformed and 
reformatted representations, and which dissolves individuals into peculiar loci 
of coordination and coalescence among multiple structured media.” (2010, p. 
213) 
 
Sutton thinks that such a third-wave of EC theorizing should be an attempt to 
decentralize the methodological boundaries in the cognitive sciences even further 
and should study how history and cultural practices are active right now in the 
current material, social, and technological resources that enter into hybrid 
distributed cognitive ecologies. I agree with this. For example, in chapter 4, I 
develop one way by which to ground Sutton’s view that a third-wave is one that 
‘dissolves individuals into peculiar loci of coordination and coalescence among 
multiple structured media’. But, where Sutton emphasizes the importance of an 
explanatory/methodological pathway towards a third-wave EC, I focus on 
articulating some of the metaphysical issues that are central to moving towards a 
third-wave version of EC. I should note that these two species of third-wave EC 
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theorizing are complementary. I provide some of the metaphysics that (arguably) 
must be operative in a wholly hybrid and dynamical science of extended cognition. 
In combination with my second aim, radicalizing the metaphysical underpinnings of 
EC is intended to innovatively advance discussion in this field of research by 
joining up issues in metaphysics (concerning supervenience, realization, material 
constitution, composition, and emergence) with EC. It is my hope to get audiences 
from these different literatures to contribute more to one another’s research projects, 
since questions which arise in metaphysics have ramifications for questions in EC, 
and vice versa.  
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Fig. 1 Diagram of the thesis aims and how they interrelate9 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Figure 1 is intended to illustrate the focus of this thesis. It is not intended as a 
statement about EC in general, e.g., that EC is entirely a metaphysical thesis. Even 
though this thesis analyzes the metaphysics of EC, we should not forget that EC is 
also based closely on cognitive scientific practice, cases, and evidence. That is, EC 
is equally a methodological project.  
!!
!!!!!!!!!
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1.1.4. Implications and controversy 
 
There is a need to look carefully into just what DIACHRONIC implies, that is, its 
implications and points of controversy. If saying that DIACHRONIC is important 
due to its emphasis on relations that are diachronic – relations that unfold over time 
– then nearly everyone will accept DIACHRONIC, because nearly everyone, 
including the friends of SYNCHRONIC, give a central place to diachronic relations, 
specifically to causal relations. If this is all that I mean by DIACHRONIC, then that 
is not at all controversial, or, for that matter, original! All defenders of 
SYNCHRONIC include diachronic – especially causal – relations in their preferred 
metaphysics. As Shapiro, for example, states, when considering the relation 
between realization and causation: “[…], realization is intended as a synchronic 
relation between the realized kind and its realizer, whereas causation is most 
typically a diachronic relation.” (2004, p. 35) Or, as Craver & Bechtel emphasize: 
“Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of constitutive and causal relations in 
a mechanism, where the constitutive relations are interlevel and the causal relations 
are exclusively intralevel.” (2007, p. 547) Or, as Bennett sums up how most 
exponents of SYNCHRONIC think about causation and metaphysical building 
relations:  
 
“[How] can I avoid calling causation a building relation? There is an obvious 
fix: add a further necessary condition on a relation’s counting as a form of 
building, namely that it be synchronic, or at least atemporal. Building 
relations do not unfold over time. If property P realizes property Q, it does so 
at some time instant t; if these molecules compose that table, they do so at 
some t; if these time slices compose that persisting object, they do so 
simpliciter. Causation, in contrast, is paradigmatically diachronic, and that 
idea is frequently invoked to distinguish causation from relations like 
composition, constitution, or supervenience […].” (2011, pp. 93-94; italics in 
original) 
 
Given these typical ways of integrating diachronic relations, i.e., causal relations, 
into one’s metaphysics, it is not the importance that I place on diachronic relations 
that is controversial, since, as we have seen, everyone agrees that diachronic 
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relations (e.g., causal relations) are important. However, what is controversial about 
DIACHRONIC is the exclusive importance that I give diachronic relations over and 
in place of synchronic relations, on the one hand, and the fact that I do not restrict 
diachronic relations to causal relations, on the other. The most controversial aspect 
of DIACHRONIC is that metaphysical building relations such as composition and 
constitution fall under the hat of DIACHRONIC. That is a controversial claim, 
since almost everyone agrees that if there is anything that separates causation, on 
the one hand, from relations such as composition, constitution, etc., on the other, 
then it is the fact that the former is diachronic, whereas the latter are synchronic.  
No doubt some readers are eager to offer a skeptical remark concerning the fact 
that I use the term “building relation” to describe diachronic relations given the 
intended restriction of the term “building relation” to relations such as composition, 
constitution, supervenience, realization, and so on. The skeptical remark might go 
as follows: the metaphors of “building” or “building up from”, etc., seem 
illegitimately to smuggle diachronic phenomena to the discussion of what is usually 
treated as synchronic phenomena. It is the received view that metaphysical relations 
like composition, constitution, supervenience, and so on, synchronically determine 
what they give rise to. That is, if X (or the Xs) composes Y, for example, the 
relation that holds between X (or the Xs) and Y is understood to be a synchronic 
(durationless and noncausal) relation. The skeptical remark is that because 
“building” is typically conceived as the ‘process of developing or creating 
something’, this conception smuggles diachronic phenomena into the discussion 
about relations that are normally treated as synchronic relations.  
But, I submit, the term building in metaphysical building relations is supposed 
to be a generic term for the nature of any one-one or many-one relation that holds 
between different relata. It may or may not be the case that a token building relation 
holds synchronically or diachronically. Building relations may be synchronic (or 
atemporal). But, as Bennett states, “they need not be.” (2011, p. 95) Suppose that 
the relation between a piece of marble and a token statue is one of constitution. 
Constitution theorists typically consider this relation to be one that holds 
synchronically, fully in line with SYNCHRONIC (Wasserman 2004b). But nothing 
about the conception of a metaphysical building relation, I submit, necessitates that 
such a relation confines itself to either SYNCHRONIC or DIACHRONIC.  
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To be sure, there are many philosophers (see e.g., Baker 2000; Polger 2004; 
Shoemaker 2007; Shapiro 2004; Wilson 2004b, 2009), who treat building relations 
as SYNCHRONIC. But this treatment represents a commitment of certain 
philosophers to analyze metaphysical building relations as synchronic relations 
between certain entities. Such a commitment, I will argue, is not necessary, and is 
not entailed by the concept of a metaphysical building relation. Without assuming 
that metaphysical building relations must be exhaustively SYNCHRONIC, I argue 
that there are fruitful grounds for DIACHRONIC.  
Even though my answer to the skeptical remark above might satisfy some 
readers, one might wonder if it is not a bit odd for a philosopher to investigate 
building relations. As Bennett puts this issue:  
 
“Most people who want to know how an aluminum atom is built out of 
various subatomic particles are asking a question for chemists or physicists. 
Most people, that is, are interested in the sort of building questions that are 
addressed by scientists, do-it-yourself manuals, and cookbooks.” 
(Forthcoming, p. 6) 
 
There is obviously nothing wrong with this mode of inquiry. One should indeed 
consult an engineer if one wishes to know how an airplane or a train or an engine is 
built or put together. However, this is not the kind of project that I (nor Bennett) 
wish to undertake by using the concept “building” with respect to metaphysical 
relations of determination. With regards to metaphysical building relations, the term 
“building” is intended to capture something general and abstract about the nature of 
building relations across an unrestricted set of different phenomena or of the same 
phenomenon. Among the categories that we will come across, there are 
metaphysical categories such as process, entity, time, cause, part, etc. Thus, a 
metaphysical statement is not intended to be a statement about everything but rather 
such a statement will often track one or several metaphysical categories and attempt 
to say something quite general and abstract about those categories. For instance, is 
the relationship between cognition and its physical substrate one of supervenience, 
realization, composition, emergence, etc.? That is the kind of question that I wish to 
address in the context of EC.  
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Am I the only philosopher investigating DIACHRONIC? To my knowledge, 
Bennett (2011; forthcoming) is the first philosopher to explicitly plump for 
diachronic metaphysical building relations. However, Bennett’s aim in her 
forthcoming book is to establish the claim that causation is a metaphysical building 
relation and therefore must be included into the family of building relations. 
Because my aim includes establishing that composition and constitution as well as 
emergence are (a) all metaphysical building relations, and (b) can be reformulated 
in terms of DIACHRONIC, I take this project in a different direction than Bennett 
does. There are philosophers that advance diachronic species of emergence (see 
e.g., Campbell & Bickhard 2011; O’Connor 2000; Silberstein 2012). Where I depart 
from these authors is not in terms of my support of diachronic modes of emergence 
but rather in my deployment of diachronic emergence.  
I will have much more to say about these issues in the rest of the thesis. I now 
turn to look at some of the background literature across distributed and extended 
cognition as well as neighboring accounts of cognition in order to position the thesis 
within this broader literature. 
 
1.2. Background literature  
 
As the reader will be aware by now, one part of the thesis concerns EC, the central 
tenet of which is that at least some instances of cognition arise from the productive 
collision points between neural and extra-neural resources. Yet there are different 
versions, articulating different methodologies and research interests in EC as well as 
neighboring accounts of cognition such as distributed cognition, dynamical systems 
approaches to cognition, and enactivism. To get a fix on where in this landscape the 
current treatment positions itself, let us take a rough-and-ready stroll through some 
of the defining aims and features of extended and distributed as well as dynamical 
and enactive cognitive frameworks.   
 
1.2.1. Distributed cognition  
 
The cognitive anthropologist Hutchins and his colleagues at the University of 
California, San Diego, have been – along with several central historical precursors 
such as the Soviet developmental psychologist Vygotsky (1978) – the primary 
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forces behind the development of “distributed cognition” (DC) both as a theoretical 
approach and as an ethnographic methodology by which to study cognition outside 
the controlled set-up conditions of laboratory experiments.  
In their agenda-setting paper, Hollan, Hutchins & Kirsh (2000) state that DC, 
just like any other theory of cognition, seeks to understand the organization of 
cognitive systems. Furthermore, DC, Hollan et al. mention, may be defined in 
accordance with the following two principles. The first principle concerns the 
boundaries of the unit of analysis for cognition. In DC, the unit of analysis pertains 
to the system or species of interaction that must be analyzed so as to achieve an 
adequate understanding of how individuals or groups of individuals cognize and 
behave. Sometimes these boundaries will be set by the boundaries of the individual 
organism, and other times the unit of analysis might include members of a social 
group, interactions between individuals and socially embedded as well as culturally 
mediated technologies, or may need to include elements distributed through time 
such that products of earlier events can be understood as transforming the character 
of later events (2000, p. 176). That is, the DC research program “looks for cognitive 
processes, wherever they may occur, on the basis of the functional relationships of 
elements that participate together in the process.” (2000, p. 175) In his (1995) 
entitled “Cognition in the Wild”, Hutchins published a striking exposition of DC, 
bringing DC’s unit of analysis to encompass social interactions, human-computer 
interactions, propagation of information over various media, onboard a US Navy 
frigate.  
The second principle broadens what has been the most influential view of 
cognition in the second half of the 20th century, namely the view that cognition is 
the process of manipulating symbols taking place inside the brains of individuals to 
include “a broader class of cognitive events and does not expect all such events to 
be encompassed by the skin and skull of an individual” (Hollan et al. 2000, p. 176). 
Consequently, from the perspective of DC, the members of a navigation team 
together with their tools and particular social organization make up a cognitive 
system that enables that system to accomplish such higher-level cognitive tasks as 
navigating a frigate safely into harbor (Hutchins 1995).  
Despite its innovative widening of the unit of analysis in cognitive science, it is 
important to mention that while DC departs from traditional cognitive science in 
substantial ways, DC retains the computational model of the mind of traditional 
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cognitive science. That is, and according to Hutchins, computation is “realized 
through the creation, transformation, and propagation of representational states.” 
(1995, p. 49), and this definition can be applied to what happens both inside and 
outside the heads of individuals (Hutchins 1995, pp. 154-55). Consequently, DC, as 
a research program, takes systems larger than an individual to be a computational 
system, and argues that cognitive science should take, when appropriate, such larger 
systems as its unit of analysis.  
 
1.2.2. Extended cognition  
 
The DC framework was brought sharply to the attention of philosophers of mind 
and cognitive science when Clark adopted it as a central theoretical tool and ally in 
his quest to develop a rich combination and synthesis of this new species of anti-
individualist movement across the cognitive sciences, resulting in Clark’s 
publication of Being There in (1997) and the influential article co-written with 
Chalmers, “The Extended Mind” (1998).  
The EC research program contains more than just one style of theorizing. There 
are different versions of EC with different methodologies and research interests. 
Sutton (2010) and Menary (2010, 2010a) have done much to make several of these 
important differences come to light. In the current landscape, the consensus seems 
to be that there are at least two articulated waves or versions of EC theorizing. 
Sutton (2010) calls these first-wave EC and second-wave EC, respectively, whereas 
Menary (2010a) distinguishes between what he calls extended-mind-style 
arguments, on the one hand, and cognitive-integration-style arguments, on the 
other. Since both Sutton and Menary intend roughly the same thing with these 
different terms, I stick with the distinction between first- and second-wave EC here.  
First-wave EC is based on what is known as the parity principle (PP) and 
functionalism (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Wheeler 2010). The PP is the following 
statement: “If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part 
of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the 
cognitive process.” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 8; italics in original) The PP, as 
Clark stresses is a plea “for equality of opportunity” (Clark 2011, p. 451) between 
inner and outer processes and/or states. If the functional analogues of certain 
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external states and/or processes were internally located, and if we would accept that 
these internally located states and/or processes were cognitive, then disqualifying 
the outer processes and/or states from being cognitive would be “philosophically 
unmotivated […]”. (Clark 2011, p. 450) In support of the PP, Clark and Chalmers 
developed (amongst other cases) the example of the neurobiologically impaired 
Otto and his notebook. Briefly, Otto suffers from a mild form of Alzheimer’s 
disease. Over time, Otto has written down useful information in his notebook in an 
apparently similar way to storing information in biological memory. According to 
Clark and Chalmers, because the dispositional information in Otto’s notebook is 
functionally poised to guide action in a way that is functionally similar to non-
occurrent beliefs in biological memory, the information in Otto’s notebook should 
be considered as cognitive belief-like states. Although the PP has been interpreted 
as a principle of demarcation (see e.g., Adams & Aizawa 2008; Rupert 2009), Clark 
& Chalmers intended the PP to play the role of a methodological heuristic meant to 
bracket “biochauvinistic prejudice” (Clark 2008, p. 77).   
Second-wave EC is based on a principle of complementary (Sutton 2010) and 
cognitive integration (Menary 2007), and is critical of arguments for EC based on 
the PP. Generally second-wave EC is EC in its integrationist, historical, and 
cognition-in-the-wild mode. Even so, second-wave EC is best understood not as a 
substantial doctrinal departure from first-wave EC; but rather, as a refinement and 
attunement to a more empirically and enactive-dynamical oriented approach to EC 
(Menary 2009). However, even if the two waves are compatible, they are also 
distinct, in the sense that most proponents of second-wave EC argue that the PP is 
either wrong or incomplete as a motivation for EC (Kirchhoff 2013b; Menary 
2010b; Sutton 2010). Within second-wave EC, there are two approaches with 
slightly different views or inflections: the first starts from a principle of 
complementarity (Sutton 2010), whereas the second focuses on integration and 
manipulation (Menary 2007).  
Sutton builds his case for complementarity by arguing, among other things, that 
the PP “does not encourage attention to the distinct features of the components in 
particular cognitive systems […],” and because of this “downplays—or even 
collapses—differences between inner and outer resources […].” (2010, p. 198)  As 
a result, the PP fails to capture the dissimilarities between “inner” and “outer” parts 
and how they complement and “operate together in driving more-or-less intelligent 
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thought and action.” (Sutton et al. 2010, p. 525) Against functional similarity, 
complementarity-driven EC both predicts and requires such disparate but 
complementary processes between the brain’s unique mode of processing and socio-
culturally engineered and mediated environments.  
For Menary, complementary is also an important aspect of cognitive integration 
(2006, p. 330). Sharing Sutton’s critical stance towards the PP, Menary builds his 
case for second-wave EC on the manipulation thesis: “The manipulation thesis as a 
constituent thesis of cognitive integration is first understood to be an embodied 
engagement with the world, […]. Secondly it is not simply a causal relation, bodily 
manipulations are also normative—they are embodied practices developed through 
habit and training and governed by cognitive norms.” (2007, p. 84) Important for 
Menary’s version of second-wave EC is that some cognitive processes are (partly) 
made up of – constituted or composed by – an individual’s bodily manipulation of 
“external” structures, with these manipulations embedded in the wider social, 
semantic, and normative cognitive niche  (2010c, p. 611). An important focus of 
Menary-style EC is the idea of cognitive transformation. In particular, Menary 
thinks that the PP fails to explain how bodily manipulations alter the informational 
and physical structure of the cognitive niche, thereby transforming human cognitive 
capacities. Also, according to Menary, nothing in the PP tells us about just how 
such manipulations result in the transformation of body schemas (Gallagher 2005) 
required for manipulation of environmental resources, in the transformation of 
representational and other cognitive capacities (2010b, p. 561; see also Kirchhoff 
2012).  
 
1.2.3. Problems leveled at first-wave EC: Parity, the Martian intuition, and the 
grain problem 
 
First-wave EC has been heavily attacked both by defenders of EC and by its critics. 
My treatment of first-wave EC would be incomplete without an exposition of at 
least some of these critical arguments. I start by exposing Wheeler’s argument for 
first-wave EC. This argument turns on the PP and it is intended to show that EC is 
possible:  
 
! 27 
1. “If psychological phenomena are constituted by their causal-functional role, 
then our terms for mental states, mental processes, and so on pick out 
equivalence classes of different material substrates, any one of which might in 
principle realize the type-identified state or process in question.” (Wheeler 
2010, p. 248) 
2. “If there is functional equality with respect to governing behavior, between the 
causal contribution of certain internal elements and the causal contribution of 
certain external elements, and if the internal elements concerned qualify as the 
proper parts of a cognitive trait, then there is no good reason to deny equivalent 
status - that is, cognitive status - to the relevant external elements.” (Wheeler 
2010, p. 248).  
3. If parity of causal contribution mandates parity of status, and if mental states 
and processes are multiply realizable, then “it is possible for the very same type-
identified cognitive state or process to be available in two different generic 
formats - one non-extended and one extended.” (Wheeler 2010, p. 248) 
4. Therefore: Cognitive processes and states are realizable (partly, at least) by 
external states and processes (Wheeler 2010, p. 249).   
 
Why disagree with this? After all, if, and whenever, two type-identified states (or 
processes) play the same causal-functional role, it is (in principle) irrelevant 
whether neural or non-neural elements realize that role.  
The first reason for being skeptical about parity-driven arguments for EC, we 
are familiar with, namely that the requirements of parity downplay – or even 
collapse – some important differences between internal and external elements 
(Sutton 2010, p. 199). According to Haugeland: “Such arguments are indifferent to 
variety and substructure within either the mental or the physical: everything is 
unceremoniously lumped together at one swoop.” (1998, p. 228) Thus, the first 
problem with PP arguments is that they pay insufficient attention to differences 
between inner and outer resources.  
Another influential critique of first-wave EC is the Martian Intuition argument 
raised by Sprevak (2009). This argument turns on the fact that first-wave EC is 
based on functionalism. Sprevak starts by acknowledging that functionalism was 
engineered, in part, so as to save the Martian Intuition: that it should be possible for 
creatures with cognitive processes to exist even if such creatures have a different 
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physical and biological makeup from human beings (Block 1980). According to 
Sprevak, if defenders of EC employ functionalism to ground EC, then the defender 
of EC faces the following dilemma: (a) accept functionalism and radical EC; or, (b) 
give up EC entirely (2009, p. 503). Sprevak thinks that if one accepts functionalism 
(which grounds the PP), then it entails a commitment to a wildly implausible or too 
radical version of EC, the consequence being: “rampant expansion of the mind into 
the world […].” (2009, p. 503) Here is the form of Sprevak’s argument: (1) 
Functionalism entails the Martian intuition (P); (2) if P, then radical EC (Q); (3) P is 
true; and (4), therefore, Q is true.  
So, if functionalism entails the Martian intuition, and if functional parity is used 
to save or ground the metaphysical claim of EC, it follows that the defenders of 
parity-based EC must be committed to a radically implausible view of cognition, 
where the following scenario holds: simply by picking up a book, one comes to 
believe all the information contained in that book. The justification for this claim is: 
(a) a Martian might “internally” encode memories in ink-marks; (b) in addition to 
gaining its beliefs via sense modalities such a Martian might equally be born with 
innate beliefs; (c) moreover, it is possible that the Martian might have such innate 
beliefs that it has not yet examined, viz., that the Martian has a library of data 
phylogenetically hardwired into its cognitive system; and (d) finally, it is possible to 
imagine that this Martian has such a stock of innate beliefs stored in an ink-based 
memory system, most of which it has not yet had any reason (or cause) to employ. 
Sprevak’s point is that it is quite plausible to think that such a creature could exist. 
As Sprevak says, the: 
 
“Martian has ink-marks inside its head that, if it were sufficiently diligent, 
would guide its action in appropriate ways. The difference between the 
Martian and me is that it has the ink-marks inside its head, while I have the 
ink-marks outside. By the fair-treatment principle [the PP], if the Martian has 
beliefs, then so do I.” (2009, p. 518) 
 
Even if Sprevak is correct in his assessment, matters are more complicated. Within 
first-wave EC, Wheeler, in order to circumvent Sprevak’s conclusion, has suggested 
the following move. One should attempt to go in between the horns of the dilemma 
by arguing that the relevant level of grain by which we individuate functional roles 
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should be set neither too high (so as not to entail radical EC) nor too low (so as to 
block the critics’ difference-argument)10. But, according to Rowlands, attempting to 
establish the relevant level of granularity with respect to functional roles leads to an 
impasse. That is, a deadlock, the ramifications of which will have paralyzing effects 
on functionalist arguments, pro and con, for EC. As Rowlands states:  
 
“If Rupert’s arguments against the extended mind are question-begging 
because they presuppose a chauvinistic form of functionalism, it is difficult to 
see why arguments for the extended mind are not question-begging given 
their predication on a liberal form of functionalism.” (Rowlands, unpublished 
ms, pp. 6-7; quoted in Wheeler 2010, p. 255; see also Rowlands 2010, pp. 
209-10)  
 
In what we might call Rupert-style anti-EC (2004, 2009), the most common way of 
criticizing the PP consists in noting a set of psychological properties found in 
human neural-cognitive systems but not socio-cultural systems, and then inferring 
that there is no parity at the level of fine-grained functional operations between 
“inner” and “outer”. Hence, inferring the metaphysical claim of EC from parity-
based arguments must be false, on Rupert’s view. The defenders of parity-based EC 
commonly respond to this line of argument by charging the Rupert-style argument 
of advocating a chauvinistic form of functionalism. As Wheeler says: “[…] it seems 
that Rupert’s […] argument continues to beg the question against extended 
functionalism […], extended functionalism looks to be predicated on the more 
liberal form of functionalism that generates a locationally uncommitted account of 
the cognitive.” (2010, p. 225) It is from this problem – the problem of identifying 
the appropriate level of functional grain – that Rowlands concludes that the debate 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The critical “differences argument” (Adams & Aizawa 2001; Rupert 2004, 2009), 
starts with the observation that there is an obvious distinctiveness between the fine-
grained causal-functional profile of “internal” operations and the causal-functional 
profile of “external” operations, and infers from this that because functional parity 
arguments hold that there is functional similarity between “inner” and “outer”, such 
arguments fail to establish the possibility of EC.  
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over constitution by way of functional parity has fallen into an impasse, with both 
sides potentially begging the question against one another.  
With these different criticisms of first-wave EC mentioned, the next couple of 
accounts of cognition on our list are dynamical systems and enactivism.  
 
1.2.4. Dynamical systems & enactive approaches to cognition   
 
The revolt against traditional scientific cognitive methodologies and theoretical 
assumptions – the view that cognition is computation over symbolic representations 
instantiated in the brain – finds its most radical articulation in approaches to 
cognition inspired by insights from dynamical systems theory (see e.g., Chemero 
2000, 2009; Chemero & Silberstein 2008a, 2008b; Keijzer 2001; Port & van Gelder 
1995; van Gelder 1995, 1998) and in the enactivist framework (see e.g., Di Paolo 
2009; Hutto & Myin 2013). I am aware that there are differences both within each 
camp as well as between the two approaches. But for my purposes here, the fact that 
there are significant overlap in methodology and theoretical assumptions is good 
enough. For instance, most enactivists use dynamical systems theory to explain their 
experimental results, from neuroscience (Di Paolo et al 2008; Froese & Di Paolo 
2010), social modes of cognition (Di Paolo & De Jaegher 2012; De Jaegher & Di 
Paolo 2013), to debates about the life-mind continuity thesis (Thompson 2007). 
Thus, for simplicity, I restrict my exposition to dynamical-systems-theoretic 
accounts of cognition. Consider the following quote by van Gelder & Port:  
 
“The heart of the problem is time. Cognitive processes and their context 
unfold continuously and simultaneously in real time. Computational models 
specify a discrete sequence of static internal states in arbitrary “step” time (t1, 
t2, etc.). Imposing the latter onto the former is like wearing shoes on your 
hands. You can do it, but gloves fit a whole lot better.” (1995, p. 2; italics in 
original)  
 
From this observation – that temporal unfolding in a dynamical context is inherently 
part of the nature of cognitive processes and modes of processing – the dynamical 
systems theorist typically infers the following claim: that conceiving of cognitive 
processing as a form of computational processing ignores real time. The claim that 
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the phenomenon “computation” ignores real time is meant to show that 
understanding cognitive processing as computational inherently ignores the fact that 
dynamical systems – which the dynamicists take cognitive systems to be – are 
quantitatively embedded in time. As Smithers points out: “If we change this 
embedding by slowing down all the movements and actions, or by speeding 
everything up, we change the behavior, and it will no longer be of much use. 
Intelligent behavior thus has an important and essential underlying dynamic […].” 
(1998, p. 652) In contrast to dynamical systems, the claim is that computation 
downplays the role of temporal unfolding. That is, as Smithers states: “Changing 
the rate at which the computation is done makes no difference; it remains the same 
computation.” (1998, p. 652; see also van Gelder 1998, p. 618) If this is correct, as 
the defenders of the dynamical approach to cognition insist it is (see also Chemero 
2009; Spivey 2007), and if cognitive systems are dynamical systems, then the 
dynamicist infers the radical conclusion that the computational theory of mind must 
go.  
That concludes my rough-and-ready survey of views in philosophy and 
cognitive science, aiming to explain how cognition is multiply distributed. Of 
course, the data and theoretical arguments that may be said to impress these 
theorists go well beyond what is surveyed in the previous sections. However, it will 
be enough to allow me to situate the main aims and contributions of the thesis 
within the current literature.  
 
1.3. Positioning the thesis in the literature 
 
This thesis has two distinct (but complementary) aims. The first is to radicalize the 
metaphysics of EC. The second is to develop DIACHRONIC. I will first say 
something about how these two aims relate.  
 
1.3.1. How my two aims relate 
 
It is entirely reasonable to accept DIACHRONIC, but still reject EC. However, I 
submit, if one wants to defend EC on metaphysical grounds, it is not possible to 
reject DIACHRONIC.  
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First, much of the urge towards EC derives from considerations about “densely 
coupled unfolding” (Clark 2005b, p. 234) in stables of dynamical and embodied 
cognitive science. Because EC is often based on considerations about dynamical 
systems, it would seem that EC must equally take seriously the idea that cognitive 
processes and their context unfold continuously in real time, and that time cannot be 
reduced to a set of discrete quanta such as t1, t2, t3, etc. And indeed they do. For 
instance, in Clark’s (1998b) article “Time and Mind,” Clark agrees with van Gelder 
and Port that cognitive processes are continuous processes. Clark gives this 
explanation of what a continuous process is: “A continuous process is one in which 
the time-series of explanatorily relevant sub-states cannot be reduced to a sequence 
of discrete states with jumps in between, but instead requires a genuine continuum 
of states.” (1998b, p. 357) Or, as Wheeler states, when he says that Turing machine 
computation is temporally impoverished: “the system features a style of processing 
in which time is reduced to mere sequence.” (2005, p. 105) 
Here is the culprit: If distributed cognitive processes, and the dynamical 
systems instantiating distributed cognitive processes, unfold continuously in time, 
then the relationship between a distributed cognitive process, say, and the densely 
coupled parts giving rise to that distributed cognitive process, can never hold 
completely at a specific synchronic time instant t but must hold diachronically. In 
other words, because the standard view of metaphysical building relations reduces 
time to discrete quanta (SYNCHRONIC), and because dynamically distributed 
processes are time continuous, SYNCHRONIC is inconsistent with distributed 
cognitive processes.  
Another core feature of my critique of the received, synchronic view is that the 
sort of entities presupposed as the relata of synchronic building relations are 
enduring entities which are wholly present whenever they exist. But, insofar as 
processes in general and cognitive processes in particular cannot be wholly present 
at a specific synchronic time instant, it follows that such processes cannot be 
understood as enduring entities. Thus, to adequately ground its own metaphysical 
foundation, EC must go DIACHRONIC. DIACHRONIC requires that we rethink 
the metaphysics of building relations and the metaphysical underpinnings of EC.  
One can, as I mentioned, plump for my diachronic account without taking EC 
onboard. This is why this thesis ultimately appeals to wider issues than merely those 
in EC. For example, both constitution and composition are commonly expressed in 
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terms of SYNCHRONIC. A paradigmatic case is the relationship between David 
and Piece. However, insofar as either the constitution relation or the composition 
relation (or, both) may hold in dynamical systems – regardless of those systems 
being cognitive – SYNCHRONIC is ill equipped to analyze the relevant relation of 
dependence between the whole and its parts. Because DIACHRONIC is both a 
general framework and applicable to the subject matter of EC, and because 
distributed cognitive processes are instantiated in distributed dynamical systems, 
DIACHRONIC, but not SYNCHRONIC, provides an adequate set of conceptual 
tools to make sense of dependence relations in dynamical systems. Note, though, 
because DIACHRONIC is intended to be a generic framework, it follows that it is 
possible to accept the view of metaphysical dependence relations put forth in 
DIACHRONIC, yet deny EC (on other grounds). So, there is no entailment relation 
from DIACHRONIC to EC.  
 
1.3.2. How the thesis sits in the literature  
 
I take from the dynamical and enactive approaches the idea that temporal unfolding 
is an ineliminable part of cognitive activity. It is a central tactic of the later chapters 
to establish that insofar as the metaphysics of EC is concerned, downplaying the 
dynamics of time should be avoided. This brings my metaphysical project into 
alignment with core tenets from both dynamical and enactive cognitive science. 
However, I only take from dynamical and enactive cognitive science the idea that 
cognitive systems and cognitive processes are time continuous, together with central 
concepts such as self-organization and nonlinearity11. I am not dispensing with 
computation and representation for the simple reason that I do not think that the 
very notions of computation and representation are “intrinsically” temporally 
austere12. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 My interest here is in physical time, not the psychology of time (or, time 
perception). An intriguing investigation would integrate issues pertaining to time 
perception. Unfortunately I do not have space and time to do this – a task for 
another occasion.  
12 In chapter 6, where I look at the relationship between the realization relation and 
the free energy minimization formulation in cognitive neuroscience, we will come 
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Instead of doubting the concepts of computation and representation, I explore this 
question: If we take seriously the idea that cognitive processes and their contexts 
continuously unfold in real time, why, then, do philosophers of mind and cognitive 
science keep appealing to relations such as supervenience and realization that are 
considered to hold synchronically between their relata? In other words, how can a 
synchronic relation hold between exclusively diachronic (i.e., temporally and 
causally unfolding) processes? I explore, and will argue for, this deep 
incompatibility in chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.  
This brings us to EC. There are independent reasons for being skeptical about 
first-wave EC. That is, issues regarding the PP, the Martian intuition, and the grain 
problem. Although I agree that these are all serious problems for first-wave EC, 
they are not the ones that I wish to emphasize (see Kirchhoff 2013b for discussion 
of these three problems with first-wave EC). My beef is with the failure of 
defenders of first-wave EC to pay sufficient attention to the metaphysical issues that 
their use of such relations as supervenience and realization, for example, involve 
them in.  
What about second-wave EC? The alternative DIACHRONIC framework that I 
develop in the thesis is not dependent on either the complementarity principle 
(Sutton 2010) or cognitive integration (Menary 2007). So, it is not part of my 
project to engage in a discussion about whether or not particular second-wave 
arguments are better than particular first-wave arguments. But, DIACHRONIC, I 
submit, is implicit in non-functionalist accounts of second-wave EC, on the one 
hand, and in dynamical and enactive cognitive science, on the other, even if 
DIACHRONIC views have not been explicitly stated, and even though – as will 
become clear throughout this thesis – these DIACHRONIC views undermine other 
views that are commonly endorsed13. Therefore, I attempt to further the project of 
second-wave EC, albeit I do so by articulating a diachronic metaphysics of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
across notions of both computation and representation, which are entirely 
compatible with richly temporal processes and modes of processing.  
13  For instance, when I discuss the causal-constitutive fallacy, I analyze one 
particular example by Menary (2006) that involves the constitution of a distributed 
process of remembering, and I show that this notion of constitution is wholly 
consistent with a diachronic interpretation.  
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dependence relations that moves beyond the typical ambitions of second-wave EC 
and towards a third-wave version of EC.  
 
1.4. Strategy and methods 
 
In an attempt to radicalize the metaphysical foundation of EC, on the one hand, and 
in providing an alternative DIACHRONIC conception of metaphysical building 
relations, on the other, I use the novel distinction between ontological synchronicity 
(roughly, at a particular time instant t) and ontological diachronicity (roughly, over 
an interval of time). Utilizing this distinction allows me to specify the following: 
metaphysically speaking, the synchronic timescale and the diachronic timescale are 
mutually exclusive such that it cannot be true of one and the same phenomenon – at 
one and the same level of analysis – that the building relation in question is both 
ontologically synchronic and ontologically diachronic. Throughout the thesis, I shall 
make use of this distinction to highlight the limitations of ontological synchronicity 
concerning metaphysical building relations in dynamical systems.  
A note on the use of case studies in relation to DIACHRONIC throughout the 
thesis. As I mentioned, the diachronic framework is a generic framework, one that is 
not restricted to the subject matter of EC, in that, it applies to dynamical systems in 
general, irrespective of these being cognitive systems. Thus, throughout the thesis, I 
shift between considering cognitive systems and non-cognitive systems. But, when I 
do consider cognitive systems or cognitive processes, I pick the particular case 
studies that I do, because I want to emphasize the socio-cultural rather than the 
strictly artifactual dimensions of research in EC, thereby nudging the projects of 
second- and third-wave EC along further (see e.g., Kirchhoff & Newsome 2012; 
Menary 2010b; Sutton 2010).  
 
1.5. Overview of the thesis chapters 
 
The plan of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 is expository. It is my aim to survey 
most of the familiar metaphysical building relations in order to establish that these 
relations are standardly thought to express SYNCHRONIC. In addition to this, I 
provide a survey of the concept of “metaphysical building relation”.  
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In chapter 3, I take a few steps towards DIACHRONIC, before applying this view 
to issues pertinent to EC in the rest of the thesis. I start by establishing, in chapter 3, 
that SYNCHRONIC can be criticized by looking at few examples of dynamical 
systems.  
In chapter 4, I discuss a recent divergence between Clark (2008, 2011) and 
Hutchins (2011a) concerning the timescales over which processes combine to 
jointly assemble instances of extended cognitive processes and/or systems. I argue 
that even though Clark favors the short-term timescales of the here-and-now, 
whereas Hutchins targets slower timescales, both approaches are incompatible with 
SYNCHRONIC.  
In chapter 5, I show that DIACHRONIC – but not SYNCHRONIC – has the 
apparatus required for analyzing cases of socially distributed cognition. I base this 
argument on an analysis of transactive remembering.  
In chapter 6, I address the realization relation. In particular, I test the flat view 
and the dimensioned view (Gillett 2002, 2007a), on the one hand, and the wide view 
(Wilson 2001, 2004a, 2004b), on the other, against the free energy principle in 
cognitive neuroscience (Friston 2010). I do this for three reasons. The first is that 
the free energy principle has recently been argued to be a powerful ally to EC 
(Clark 2013). The second reason is that the free energy principle portrays the mind-
body relationship as one of free energy minimization, and the most prominent 
application of the realization relation has been to address the mind-body problem. 
As a first approximation, this suggests that the realization relation and free energy 
minimization can be brought together. My final reason is that in various writings, 
Wilson (2001, 2004a, 2004b) has argued that if the relation of realization is 
metaphysically wide, the realization relation may be used to ground the metaphysics 
of EC. By extension, then, if EC is consistent with the free energy principle, and if 
the metaphysics of EC is consistent with wide realization, then the free energy 
principle is consistent with wide realization.  
Research at the interface between philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive 
science, on the one hand, and philosophy of science and metaphysics, on the other, 
is filled with claims about emergence. It is no different in EC. Hence, in chapter 7, 
my goal is to begin to develop an ontological diachronic notion of emergence (see 
e.g., Campbell & Bickhard 2011; Kirchhoff 2013c; Mitchell 2012; Silberstein & 
McGeever 1999), which leads to the view that the synchronic account of 
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supervenience emergentism is problematic. Having argued that the SYNCHRONIC 
view of supervenience emergentism is problematic, I move on to pursue my second 
aim, namely to explore an implication of my argument against supervenience 
emergentism for EC. The upshot will be the suggestion that EC should avoid 
supervenience talk unconditionally.  
In the final chapter, I consider what we might call a classic in the EC literature. 
I launch a critical argument against the alleged causal-constitutive fallacy leveled 
against EC. Fortunately for us, all the hard work of establishing DIACHRONIC 
now pays for itself. That is, I shall argue that the critics of EC – such as Adams & 
Aizawa – are wrong to charge EC with the universally construed causal-constitutive 
fallacy, since Adams & Aizawa are working with a notion of SYNCHRONIC 
constitution that is inconsistent with common cases of EC. Thus, paying closer 
attention to the metaphysical concepts we apply may provide us with all the tools 
we need to successfully deal with our critics.  
 
1.6. Overview of the thesis’s conclusions 
 
This chapter has previewed the thesis’ overarching themes and clarified its goals 
and methods. I wish to finish this introduction by clarifying some of the thesis’ 
main conclusions. Consider, first, figure 2, which lists five different 
SYNCHRONIC building relations:  
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Overview of five different synchronic building relations 
 
Based on issues such as decentralization, self-organization, nonlinearity, context-
dependence, relational properties, dynamical systems, and processes, I argue 
SYNCHRONIC 
building relations 
(Material) 
constitution Composition Realization Supervenience 
Supervenience 
emergentism 
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(chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) that the metaphysical foundation of EC can be grounded 
by appeal to constitution, composition, and emergence only if none of these 
building relations are understood in the terms of SYNCHRONIC. Thus, in those 
chapters, I defend and reformulate the following three building relations in terms of 
DIACHRONIC (figure 3): 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Overview of three different diachronic building relations 
 
I problematize both realization and supervenience as these are currently construed 
as candidates for the project of underpinning EC’s metaphysical foundation. That is, 
I argue, in chapters 6 and 7, that realization and supervenience carry with them 
baggage that should not be accepted by the EC theorists – e.g., appeals to 
ontological synchronicity and intrinsic properties. Given the current state of 
evidence from dynamical systems, I suggest that we should abandon both of these 
features from our metaphysics – at least when addressing systems and/or processes 
grounded in self-organizing, nonlinear, temporal and decentralized dynamics. Thus, 
I arrive at the conclusion that insofar as the metaphysical foundation of EC is 
concerned such an endeavor must go completely DIACHRONIC. In addition, 
related to my second aim of the thesis, I conclude that plumping for DIACHRONIC 
allows research in metaphysics to engage with cases of metaphysical building 
relations far more dynamic and complex than many of the atemporal examples 
commonly used in the metaphysical literature. !!!!!
DIACHRONIC 
building relations 
Diachronic 
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Diachronic 
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2. Metaphysical building relations: A survey of synchronic 
relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter will be mostly expository. I will focus on surveying metaphysical 
building relations that express what I labeled the SYNCHRONIC account in the 
introduction. Together with introducing a general framework for thinking about the 
term “metaphysical building relation,” what I hope to show here is that the standard 
view of metaphysical building relations presuppose SYNCHRONIC.  
Let us start with the observation that one theme that occupies a large space 
throughout philosophy is what I, following Bennett (2011), call metaphysical 
building relations. A read through such fields as metaphysics, philosophy of 
cognitive science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, etc., reveals much 
talk of something’s being built up from, giving rise to, getting out of, determining, 
putting together, assembling, etc. For example, in the philosophy of mind, one finds 
questions about how mental properties are instantiated by or dependent on non-
mental, physical properties. In metaphysics, one question that is sometimes asked is 
how nonmodal properties give rise to modal properties. In philosophy of science, 
where talk of levels is commonplace, one often finds questions pertaining to how 
macro-level properties are constructed from micro-level properties. In ethics, some 
philosophers have been occupied with the question of how moral properties get out 
of non-moral properties. And so on.  
Metaphysical building relations are the relations that philosophers commonly 
use to come up with answers to questions such as those mentioned above by 
invoking relations such as supervenience, realization, emergence, constitution, 
composition, and others.  
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2.1. Aim and overview  
 
In the philosophy of extended cognition, the area of research that will occupy me in 
the thesis, the core metaphysical building question is: How are cognitive processes 
or systems built up from physical processes or systems crisscrossing such 
heterogeneous elements as the brain, body, and environment? Or, under what 
circumstances are certain cognitive processes or systems grounded metaphysically 
in elements distributed across brain, body, and world? As one of the leading 
exponents of EC says: “Thus if the extended [cognition] thesis is true, it is true in 
virtue of something implementationally deep about cognition.” (Wilson 2010, p. 
171; italics added)  
Often this metaphysical question is phrased in terms of constitution in the EC 
literature. Relations such as constitution fall under what I, following Bennett 
(2011), call a metaphysical building relation. In discussing the metaphysical 
underpinnings of EC, I keep in use the notion of a metaphysical building relation for 
the reason that it is not only the constitution relation that is invoked by defenders of 
EC but also a variety of other metaphysical relations such as supervenience, 
composition, realization, and emergence.  
The overarching aim of this chapter is expository. I wish to survey five 
different but very familiar metaphysical building relations, all standardly 
understood to express SYNCHRONIC. I will begin by characterizing the central 
features of the concept “metaphysical building relation”. Then I survey five 
different building relations in section 2.3.  
 
2.2. Metaphysical building relations 
 
A useful starting point in an analysis of what characterizes a metaphysical building 
relation is the idea that for R to qualify as a metaphysical building relation, R must 
express the form ‘X (or the Xs) metaphysically determines Y’, when it is in virtue 
of X (or the Xs) that Y exists. This in virtue-ness is often specified as a species of 
determination (see e.g., Kim 1990; Polger 2010; Shapiro 2004). That is, if X (or the 
Xs) builds Y, metaphysically, then X (or the Xs) determines the existence of Y. 
Different relations – such as constitution, composition, realization, supervenience, 
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emergence, and others – have been used in philosophy to express the view that 
something exists in virtue of something else (Bennett 2011; Kim 1998).  
From the “standard view,” as I call it, of a metaphysical building relation, it is 
commonplace to say of this kind of determination that it, at least, holds irreflexively 
(i.e., if X (or the Xs) determines the existence of Y, then neither X (or the Xs) nor Y 
determines the existence of themselves) and asymmetrically (i.e., if X (or the Xs) 
determines the existence of Y, Y does not determine X (or the Xs) on the occasions 
when a relation holding counts as building). Following Bennett, we can highlight 
two things about the fact that metaphysical building relations hold asymmetrically 
and irreflexively. First, building relations are relations of relative fundamentality 
(RF). Formally: “(RF) for all x and y, and all building relations B, if xBy then x is 
more fundamental than y.” (Bennett, forthcoming, p. 27) If X (or the Xs) composes 
Y, or if Y is emergent from X (or the Xs), in both cases Y is in some sense less 
fundamental than its base, X (or the Xs)14.  
That building relations have this implication is not surprising. It is precisely the 
implication expressed by philosophers who use relations such as supervenience, 
realization, constitution, and so on, to state that Y exists in virtue of X (or the Xs)15. 
The second thing is that “building relations have an input-output structure; they take 
some relatum(a) and generate another.” (Bennett 2011, p. 91) That is, if xBy, then B !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Depending on which sense of “emergence” one is using, it is possible to claim 
that emergence is both a relation that expresses that emergent properties are less 
fundamental than their base and that emergence is not a relation of relative 
fundamentality. There is nothing (in principle) problematic about this so long as the 
sets of claims – pertaining to the different senses of emergence – do not entail a 
contradiction. For a view of emergence that would seem to exclude emergence from 
being a relation of relative fundamentality see Chalmers (2006; see also Bennett, 
forthcoming, p. 27). I deal extensively with emergence in chapter 7.  
15 As Kim, for example, states in his discussion of supervenience, it is customary to 
associate supervenience with the idea of dependence such that “if [y] depends on, or 
is determined by [x], it cannot be that [x] in turn depends on or is determined by [y]. 
What does the determining must be taken to be, in some sense, ontological prior to, 
or more basic than, what gets determined by it.” (1998, location 247/2719; Kindle 
Version)  
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takes as its ‘input’ x and as its ‘output’ y, and insofar as B expresses a relation of 
RF, it follows that the ‘input’ of B is in some sense more fundamental than its 
‘output’.  
From this Bennett gives the following, minimal, requirement that any relation, 
for it to qualify as a metaphysical building relation, must imply: “[A] relation is a 
building relation if and only if:  
 
• it is asymmetric and irreflexive,  
• the ‘input’ relatum(a) is both more fundamental than the ‘output’, and  
• Either: 
the input is minimally sufficient in the circumstances for the output, or  
the existence, instantiation, or occurrence of the output counterfactually 
depends on that of the input.” (Forthcoming, p. 32)16  
 
Metaphysical building relations are often contrasted with the relation of identity. 
Identity relations are reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive (Wilson 2009, p. 363). 
What about transitivity? In his discussion of material constitution, Wilson says that 
in metaphysics, “the view that material constitution is transitive is ubiquitous, an 
assumption expressed by both proponents and critics of constitution views.” (2009, 
p. 363) Transitivity entails, if X (or the Xs) constitutes Y, and if X (or the Xs) is 
constituted by Z (or the Zs), then Y is constituted by Z (or the Zs). To be sure, then, 
there are philosophers who argue that insofar as the relation between X (or the Xs) 
and Y is one of relative fundamentality, then the relation between X (or the Xs) and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Let me quickly deflect a potential misunderstanding concerning emergence. Even 
though dynamical systems are commonly said to exhibit emergent phenomena, and 
even though many dynamical systems exhibit both top-down and bottom-up 
mediated effects (Kelso 1995), this particular “symmetrical relation” between 
higher and lower levels does not contravene the idea that emergence is asymmetric. 
If Y is emergent from the Xs, the existence of Y is determined by the Xs. However, 
there is nothing problematic about the idea that Y may affect the functioning of the 
Xs so long as we do not confuse the two kinds of relations. I deal with this issue in 
chapter 7.  
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Y is transitive. But there is no entailment relation between relative fundamentality 
and transitivity. Consider, e.g., the following statement by Bennett:  
 
“Suppose that, for some building relation B, aBb, bBc, but there is no B such 
that aBc. (RF) entails that a is more fundamental that b, and b is more 
fundamental than c. The transitivity of more fundamental than entails that a is 
also more fundamental than c. But that does not conflict with the assumption 
that a does not build c: it simply has to be the case that one thing can be more 
fundamental than another despite not standing in a building relation to it. This 
is clearly true. Intuitively, sodium ions are more fundamental than benzene 
rings, but benzene rings are not even partly built out of sodium ions – sodium 
is simply not involved.” (Forthcoming, pp. 28-29) 
 
Another way to express the idea that there is no entailment relation between the 
notion of a metaphysical building relation and transitivity is due to Wilson (2009). 
For instance, consider these two arguments:  
 
1.A . This chain is constituted by metal links. 
1.B . Those metal links are constituted by physical particles. 
1.C . This chain is constituted by physical particles. 
 
In this case, the premises (1.A) and (1.B), together with the criterion of transitivity, 
entail (1.C). What about the following argument?  
 
2.A . This queue is constituted by a sequential order of people.  
2.B . That sequential order of people is constituted by physical particles.  
2.C. This queue is constituted by physical particles.  
 
Argument 2A-2C has the same form as 1A-1C. However, even if both arguments 
rely on the principle of transitivity, unlike 1A-1C, 2A-2C is controversial, in that, it 
is not clear that 2A-2C can accommodate transitivity. Specifically, unlike a metal 
chain, which one might think of as nothing more than various entities appropriately 
organized, queues are more than simply their physical parts – regardless of how 
these might be arranged. Hence, while it is entirely unproblematic to say of 
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argument 1A-1C that it is transitive, the same is not true of argument 2A-2C (for a 
detailed discussion, see chapter 8). Consequently, I refrain from adding the formal 
property of transitivity as a necessary condition for a relation to count as a 
metaphysical building relation, since even though metaphysical building relations 
are relations of relative fundamentality, it does not follow that all instances of 
building relations are transitive.  
From these minimal requirements, one further condition is standardly added for 
a relation to count as a metaphysical building relation, namely that it must hold 
synchronically. For instance, in his (2004) and (2011), Shapiro says this about the 
relations of realization and constitution, respectively:  
 
“As I have already mentioned in passing, realization is intended as a 
synchronic relation between the realized kind and its realizer.” (2004, p. 36; 
italics added)  
 
“[If] C is a constituent of an event or process P, C exists where and when that 
event or process exists. Thus, for some process P, if C takes place prior to P’s 
occurrence […], or if C takes place apart from P’s occurrence […], then C is 
not a constituent of P.” (2011, p. 160)  
 
This added necessary condition of synchronicity is typically made by invoking a 
distinction between relations that hold synchronically and those that hold 
diachronically, thus demarcating diachronic relations from the family of 
metaphysical building relations. Note that this distinction is usually drawn in order 
to separate causation from counting as a metaphysical building relation. Here 
Shapiro is explicit once again: “Thus, the synchronic nature of realization serves to 
distinguish it from causation […].” (2004, p. 36). Or, as Bennett points out: 
“Causation, in contrast, is paradigmatically diachronic, and that idea is frequently 
invoked to distinguish causation from relations like composition, constitution, or 
supervenience […].” (2011, pp. 93-94; italics in original)17  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Bennett does not endorse this way of distinguishing between metaphysical 
building relations and diachronic relations. In fact, she immediately rejects this, as 
she says: “Yet although this is a tempting solution to the problem, occasionally 
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Philosophers accepting the condition that only relations that hold synchronically 
may count as metaphysical building relations often find it natural to say that 
metaphysical building relations are noncausal relations of determination18. For 
instance, in his discussion of realization, Polger emphasizes:  
 
“Whether in the restricted or unrestricted form, the thesis is meant to be 
ontological: one entity or set of entities ontologically depends on another. The 
dependence is non-causal […].” (2010, p. 195; italics added)  
 
That a metaphysical building relation is standardly conceived of as synchronically 
determining (and non-causally explaining) what it constructs can easily be made 
sense of with the following two examples: (i) the statue in front of me is constituted 
by a piece of marble; and (ii) throwing a bottle on a statue in front of me causes the 
bottle to break.  
The intuition is that only one of these two examples is a case of metaphysical 
building, since only example (i) implies a vertical relation of determination, 
whereas example (ii) implies a horizontal relation of dependence. The horizontal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
temptation is best resisted. This is one of those occasions. We should not require 
that building relations be synchronic, because there is at least one important relation 
that is worth calling a building relation, but that unfolds over time. I explore this 
elsewhere (MSa).” (Bennett 2011, p. 94) As I mentioned in the introduction, 
Bennett’s aim is to establish that causation is a metaphysical building relation. In 
this thesis, my primary goal when addressing the possibility of diachronic 
metaphysical building relations is not to propose that causation is a building relation 
but rather to establish that relations such as constitution, composition and 
emergence are ripe for a diachronic articulation. 
18 Note that in contrast to the relation of causation, insisting on the idea that only 
metaphysical building relations synchronically determine (and thus noncausally 
explain) what they give rise too does not exclude causation from being a relation of 
determination. To be sure, exponents of the idea that metaphysical building 
relations determine higher-level phenomena synchronically, will, all things being 
equal, endorse the view that causation is a diachronic relation of determination such 
that causes diachronically determine their effects.  
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dimension represents time, whereas the vertical dimension represents a synchronic 
relation of relative fundamentality (see e.g., Aizawa & Gillett 2009a). In a nutshell, 
if I throw a bottle at some statue in front of me, a time interval will unfold between 
me throwing the bottle and the bottle breaking, whereas if the statue itself is 
constituted by a piece of marble, the constitution relation between a piece of marble 
and the token statue holds instantaneously (at a durationless point in time). This is 
not only the case for constitution, but is usually taken to be the case for all 
metaphysical building relations (Bennett 2011; Gillett 2007b). Again we can find a 
statement by Shapiro highlighting this distinction:  
 
“A realization is present simultaneously with that which it realizes and cannot 
be separated from it. In contrast, causes and effects are independent events. A 
cause is followed by an effect and, depending on the amount of time between 
the cause and the effect, it is possible to imagine that a cause and its effect 
never exist simultaneously.” (2004, p. 35; italics added)  
 
That concludes my brief sketch of the standard notion of a metaphysical building 
relation. In summary, a metaphysical building relation is (a) a synchronic 
(atemporal) dependence relation; (b) a relation of relative fundamentality; and (c) 
asymmetric, irreflexive, and (usually) transitive. The aim of the next section is to 
survey five familiar building relations, sketch a few differences between them, point 
to how each plays its distinctive building role, and show that they all hold 
synchronically.  
 
2.3. A survey of SYNCHRONIC building relations 
 
Due to the large literature on relations like supervenience (see e.g., Horgan (1993)), 
and other building relations, I consider here, including all their ins and outs is not a 
feasible option. Instead my aim is to say just enough about each building relation to 
introduce these relations and explain how they differ from one another. For an 
overview of SYNCHRONIC building relations, see figure 2 (chapter 1). I begin this 
survey with the relation of material constitution.  
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2.3.1. Material constitution19 
 
Michelangelo’s David is constituted by a particular piece of marble, Piece. These 
metal links constitute this token metal chain. Or, this particular Danish national flag 
is constituted by a piece of fabric. These are familiar examples of what is called the 
material constitution view in metaphysics.  
Material constitution is standardly taken to be a synchronic one-one relation of 
determination that holds between spatially and materially co-located objects of 
different kind. In the literature, there is still some debate concerning the claim that 
constitution holds between two distinct objects that exists at the same time and in 
the same place (see e.g., Wasserman 2009). Despite disagreement about just how 
objects can exist at the same time and in the same place, but still differ with regards 
to their modal properties, the constitution view is popular, and has been defended by 
Baker (1997, 2000), Chappell (1990), Fine (2003), Johnston (1992), Kripke (1971), 
Lowe (1995), Shoemaker (1999), Simons (1985), and others.   
The constitution relation can be framed in terms of how to fill out the following 
schema: X (or the Xs) constitutes Y at t if and only if ______? (Wasserman 2004b, 
p. 694) In metaphysics, there is still some dispute about how to adequately fill out 
this schema. However, it is widely agreed that a necessary condition for X (or the 
Xs) to constitute Y is that the relation of constitution that holds between X (or the 
Xs) and Y involves two coincidence conditions. First, material constitution requires 
spatial coincidence: X (or the Xs) constitutes Y at t only if X (or the Xs) and Y 
have the same spatial location at t. Second, material constitution requires material 
coincidence: X (or the Xs) constitutes Y at t only if X (or the Xs) and Y share all the 
same material parts at t (Wasserman 2004b, p. 694; Wilson 2007, p. 5).  
In addition to these coincidence conditions, we can also say something about 
the formal properties of the constitution relation. Material constitution is often taken 
as transitive and irreflexive. Moreover, material constitution is usually considered to 
be asymmetric. Defenders of constitution want to say that Piece constitutes David, 
but not vice versa. Adding the formal properties of irreflexivity and asymmetry 
entail a specific view of the constitution relation, that “constitution is not mere !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 I discuss the constitution relation in detail in chapter 8, where I scrutinize the 
causal-constitutive fallacy leveled against the justifiability of EC. 
! 48 
coincidence,” (Wasserman 2004b, p. 694; italics in original) for coincidence is both 
symmetric (i.e., ∀x (Pxx)) and reflexive (i.e., ∀xy (x = y)). As Wasserman says: 
“This is a substantial commitment, but it is also welcomed by most constitution 
theorists.” (2004b, p. 694)20  
In addition to the coincidence conditions as well as formal properties of 
material constitution, the standard view of constitution is commonly thought to hold 
between enduring relata, which are wholly present whenever they exist (Wasserman 
2004b, p. 708, fn. 3)21.  
 
2.3.2. Composition22 
 
There are different species of composition to be found in the literature both across 
metaphysics and the philosophy of science. See figure 4 for an overview of these 
different versions:  
 
 
Fig. 4 Overview of different species of composition  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 For instance, as Lowe states: “Of course, there must evidently be more to 
constitution than just this, not least because constitution is an asymmetrical relation 
(if x is constituted by y, then y is not constituted by x), whereas spatiotemporal 
coincidence is symmetrical.” (1989, p. 81; italics in original) Or, as Baker writes: 
“Pretheoretically, I take the constitution relation to be an asymmetric relation. Piece 
constitutes David; David does not constitute Piece.” (2000, p. 33; italics in original) 
21 I discuss the notion “wholly present” is chapters 3, 4, and 5.  
22 I discuss the composition relation in more detail in chapter 3, 4, and 5. 
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As it is most commonly understood, “composition is a relation which holds between 
a plurality of non-overlapping objects, on the one hand, and a single object, on the 
other […].” (Hawley 2006, p. 2) This general description is consistent across 
metaphysics and philosophy of science (see e.g., Craver 2007; Craver & Bechtel 
2007; Hawley 2010; van Inwagen 1990), although with the exception that not all 
accounts of composition imply that composition must hold between objects. 
Composition is also thought to hold between components (Craver 2007; Gillett 
2007a). With this small caveat exposed, composition is standardly understood to be 
a synchronic relation of determination. For instance, in his influential Material 
Beings, van Inwagen states explicitly that the verb “compose” in the predicate “the 
xs compose y” is to be understood synchronically. As he says:  
 
“The verb ‘compose’ in the predicate ‘the xs compose y’ is to be understood 
as being in the present tense, and the same point applies to ‘are’ in ‘are parts 
of’. Thus, ‘are parts of’ and ‘compose’ should be read ‘are now parts of’ and 
‘now compose’. Strictly speaking […], our definiendum should have been ‘the 
xs compose y at t’, and our “primitive” mereological predicate should have 
been ‘x is a part of y at t.” (1990, p. 29; italics in original)  
 
Or, as Bennett states:  
 
“Composition is a synchronic or atemporal many-one relation between two 
distinct objects. It carries with it the cognate notion of ‘part’: if the xxs 
compose y, then each x is part of y [at t].” (2011, p. 81)  
 
Or, as Craver says:  
 
“At least since Hume, many philosophers have held that causes and effects 
must be logically independent. If one endorses this restriction on causal 
relations, then one should balk at positing a causal relationship between 
constitutively [or compositionally] related properties. Finally, because the 
[composition] relationship is synchronic, Φ’s taking on a particular value is 
not temporally prior to Ψ’s taking on its value.” (2007, p. 153) 
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In metaphysics, some philosophers argue that the relation of composition is a 
relation of identity (see e.g., Baxter 1988; Lewis 1991; Wallace 2011). Such 
philosophers think that if X (or the Xs) is (or are) part of Y, then X (or the Xs) is (or 
are) identical to Y. As van Inwagen expresses this particular view: “x overlaps y = df 
Some one thing is part of both x and y.” (1994, p. 207)23 That is, if some Z bears 
identity to both X and Y, it follows that X and Y are identical (van Inwagen 1994, 
p. 208) One benefit of this view is that if the Xs compose Y, and if the Xs and Y are 
identical, then this circumvents the problem of having to explain just how parts and 
whole can be co-located at the same time and in the same place.  
For the purpose of this survey, I will not have anything else to say about 
composition as identity. Indeed, it is not a very popular view in metaphysics (cf. 
Wallace 2011, p. 807) – the reason being that even if the Xs and Y occupy the same 
region in space-time, and insofar as the Xs compose Y, more often than not there 
will be some qualitative difference between the Xs and Y (Aizawa & Gillett 2009a). 
Let us, for example, say that water is composed of H20. However, whereas water is 
a solvent, neither hydrogen molecules nor oxygen molecules are solvents. This is a 
simple case, in that, if H20 composes water, then the microphysical components and 
properties are not identical with the macrophysical components and their 
properties24. It is not difficult to construct many more of such examples. 
In this sense, and with the exception of composition as identity, the three 
remaining accounts of composition share with the constitution theorist the view that 
more than one distinct entity can be co-located in the same place and at the same 
time. Note, though, that whereas constitution is usually the view that two distinct 
objects can “wholly occupy exactly the same location at the same time […]. [The] 
similar-sounding ‘composition is not identity’ usually represents the quite different 
view that a whole is not identical to its several parts.” (Hawley 2010, p. 10)  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 As Lewis puts the point: “A fusion is nothing over and above its parts.” (1991, p. 
80) Or, as Lewis mentions two pages later: “The ‘are’ of composition is, so to 
speak, the plural form of the ‘is’ of identity.” (1991, p. 82) 
24 Opponents of composition as identity include Craver (2007), Hawley (2006) 
Markosian (1998), McDaniel (2007, 2008), McKay (2006), Merricks (1999, 2005), 
Sider (2007), van Inwagen (1990, 1994), and Wimsatt (1986), among others.  
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Furthermore, unlike material constitution, where a relation counts as a metaphysical 
building relation only if it holds between spatially and materially coincident objects, 
the nature of composition (composition as non-identity, aggregativity, mechanistic) 
is generally considered to consist in what van Inwagen calls:  
 
“Composition: The xs compose y if and only if no two of the xs occupy 
overlapping regions of space and y occupies the sum of the regions of space 
occupied by the xs.” (1990, p. 45; italics in original) 
 
Or, as Craver and Bechtel state about composition in mechanisms:  
 
“Given the compositional relations between mechanisms and their 
components, the space-time path of the mechanism includes the space-time 
path of its components. They coexist with one another, and so there is no 
possibility of their coming to spatiotemporally intersect with one another.” 
(2007, p. 552; italics in original) 
 
Composition, in van Inwagen’s terms, addresses the “general composition question” 
(GCQ), in that, it asks about the relationship between Y and the Xs that combine to 
compose Y. For both van Inwagen and Craver & Bechtel, composition requires 
spatial coexistence: the Xs compose Y at t only if Y as a whole shares the same 
space-time path as the Xs and no two of the Xs occupy an overlapping space-time 
path. And composition requires material coexistence: the Xs compose Y at t only if 
Y as a whole is composed of the Xs and no two of the Xs materially overlap in 
terms of their parts (Hawley 2006, p. 483). As we saw with material constitution, it 
is also the case that composition is taken to be transitive, irreflexive, and 
asymmetric25.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 I am aware that Craver & Bechtel (2007) state that composition is symmetric. But 
it is entirely consistent with Craver & Bechtel’s view to argue, first, that 
composition is asymmetric such as the Xs determine Y, and then, secondly, argue 
that once instantiated, Y may have top-down effects on the Xs. This is how I 
understand composition in mechanisms. Furthermore, even though it is standard to 
understand the relation of composition as being a transitive relation, Bechtel (2009) 
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To continue our survey of composition, it would be natural to distinguish the GCQ 
from two other questions one might ask about composition. Van Inwagen calls these 
for the “special composition question” (SCQ) and the “inverse special composition 
question” (ISCQ) respectively. The SCQ asks about the circumstances under which 
the Xs jointly compose Y – as such, the focus is on the constituents, not on the 
relation between the Xs and Y. The ISCQ, by contrast, focuses on the properties 
that Y instantiates once Y has been composed by the Xs – here the attention is on 
the whole rather than either the parts or the part-whole relation26.  
I should stress that it is not my intention to provide the reader with an in-depth 
analysis of these sorts of composition questions; rather, I use them here for didactic 
purposes. For instance, composition as aggregativity informs us both about the SCQ 
and the ISCQ; similarly for mechanistic composition. However, composition as 
aggregativity is by far the most uninteresting of the two. According to 
aggregativity, Y is nothing over and above the aggregated sum of the Xs. For 
example, the mass of a pile of sand is the sum or aggregate property of the masses 
of the individual sand grains that taken together compose the pile of sand. That is, 
intersubstitution makes no difference to Y, since the Xs do not interact or overlap in 
ways relevant to the aggregate Y.  
In his work on emergence, Wimsatt has provided an important analysis of 
aggregate relations. As Wimsatt says: “Four conditions seems separately necessary 
and jointly sufficient for aggregativity or non-emergence.” (2000, p. 272; italics in 
original) These conditions are, he specifies: “For a system property to be an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
maintains that compositional relations in mechanisms are non-transitive. That is, in 
a three-level mechanism, say, Bechtel states that mechanistic explanations are 
always just one way or one level down such that if level 0 explains level 1 and level 
1 explains level 2, it does not follow, according to Bechtel, that level 0 explains 
level 2 (for a similar point, see Aizawa (2013).  
26 In metaphysics, the SCQ has been given by far the most attention (Hawley 2006). 
For instance, when Markosian asks: “Under what circumstances do some things 
compose, or add up to, or form, a single object?” (1998, p. 211), he is explicitly 
addressing the SCQ. The same holds for van Inwagen, who spends most of his time 
discussing the SCQ in his (1990).  
! 53 
aggregate with respect to a decomposition of the system into parts and their 
properties, the following four conditions must be met: 
 
Suppose P(Si) = F{[p1, p2, …, pn(s1], [p1, p2, …, pn(s2)], …, [p1, p2, …, 
pn(sm]} is a composition function for system property P(Si) in terms of parts’ 
properties p1, p2, …, pn, of parts s1, s2, …, sm. The composition function is an 
equation – an inter-level synthetic identity, with the lower level specification 
[of] a realization or instantiation of the system property.  
 
1. IS (Inter Substitution) Invariance of the system property under 
operations rearranging the parts in the system or interchanging any 
number of parts with a corresponding numbers of parts from a relevant 
equivalence class of parts […]. 
2. QS (Size Scaling) Qualitative similarity of the system property 
(identity, or if a quantitative property, differing in value) under 
addition or subtraction of parts […]. 
3. RA (Decomposition or ReAggregation) Invariance of the system 
property under operations involving decomposition and reaggregation 
of parts […]. 
4. CI (Linearity) There are no Cooperation or Inhibitory interactions 
among the parts of the system which affect this property.” (2000, pp. 
275-276)  
 
As I mentioned, examples of aggregative composition are rarely interesting. From 
the perspective of the ISCQ, Y is the aggregate sum of the Xs, and according to the 
SCQ there would seem to be nothing of importance about the circumstances in 
which grains of sand compose a pile of sand. Adding a grain of sand to a pile of 
sand makes Y one subunit heavier. If we move all the Xs from location Z to 
location P, it has no qualitative influence on Y. Replacing one X with an equally 
weighted replica has no effect on the weight of Y, and so on.  
According to defenders of mechanistic explanation, scientific explanation in 
terms of mechanisms turns, in part, on the idea that most fundamentally levels of 
mechanisms are a species of compositional, or part-whole, relations (Craver 2007; 
Craver & Bechtel 2007; Gillett 2013; Machamer et al. 2000). As Craver specifies: 
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“Levels of mechanisms are levels of composition. […]. The interlevel relationship 
[that holds between acting entities at different levels] is as follows: X’s Φ-ing is at a 
lower mechanistic level than S’s Ψ-ing if and only if X’s Φ-ing is a component in 
the mechanism for S’s Ψ-ing.” (2007, p. 188)  
Mechanisms are collections of entities (Xs) and activities (Φs) organized so as 
to produce regular changes from start-up to termination conditions (Machamer et al. 
2000, p. 3), with the organization of mechanisms explaining how the Xs and their 
Φ-ing are organized to produce something Ψ (Craver 2001, p. 58).  
Mechanisms are hierarchically organized, integrating different levels together 
in an explanation of a mechanism. Craver, for example, thinks that the circulatory 
system is hierarchically organized, in that, the activities Ψ of the circulatory system 
S are manifested, implemented or instantiated by the heart’s different Xs and their 
Φ-ing – e.g., the activity of the heart’s pumping blood, the kidney’s filtration of 
blood, and the venous valves’ regulation of the direction of blood flow (2001, p. 
63). That is: “The relationship between lower and higher mechanistic levels is a 
[compositional] part-whole relationship with the additional restriction that the 
lower-level parts are components of (and hence organized within) the higher-level 
mechanism.” (Craver 2001, p. 63) According to this story, the compositional 
relation that holds between mechanisms and their components implies that the relata 
do neither spatially nor materially coincide, in the sense (i) that the mechanism and 
its components share the same space-time path, (ii) none of the components occupy 
the same space-time path, and (iii) none of the components materially overlap27.  
A natural way to contrast aggregativity with mechanistic composition is to look 
at the part-whole relation in mechanistic composition, since it is often argued by the 
mechanists that the relation between the Xs and Y is one of mutual manipulability 
(Craver 2007, p. 152) or mechanistically mediated effects (Craver & Bechtel 2007, 
p. 547). Craver provides both an informal gloss and a more formal characterization 
of mutual manipulability. Formally: “(i) x is part of S; (ii) in the conditions relevant 
to the request for explanation there is some change to Xs Φ-ing that changes S’s Ψ-
ing; and (iii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation there is some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Recall that constitution utilizes coincidence conditions, whereas composition 
turns on coexistence conditions.  
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change to S’s Ψ-ing that changes Φ-ing.” (2007, p. 152) One can change the 
explanandum by intervening to change to Xs, and one can change the explananda 
by intervening to change Y. That is, it is possible to change the Ψ-ing of the 
circulatory system by changing the Xs Φ-ing, and vice versa. Thus, mechanistic 
composition yields an account of the three composition questions. In terms of the 
SCQ, the parts are related to the whole such that one cannot replace, change or 
subtract one of the parts without affecting a qualitative or quantitative change in S. 
At the same time, and as an answer to the ISCQ, the whole is related to the parts in 
such a way that one cannot change the value of S’s Ψ-ing without changing the 
value of the Xs and their Φ-ing.  
 
2.3.3. Realization28  
 
Realization – just like constitution and composition – is an ontological relation: one 
entity or property (or sets of entities or properties) ontologically depends on one 
another 29 . The dependence relation in realization is standardly taken to be 
synchronic or noncausal such that if P realizes Q, P synchronically determines Q 
(Bennett 2011). As Polger testifies to: “The dependence is non-causal and, to use 
Amie Thomasson’s terms (1999), existential and constant.” (2010, p. 195) Or, as 
Polger & Shapiro put it: “[…] the property instances of wholes are noncausally 
determined by the property instances of their parts.” (2008, p. 219) Furthermore, 
and again in Polger’s words, “[…] ontological dependence relations of this sort are 
normally asymmetric and irreflexive [as well as] invariant and counterfactual 
supporting.” (2010, p. 195)  
The concept of realization entered analytic philosophy in Putnam’s 
(1960/[1975]) classical paper “Minds and Machines,” formulating the relationship 
between the mental and the physical as one of realization based on an analogy to the 
relationship between the physical arrangement of matter and the abstract operations !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 I discuss the realization relation in much more detail in chapter 6. 
29 Some accounts of realization discriminate between which kinds of entities are 
related to realization, whereas other accounts do not (Polger 2010). Although I use 
“entities” above, the familiar view in philosophy of mind takes realization to hold 
between states or properties at the level of the mental and the physical, respectively. 
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of a Turing machine implemented by that physical arrangement of matter. So, 
Putnam drew the distinction between the logical description of a Turing machine, 
on the one hand, and the physical states realizing the states referred to by that 
logical description, on the other, with the idea being that mental states are realized 
by physical brain states in just this sense (Wilson 2004a, p. 101). Alongside this 
claim, two further claims were made by Putnam: the first of these was that mental 
states thus realized can be multiply realized by physical states; and second, the 
claim that one can (in principle) identify mental states with physical brain states. 
How the latter of these two claims were rejected on the basis of the first is nicely 
summarized by Wilson: “Within a few years, the first of these ideas, that of multiple 
realizability of mental states, had become a central reason for rejecting the second 
of them, the mind-brain identity thesis […].” (2004a, p. 101) From the rejection of 
the mind-brain identity thesis, driven by the idea of multiply realizability, arose the 
view of functionalism about the mind (Block 1980). With the rise of functionalism, 
the idea that mental states are realized in physical states became the received view 
on the mind-body relationship (Wilson 2004a, p. 101)  
Despite Putnam’s groundbreaking contributions to the metaphysics of 
realization, there is still controversy over the question of whether realization is an 
ontological dependence relation (Gillett 2002, 2003; Polger 2004, 2007; Polger & 
Shapiro 2008), whether realization supports ontological reductions (Fodor 1974, 
1997; Kim 1989, 1992; Lewis 1972; Shoemaker 2007), whether realization counts 
against the reduction of higher-level properties to their lower-level realizers (Block 
1997; Gillett 2003; Shapiro 2000; Sober 1999), or whether realization can be shown 
to be inherently context-sensitive (Wilson 2001, 2004a, 2004b). Hence, we should 
not be surprised to find more than one version of realization in the literature. For 
simplicity, and nothing else, I shall restrict my survey of realization to the versions 
listed in figure 5:  
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Fig. 5 Overview of different species of realization 
 
It is often said that realization is a relation that holds between first-order properties 
and second-order properties (i.e., functional properties) such that for P to realize Q 
is, roughly, for P to play the Q-role (Bennett 2011, p. 82). This is a sketch of what 
Gillett refers to as flat realization (2002). Gillett calls the flat view of realization the 
standard view, while he thinks of his dimensioned account as an alternative, non-
standard view of realization. Here I lump both the flat and the dimensioned view 
under the label “standard view”. Why I do so will become clearer, I hope, as I 
unfold this section.   
According to Gillett, the flat view of realization is comprised of two 
interconnected claims. The first is that the realizer/realized properties are 
instantiated within one and the same individual. In his work on realization, Wilson 
dubs this claim the constitutivity thesis: “realizers of states and properties are 
exhaustively physically constituted by the intrinsic, physical states of the individual 
whose states or properties they are.” (2001, p. 5) Gillett cites both Kim (1998) and 
Shoemaker (1999) as proponents of this first claim of the flat view. Consider, e.g., 
what Kim states here: “It is evident that a second-order property and its realizers 
are at the same level … they are properties of the very same object.” (1998, p. 82; 
italics in original) The second claim of the flat view concerns the causal powers of 
the realized/realizer properties. Wilson refers to this claim as the sufficiency thesis: 
“realizers are metaphysically sufficient for the properties or states they realize.” 
(2001, p. 4) Consider this time what Shoemaker says: “[…] property X realizes 
property Y just in case the conditional powers bestowed by Y are a sub-set of the 
conditional powers bestowed by X […].” (2001, p. 78) Hence, the flat view of 
Realization 
Standard view 
Flat realization Dimensioned realization 
Context-sensitive 
view 
Entity-bounded 
realization 
Wide/radical 
realization 
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realization is based on the ideas that the realized/realizer properties are internal to 
one and the same individual, and that the causal powers individuative of the realized 
property match the causal powers contributed to it by the realizer property.  
Gillett, however, thinks that the flat view of realization is inadequate; thus his 
development of what he calls the dimensioned view of realization. Let us start with 
the observation made by Polger & Shapiro that “the dimensioned approach 
characterizes realization in terms of composition whereas the flat approach views 
realization in terms of occupiers of functional roles.” (2008, p. 213) That is, rather 
than a one-one relation between property instances, the dimensioned account 
presupposes a many-one relation between different properties. At the same time, 
and this is the real culprit, Gillett proposes that there are genuine cases of realization 
which violate the constitutivity thesis as well as the sufficiency thesis of the flat 
view. That is, the realized/realizer property may be instantiated within different 
individuals and the realizer/realized properties may contribute distinct causal 
powers. In support of the dimensioned view of realization, Gillett considers the 
example of a diamond, stating that the proponents of the flat view:  
 
“[…] must deny that the alignment and bonding of particular carbon atoms 
realizes the hardness of the diamond. For neither (I) [the constitutivity thesis] 
nor (II) [the sufficiency thesis] is true in this case, since the 
properties/relations of the carbon atoms are instantiated in different 
individuals, and contribute distinct causal powers, from the properties of the 
diamond.” (2002, p. 319) 
 
Consider, now, Wilson’s context-sensitive view of realization, which he 
taxonomizes into the following three modes of context-sensitive realization: (a) 
entity-bounded realization; (b) wide realization; and (c), radically wide realization. 
Entity-bounded realizations of P by some lower-level state or process X are total 
realizations, with both the core and non-core parts being completely located within 
the individual bearer, B, who has P. According to Wilson, the mammalian 
circulatory system, which is made up of different parts such as the heart, the 
arteries, the capillaries, the venules, the blood, and so on, is an example of entity-
bounded realizations. Entity-bounded realizations, I submit, are consistent with 
Gillett’s dimensioned view. As Polger & Shapiro point out: “the dimensioned view 
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of realization amounts to no more than a specification of mereological composition. 
According to Gillett, if objects O1 – On compose an object M, then properties F1 – 
Fn of O1 – On realize property H of M.” (2008, p. 219) That is, if the heart, arteries, 
etc., compose the circulatory system, then the properties of the parts realize the 
circulatory properties H that M has at any given time. However, just as the property 
“high blood pressure” is not instantiated in any of the individual parts of the 
circulatory system, similarly for the property of “being hard” in a diamond. Indeed, 
the hardness of a diamond is a realized property at a higher level than its component 
properties. Crucially, however, whereas Gillett’s dimensioned view of realization is 
manifested between higher- and lower-levels occupying the same region of space-
time (e.g., the space-time region occupied by the diamond), Wilson’s notions of 
wide and radically wide realization breaks with this restriction. According to 
Wilson, wide realization =df “a total realization of P whose noncore part is not 
located entirely within IB, the individual who has P.” (2004a, p. 111) An example 
of wide realization is fitness in a biological sense. As Wilson says:  
 
“[An] organism’s fitness is its propensity to survive and reproduce in its 
environment; we can represent the former as a probability between 0 and 1 
(the organism’s viability), and the latter as a number greater than or equal to 0 
(the organism’s fertility) where this number represents the organism’s 
expected number of offspring. In either case, although fitness is a 
dispositional property of individual organisms […], this disposition is not 
individualistic, since physically identical organisms may differ in fitness 
because they have been or are located in different environments: the number 
that represent viability and fertility may vary solely because of an organism’s 
environmental location.” (2001, p. 13; italics in original) 
 
In this case, what it metaphysically sufficient for the fitness level of a given 
organism is not wholly instantiated within that organism – that is, what Wilson calls 
the total realization of fitness outstrips the boundaries of the individual and includes 
part of that individual’s environment. For the sake of completeness, Wilson defines 
what he calls radically wide realization accordingly: “a wide realization whose core 
part is not located entirely within [B], the individual who has P.” (2004a, p. 116) 
Examples of radically wide realizations include social actions, involving 
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engagement in cultural practices that themselves have additional social and 
institutional background conditions, e.g., writing a cheque, voting, withdrawing 
money from a bank, etc. (Wilson 2001, pp. 13-14; 2004a, p. 116).  
 
2.3.4. Supervenience30  
 
Supervenience is primarily “used non-temporally [viz., synchronically], to signify a 
metaphysical and/or conceptual determination-relation; […], the idea being that 
something supervenient […] – is “grounded by” – that on which it supervenes.” 
(Horgan 1993, p. 555) Although philosophers disagree about a great many things 
concerning supervenience, e.g., is supervenience an entailment relation? Is it a 
relation of explanation, and so on; supervenience is usually understood to be a 
modal relation such that if a set of A-properties supervene on a set of B-properties 
there could be no difference in A-properties without there being a difference in B-
properties (see e.g., Davidson 1970; Horgan 1982, 1993; Kim 1984, 1988, 1990, 
1993, 1998; Lewis 1983, 1986; Stalnaker 1996; etc.). That is to say that a set of A-
properties supervene on a set of B-properties if and only if no two things can differ 
with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-
properties. The slogan “there can’t be an A-difference without a B-difference” is 
applied both to particular individuals and to possible worlds, and across these 
different qualifications, one may find weak and strong articulations of each view 
(see figure 6)31:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 I provide a detailed discussion of supervenience in chapter 7. 
31 Philosophers also argue over the modal strength of supervenience. For instance, if 
the mental supervenes on the physical, which is the received view in the philosophy 
of mind, there is still substantial debate about whether the supervenience relation 
between the mental and the physical holds with metaphysical or nomological 
necessity. For example, Chalmers (1996) has argued that zombies – creatures that 
are physically indiscernible from human beings, yet who do not have conscious 
experiences – are metaphysically possible despite most philosophers agreeing that 
zombies are nomologically impossible (McLaughlin & Bennett 2011)  
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Fig. 6 Overview of different species of supervenience32 
 
Let A and B be two sets of properties. Using the modal necessity operator “ ”, 
Horgan expresses weak and strong forms of individual supervenience as follows33:  
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 I am aware that there are other accounts of supervenience in the literature, e.g., 
Horgan’s (1982) version of regional supervenience. I do not consider this account 
here, because it still expresses a commitment to synchronicity, and will, therefore, 
not present any problems for my overall aim in this chapter.  
33 These two definitions are formulated by means of modal operators rather than 
over possible worlds. For a definition of weak and strong individual supervenience 
defined by means of quantification over possible worlds, consider the following 
definitions offered by McLaughlin & Bennett: “A-properties weakly supervene on 
B-properties if and only if for any possible world w and any individuals x and y in 
w, if x and y are B-indiscernible in w, then they are A-indiscernible in w.” (2011, p. 
14; italics in original) And: “A-properties strongly supervene on B-properties if and 
only if for any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any individuals x in w1 and y in w2, if 
x in w1 is B-indiscernible from y in w2, then x in w1 is A-indiscernible from y in w2.” 
(2011, p. 14; italics in original) See also Kim (1984, 1987) for a discussion of the 
difference between strong and weak individual supervenience when either 
expressed in terms of modal operators or quantified over possible worlds.  
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“Weak Supervenience: 
  (∀x)( ∀F∈A){x has F → (∃G∈B)[x has G & (∀y)(y has G → y has F)]} 
(Necessarily, if anything has property F in A, there exists a property G in B 
such that the thing has G, and everything that has G has F.” (1993, p. 566; 
italics in original) 
 
“Strong Supervenience: 
  (∀x)( ∀F∈A){x has F → (∃G∈B)[x has G &   ((∀y)(y has G → y has 
F)]} (Necessarily, if anything has property F in A, there exists a property G in 
B such that the thing has G, and necessarily everything that has G has F.” 
(1993, p. 567; italics in original) 
 
The difference between these two forms of supervenience relations is that weak 
supervenience pertains only to entities (or properties) that occupy the same possible 
world, whereas the strong supervenience claim is quantified across possible worlds. 
That is, the strong supervenience claim states that “for any worlds w and w’ and any 
things x and y (in w and w’ respectively), if x in w is B-indiscernible from y in w’, 
then x in w is A-indiscernible from y in w’.” (Horgan 1993, p. 567; italics in 
original) In contrast, the weak supervenience claim says that within any world, if X 
and Y are B-indiscernible, and if B supervenes on A, then X and Y are also A-
indiscernible.  
With the exception of Wilson’s conception of wide realization, all the 
building relations surveyed thus far have traditionally been formulated in such a 
way that they presuppose that a single individual instantiates both the lower-level 
properties and the higher-level properties. For instance, “that a single individual 
instantiates both the subvenient property and the supervenient property.” (Horgan 
1993, p. 570) One example in which this fails is with the property of being a bank. 
The property of being a bank is not exhaustively instantiated by the intrinsic or 
physical property of the bricks and their organization located in some particular 
place. The building’s having this sociocultural property depends (metaphysically) 
on the social practice of banking. To accommodate such broader cases of 
supervenience one solution has been to formulate supervenience in terms of whole 
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or entire possible worlds. Kim coined the conception of global supervenience to 
capture this idea. Global supervenience may be formulated as follows34:  
 
“A-properties globally supervene on B-properties if and only if for any worlds 
w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 have exactly the same world-wide pattern of 
distribution of B-properties, then they have exactly the same world-wide 
pattern of distributed of A-properties.” (McLaughlin & Bennett 2011, p.  18; 
italics in original) 
 
2.3.5. Emergence35  
 
Emergence is a philosophical term of trade. As Kim puts it: “[It] can pretty much 
mean whatever you want it to mean, the only condition being that you have better 
be reasonably clear about what you mean, and that your concept turns out to be 
something interesting and theoretically useful.” (2006, p. 548) Approaches to 
emergence are often divided into two broad categories, that is, those of diachronic 
and synchronic emergence, see figure 7:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Here is how McLaughlin & Bennett formulate weak global supervenience and 
strong global supervenience: “A-properties weakly globally supervene on B-
properties iff for any worlds w1 and w2, if there is a B-preserving isomorphism 
between w1 and w2, then there is an A-preserving isomorphism between them.” 
(2011, p. 22; italics in original) And: “A-properties strongly globally supervene on 
B-properties iff for any worlds w1 and w2, every B-preserving isomorphism between 
w1 and w2 is an A-preserving isomorphism between them.” (2011, p. 22; italics in 
original) See also Stalnaker (1996), and Sider (1999) for ways of making this 
distinction.  
35 I examine emergence in detail in chapter 7.  
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Fig. 7 Overview of different species of emergence 
 
Diachronic emergence is where P emerges as, in part, “a function of some 
dynamical lower-level or more basic process that unfolds in time. As the system 
evolves in time new ‘higher-level’ properties will come into being as a function of 
the unfolding of the more fundamental dynamical process.” (Silberstein 2012, p. 
630) Synchronic emergence, by contrast, emphasizes “the co-existence of novel 
‘higher-level’ objects or properties with objects or properties existing at some 
‘lower-level’.” (Humphreys 2008, p. 431)  
Most cases of diachronic emergence are epistemological (see e.g., Bedau 1997). 
Cases of epistemological emergence are cases where emergent properties, say, are 
merely artifacts of a particular model, and where novel or unexpected properties are 
commonly unexplainable or unpredictable prior to modeling or analysis. In fact, 
epistemologically emergent phenomena are phenomena where it is often hopeless to 
understand the emergent feature of the whole by tracing only the individual parts or 
processes making up the whole. Often, as Silberstein & McGeever point out, in 
these cases “we must find a method of representing what the system does on the 
whole or on average in a manner which abstracts away from causal detail.” (1999, 
p. 185) Prima facie, at least, dynamical systems theory is a paradigm discipline in 
which the study of qualitative behavior of higher-level phenomena is dependent on 
simulation or modeling (Kelso 1995).  
Ontological emergence, by contrast, is the idea that higher level phenomena or 
domains may have causal properties distinct from the causal properties of the 
Emergence 
Diachronic 
emergence 
Epistemological 
emergence 
Ontological 
emergence 
Synchronic 
emergence 
Ontological 
emergence 
(supervenience) 
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constituents, and that those causal properties or capacities may, in the right 
circumstances, affect the functioning of the lower-level properties or capacities 
(Mitchell 2012; Silberstein & McGeever 1999). Note, though, that there at least two 
possible senses of ontological emergence in the literature, and only one of these, I 
submit, qualifies as a metaphysical building relation.  
The first meaning of ontological emergence I call supervenience emergentism, 
which is the standard synchronic view of ontological emergence (Broad 1925; Kim 
2006)36. This is the view that higher-level properties supervene on lower-level 
subvenient properties, while possessing (the higher-level properties) causal powers 
that are not entailed by, and consequently not deducible from, the lower-level 
properties (see e.g., Broad 1925, pp. 67-68). As Horgan states:  
 
“Certain higher-level properties could be supervenient on lower-level ones 
[…] and also possess the two key features the emergentists stressed: (i) the 
supervenient higher-order properties could be fundamental causal properties, 
generating causal forces over and above physical causal forces; and (ii) the 
connections between lower-order and higher-order properties – supervenience 
connections – could be metaphysically fundamental, hence unexplainable.” 
(1993, p. 559)  
 
According to Bennett (forthcoming), supervenience emergentism is not a building 
relation, because of the fact that it implies that emergent properties are basic (i.e., 
fundamental) properties despite the relata involved being connected via the 
supervenience relation. As Bennett states: […] it follows that ontological emergence 
[…] is not a building relation. Genuinely [fundamental] emergent properties – if 
there really are any […] – are purportedly no less fundamental than their bases.” 
(Forthcoming, pp. 26-27)  
Whether I agree with this or not is unimportant, since this is not the form of 
emergence that I will defend in the thesis. Fortunately for me, there is a second 
conception of ontological emergence in the literature, which is less radical than the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Boogerd et al. (2005), Humphreys (2008), and McLaughlin & Bennett (2011) 
also mention that the standard view of ontological emergence is based on 
supervenience.  
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first (or, as some would put it, less strong). This sense of ontological emergence, I 
call ontological diachronic emergence. I explore and defend this notion in chapter 
7. The basic idea is that P emerges in virtue of certain dynamical lower-level 
processes that unfold in time. As these lower-level processes unfold certain higher-
level properties emerge. To some this will sound like a rather weak notion of 
emergence. But, it qualifies as ontological emergence for the following reason: P 
emerges in virtue of the dynamical activity and organization of the Xs in system S, 
and the Xs determine the existence of P; once emergent, P may, in the right 
circumstances, exhibit downward effects on the Xs. Even though P may influence 
its parts, had the Xs not occurred, P would not had occurred. This second form of 
ontological emergence is consistent with Silberstein & McGeever’s view of 
ontologically emergent properties: “Emergent properties are properties of a system 
taken as a whole which exert a causal influence on the parts of the system consistent 
with, but distinct from, the causal capacities of the parts themselves.” (1999, p. 182) 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
That concludes my brief survey of five different but familiar metaphysical building 
relations. I have shown that whereas composition and constitution are usually 
thought to hold between different objects or components, the relations of 
supervenience, realization, and emergence are commonly considered to hold 
between properties of different sorts across levels. Most importantly, I have shown 
that in their familiar and standard formulations, all of these different building 
relations are considered as synchronic (not diachronic) relations. In chapter 3, I will 
take a few steps towards formulating DIACHRONIC.  
 !!!!!!!
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3. Metaphysical building relations: Towards a diachronic 
account  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a need to look carefully into just what “time” amounts to when we consider 
the relationship between metaphysical building relations and temporality. As I said 
in the introduction, if saying that the diachronic view is important simply because of 
its emphasis on relations that unfold over time, then nearly everyone will accept the 
diachronic view. The reason for this is that nearly everyone, even proponents of the 
synchronic view of building relations, give a central place to causal relations, and 
the latter are usually understood to be diachronic (see e.g., Bennett 2011; Craver & 
Bechtel 2007; Polger 2010; Shapiro 2004). Indeed, if this is all that I intend by the 
diachronic view, I would be advocating what all of the defenders of the standard 
view of metaphysical building relations take to be completely familiar, namely that 
all exponents of the synchronic view include causation into their metaphysics.  
What is controversial about my diachronic account of building relations, 
however, is that I give exclusive importance to diachronic relations over and in 
place of synchronic relations, on the one hand, and that I do not restrict diachronic 
relations to causal relations, on the other. As I argue in this chapter, and in the 
chapters to come, metaphysical building relations such as composition, constitution 
and emergence may all be articulated in accordance with the diachronic perspective. 
That is the controversial and original claim of the thesis, especially since almost 
everyone agrees that if there is anything that distinguishes causation, on the one 
hand, from relations such as composition, constitution, etc., on the other, it is that 
causation is diachronic, whereas building relations are synchronic.  
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3.1. Aim 
 
The aim of the chapter is to take a few general steps toward a framework by which 
to express the diachronic view, before applying and discussing this framework with 
regards to issues pertinent to EC. Although many of the examples I shall use for this 
purpose have a distinctly compositional flavor, nothing that I will say in this chapter 
restricts the diachronic account to the relation of composition. During my 
discussion, I will keep making use of the standard example from the constitution 
debate, namely the relation between a piece of marble (Piece) and a token statue 
(David) in order to draw out several important points of contrast between the 
synchronic view and the diachronic view.  
In order to avoid complicating things unnecessarily, I postpone any critical 
discussion of realization, supervenience, and emergence to chapters 6 and 7, and 
focus just on constitution and composition here.  
I present two arguments for the claim that both constitution and composition 
are, in some cases, diachronic. First, building relations are diachronic in cases where 
they cannot hold between the very same relata at any particular time instant t. 
Second, building relations hold diachronically in cases where they cannot 
exhaustively determine the existence of some phenomenon at any particular instant 
t, because neither the parts nor the whole are wholly present at any particular instant 
t.  
I am aware that one temporally extended entity might constitute or compose or 
make up another temporally extended entity, in a way analogous to the standard 
view of constitution, and as proposed by proponents of the thesis of four-
dimensionalism in metaphysics (see e.g., Brogaard 2000). However, failing to press 
on diachronicity in relation to metaphysical building relations results in theoretical 
modesty on behalf of theories of building relations. In particular, given that the 
received view of relations such as constitution and composition is that these 
relations are synchronic (i.e., durationless) relations, this prevents metaphysical 
theorizing on composition, and the like, from analyzing time-continuous dynamical 
systems, which are ubiquitous in nature.  
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3.2. Overview 
 
In section 3.3, I briefly reiterate the standard view of constitution and composition. 
In section 3.4, I make a novel distinction between what I call ontological 
synchronicity and ontological diachronicity in order to clearly separate the 
synchronic view from the diachronic view, and vice versa. In section 3.5, I pursue 
the first argument for the diachronic view, and in section 3.6, I develop the second 
argument. Finally, in section 3.7, I add a few additional points of contrast with the 
synchronic view.  
 
3.3. The standard view of constitution and composition  
 
Michelangelo’s David is constituted by a piece of marble, Piece. This token flag is 
constituted by a piece of fabric, and so on. These are familiar cases of the 
constitution view in metaphysics. Although the relation of composition is similar to 
constitution, the composition relation is usually understood to be a one-many 
relation between a whole and its parts. For instance, the liquid in this glass is 
composed of water molecules.  
A widespread view amongst constitution theorists (see e.g., Baker 1999; 
Chappell 1990; Fine 2003; Lowe 1995; Wasserman 2004a, 2009), whatever their 
other differences, is that the constitution relation between X (or the Xs) and Y must 
satisfy a number of constraints. If X (or the Xs) constitutes Y, X (or the Xs) and Y 
exist at the same time instant and share the same material parts (see e.g., Wilson 
2007, 2009). In the previous chapter, I referred to these two conditions as the spatial 
and material coincidence condition, respectively. The standard view of constitution 
can be easily reformulated in compositional terms by replacing the spatial and 
material coincidence conditions with the spatial and material coexistence conditions 
of composition. That is, the Xs compose Y only if Y shares the same space-time 
path as the Xs and no two of the Xs occupy overlapping regions of space-time, and 
only if Y is composed of the Xs and no two of the Xs materially overlap in terms of 
their parts (Craver & Bechtel 2007; Hawley 2006; van Inwagen 1990). Both 
composition and constitution are usually transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive. The 
final condition of the standard view of constitution/composition is synchronicity: X 
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(or the Xs) constitutes (or compose) Y only if the relation that holds between X (or 
the Xs) and Y is synchronic.  
The central reason for conceiving of constitution as synchronic is nicely stated 
by Bennett: “[Metaphysical] building relations do not unfold over time […]. 
Causation, in contrast, is paradigmatically diachronic, and that idea is frequently 
invoked to distinguish causation from relations like composition, constitution, or 
supervenience […].” (2011, pp. 93-94; italics in original)37 That both constitution 
and composition are understood to hold synchronically is engrained in the very 
manner in which both relations are articulated. For instance, it is a standard 
assumption on the part of constitution theorists that constitution requires spatial and 
material coincidence – X constitutes Y at t only if X and Y have the same spatial 
location at a particular time instant t and share the same material parts at that 
specific time instant t. The standard presupposition, then, at the very core of the 
standard view of constitution, is that the constitution relation holds instantaneously 
between X (or the Xs) and Y and therefore cannot be a temporally unfolding 
relation.  
Causation, by contrast, may be said to hold between independent events or 
processes, in the sense that depending on the time interval between the cause and 
the effect, it is (prima facie, at least) possible to think that a cause and its effect 
never exist simultaneously. As Shapiro says: “[If] C is a constituent of […] P, C 
exists where and when […] P exists. Thus, for some […] P, if C takes place prior to 
P’s occurrence […], or if C takes place apart from P’s occurrence […], then C is not 
a constituent of P.” (2011, p. 160)  
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Bennett does not endorse this way of distinguishing between constitution and 
causation. In fact, she immediately rejects this, as she says: “Yet although this is a 
tempting solution to the problem, occasionally temptation is best resisted. This is 
one of those occasions. We should not require that building relations be synchronic, 
because there is at least one important relation that is worth calling a building 
relation, but that unfolds over time […].” (Bennett 2011, p. 94) 
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3.4. Ontological synchronicity and ontological diachronicity 
 
In scrutinizing the assumption of the synchronic condition in the standard view of 
building relations, I start by offering a distinction between ontological synchronicity 
and ontological diachronicity. I use the prefix “ontological”, here, because I want to 
stress that when addressing the synchronic-diachronic distinction, we are 
considering ontological dimensions of this distinction rather than epistemological. If 
a building relation R that holds between X (or the Xs) and Y is ontologically 
synchronic, it follows that whenever X (or the Xs) is present, Y is present, since for 
X (or the Xs) to synchronically determine the existence of Y, both X (or the Xs) and 
Y must be wholly present at a particular instant t. This is the view that I refer to as 
the synchronic view. For R to be a metaphysical building relation, R must hold 
synchronically between X (or the Xs) and Y. For instance, Piece synchronically 
determines the existence of David at time t (or at each stage over an interval t, …, 
tn) if and only if Piece and David are exhaustively present at t or Piece and David 
are wholly present at each particular stage over t1, …, tn. This synchronic view of 
building relations is durationless or timeless, in that, the relatum (Y) is determined 
wholly and completely at a moment in time. In addition to the assumption that R is 
ontologically synchronic such that R is wholly present at a particular instant t, the 
standard view of building relations equally presuppose that R holds between the 
very same token relata both at a time instant t and at each particular stage over an 
interval, t1, …, tn. If we consult the example of David and Piece, this illustrates that 
R holds between the very same token Piece and the very same token David at a time 
or at each specific temporal stage over an interval, t1, …, tn. 
 Contrast this with the conception of ontological diachronicity. There are two 
closely related modes of what I call ontological diachronicity, and both of these 
modes are implicit in “modern science” cases of building relations, ones far more 
complex and dynamic than the “commonsense” example of David and Piece used in 
analytical metaphysics (see e.g., Ladyman & Ross 2007, p. 21). According to the 
first sense of ontological diachronicity, if R that holds between X (or the Xs) and Y 
is ontologically diachronic, then R itself can never be entirely present at any single 
moment t or at each particular stage over an interval, t1, …, tn. On the second sense 
of ontological diachronicity, if R that holds between X (or the Xs) and Y is 
ontologically diachronic, R holds between relata that can never be wholly present at 
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a particular time t or at each particular stage over an interval, t1, …, tn. Ontological 
diachronicity can be made more evident in exploring some differences between 
objects (or object-like entities) and processes. As we have seen, objects such as 
Piece and David are whole and complete at each moment of their existence – their 
manifestation is fully determined at a durationless point in time. Processes, by 
contrast, are creatures of time (Noë 2006). Unlike objects, processes are extended 
over an interval of time – that is, processes are temporally extended in nature. 
Indeed, the view of ontologically diachronic dependence relations is intended to 
highlight that if the relata themselves are diachronic – and, thus, temporally 
extended in nature – then the relation of dependence that holds between such 
temporally extended relata cannot determine the existence of such relata at a 
durationless (or atemporal) point in time. In other words, if the relata are inherently 
temporally extended, can their existence be determined at an atemporal instant? The 
answer is ‘no’, as both of the next two argument will establish.  
 
3.5. The first argument for DIACHRONIC 
 
To bring out the first contrast between ontological synchronicity and ontological 
diachronicity, I begin by asking the following question: In what circumstances, and 
by which principles, do the microscopic patterns that compose water make up the 
macroscopic patterns that we typically refer to as water? I begin with the standard 
assumption that the macroscopic kind “water” is composed of H2O, that is, of two 
hydrogen molecules and an oxygen molecule. The interesting question here is 
whether or not this example is consistent with an ontologically synchronic notion of 
composition or an ontologically diachronic conception of composition? If H2O 
composes water at t, or at each temporal stage over t, …, tn, and if the composition 
relation is ontologically synchronic, then both of the hydrogen molecules and the 
oxygen molecule must be wholly present at t or at each moment over t1, …, tn.  
 However, according to Ladyman & Ross, this assumption is wrong. That is, 
water is composed, Ladyman & Ross remind us, “by oxygen and hydrogen in 
various polymeric forms, such as (H2O)2, (H2O)3), and so on, that are constantly 
forming, dissipating, and reforming over short time periods in such a way as to give 
rise to the familiar properties of the macroscopic kind water.” (2007, p. 21; italics 
added) Because water is composed in a complex dynamical system it “makes no 
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sense to imagine it having its familiar properties synchronically.” (Ross & Ladyman 
2010, p. 160; italics added) To complicate matters, we cannot even assume that 
water is composed of H2O (van Brakel 2010). For instance, in liquid water, water 
molecules form clusters through interactions, while in ice, as van Brakel mentions, 
“there aren’t really individual molecules.” (2010, p. 131) Not even individual 
hydrogen atoms (H-atoms) are the same over time. In water, van Brakel states, there 
are both ortho-hydrogen and para-hydrogen H-atoms, and these have quite different 
physico-chemical properties (2010, p. 132). Fascinatingly, we cannot even assume 
that water always consists of interactions between H and O atoms. As Belyaev et al. 
state: “[There] is some probability (however, small) that a water molecule will 
suddenly transform into a Neon atom.” (2001; quoted in van Brakel 2010, p. 132) 
 What this example indicates is that even if we begin with the assumption that 
water is composed of H2O, the dynamics and complexity of the constituent 
interactions over time contravene the requirement of ontological synchronicity. That 
is, what is needed is a way of accounting for the dependence relation between water 
molecules and the macroscopic kind ‘water’ without presupposing, incoherently, 
that this relation of dependence is one that holds in an ontologically synchronic 
manner. Indeed, a synchronic view of composition distorts the complex, inherent 
temporal dynamics apparent in the microphysical and chemical aspects of water.  
 
3.6. The second argument for DIACHRONIC 
 
The difference between ontological synchronicity and diachronicity also comes 
about because the former, and not the latter, insists that for X (or the Xs) to 
synchronically determine the existence of Y, both X (or the Xs) and Y must be 
wholly present at a particular instant. To get a grip on this idea, I consider a couple 
of additional examples. But let us first see if we can get clear about the notion of 
“wholly present”.   
To claim that David is wholly present at a particular moment is equivalent to 
the claim that what there is of David at any specific moment is sufficient to 
determine that David exists. Such an account has been proposed by Hofweber & 
Velleman, though they frame what it is for an entity to be wholly present in terms of 
identity. As they state: “[An] object o is wholly present at a time iff the identity of o 
is intrinsic to that time.” (2011, p. 55; italics in original) But this way of defining 
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“wholly present” only invites the following question: what is it for an object to have 
its identity determined intrinsically to a time? Or, consider what Lewis says about 
the conception of “wholly present”: “Let us say something […] endures iff it 
persists by being wholly present at more than one time.” (1986, p. 202; italics in 
original) But this is just as poor a way to characterize what the concept “wholly 
present” means, in that, it raises another question: what does it mean for an object to 
be wholly present at more than one time? In the literature, the concept “wholly 
present” has been (and still is) notoriously hard to provide an adequate definition 
(Sider 2001)38. Here is another try, this time by Wasserman, who states: “x is 
wholly present at t =df x exists at t and x does not have a proper temporal part at any 
time other than t.” (2004a, p. 77)39  
These definitions, despite their differences, fit the standard view of building 
relations. Most defenders of the standard view claim that the sorts of entities under 
discussion are enduring entities, which are wholly present whenever they exist. For 
instance, if P realizes Q, both P and Q are entirely occurrent, and neither P nor Q is 
only partially occurrent. Or, if Piece constitutes David, both Piece and David are 
present at the same place at the same time. And so on. But, this is unlike entities 
such as events and processes (Hofweber & Velleman 2011; Noë 2006). Consider 
the following two examples: the process of writing a cheque, and a Mexican wave.  
 Writing a cheque is a temporally extended process – it takes time from the 
beginning of writing a cheque to the finished product. Furthermore, insofar as the 
process of writing a cheque is a temporally extended process, it follows that the 
process consists of temporal parts each of which involves the laying down of 
successive drops of ink. As Hofweber & Velleman put the point: “What there is of 
the process at a particular moment – the laying down of a particular drop – is not 
sufficient to determine that a cheque is being written.” (2011, p. 50; italics added) 
Therefore, and in contrast to David and Piece, for example, “the process [is not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Sider’s attempt at a definition goes accordingly: “x is strongly wholly present 
throughout interval T =df everything that is at any time in T part of x exists and is 
part of x at every time in T.” (2001, location 1002/3600; Kindle version) 
39 Wasserman himself thinks that this definition fails as a general definition of 
“wholly present”. But of all the definitions he surveys, this seems to be the one he 
prefers.  
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present] in its temporal entirety within the confines of the moment: it is not fully 
determined by the events of the moment to be the process that it is. Within the 
moment, it is not all there and it is not fully itself.” (Hofweber & Velleman 2011, p. 
50; italics added) On the identity-based account of “wholly present”, it follows that 
the process of writing a cheque is inconsistent with the requirement that for the Xs 
to constitute Y, the Xs must be wholly present at a particular time t or at each 
particular stage over an interval, t1, …, tn. Objects, as I have already noted, are 
durationless, in that, they exist wholly and completely at a time instant. Processes 
such as writing a cheque, by contrast, are temporally extended. At the beginning of 
a process or an event, as Noë (2006) reminds us, the process itself has not yet 
achieved its end state. Similarly, at the end of the process, its beginning is no 
longer. Indeed, as Noë says, to suppose that “the beginning of an event [and/or a 
process] would be available, and so present, at its conclusion, […], would be to 
suppose, confusedly, that events [and/or processes] were in fact object-like 
structures.” (2006, p. 28)  
 Now, consider a Mexican wave. A Mexican wave is a common occurrence in 
sports arenas and happens when individual fans stand up slightly after the person 
next to them does, resulting in what appears to be a wave running through the 
crowd. A Mexican wave might not be a material object – the “material object” 
being the paradigmatic choice of the composition or constitution theorist with a 
synchronic bent – but a Mexican wave is both extended in time and space, and, thus 
may be conceived as being composed (in some sense) across a time interval. One 
way to illustrate that the relation R between the Xs (the constituents of a Mexican 
wave) and Y (the Mexican wave) is diachronically composed is to consider what it 
implies to claim that R, in this specific example, holds synchronically. Bennett 
considers the argument that diachronic talk is superfluous, since any diachronic 
relation of composition can be fully analyzed in terms of synchronic composition40. 
Here is how Bennett schematizes the argument: “The xxs at t1 (or over some interval 
t1-tn) stand in a diachronic composition relation to y at t2 iff the xxs exist at t1, y 
exists at t2, and at t2 the xxs compose y.” (Forthcoming, p. 63; italics in original)  
The first thing to note about this argument against diachronic composition is 
that it treats metaphysical relations of determination – such as composition – and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Bennett is, however, quick to reject such an argument. 
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causal/diachronic relations as two distinct kinds of relations simpliciter. That is to 
say that the composition relation holds between the Xs and Y at t1 and t2, and so on, 
while it is in virtue of certain causal or diachronic relations that the Xs persist 
through time from t1 to t2, and so on. Here R is wholly present whenever it holds 
between the Xs and Y. Thus, if this argument is correct, it entails that the Xs 
synchronically determine the existence of Y at each moment in time over t1, …, tn. 
The second thing to note about the argument is that it presupposes that R holds 
between the very same relata throughout the existence of the Xs and Y. This is easy 
to understand by looking at the case of David and Piece. What there is of David and 
Piece at each instant is wholly determined at each of those instants. David is wholly 
present at t if and only if David exists at t and does not have a proper temporal part 
at any time other than t. 
Let us now apply the critical argument against diachronic composition to the 
Mexican wave. First, suppose that there are 100 Xs composing Y, and that each X is 
a token individual with a particular name: Adam, Alice, Betty, John, Michael, 
Michelle, Richard, Rachel, Will, etc. Second, if the diachronic composition relation 
can be accounted for in purely synchronic terms, then the composition relation that 
holds between Y and the Xs at t2 must also be the composition relation that holds 
between Y and the Xs at t1, whereas it is in virtue of some causal or diachronic 
relation that the Xs persist from t1 to t2. If this is correct, it is clear that diachronic 
relations cannot be compositional (or that compositional relations cannot be 
diachronic), since diachronic relations would only hold between the Xs, whereas the 
composition relation holds between the Xs and Y.  
However, we can easily reject this skeptical argument. In contrast to the 
assumption that for R to hold synchronically between the Xs and Y, R must hold 
between the very same relata at each particular time instant over the interval it 
exists, Y continuously looses and gains constituents at each moment of its existence 
and over its career. That is, the composition relation R, which holds between Y and 
the Xs, connects individual parts that do not exist at the same time – in the sense 
that the Xs are spread out in time and in space – and, as a result, cannot hold 
between the very same relata at each moment in time over some interval. For 
instance, Adam, Alice, Betty, John, Michael, Michelle and Richard might stand in a 
relation to Y at t1, but not at t2, since here it is Rachel, Ross, Steven, Stephanie, 
Will, and Xenia that stand in a relation to Y, and so on until tn. At the beginning of 
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Y, Y has not yet achieved its end. Similarly, at the end of Y, its beginning is done 
with (Noë 2006, p. 28). There should be nothing strange about this, in that, if we 
grant that Y may gain and loose parts throughout its unfolding, it does not follow 
that the parts – Adam, say – that are no longer part of the composition relation at t2, 
but was at t1, do not still exist. Of course, it may equally be the case that the parts do 
not survive the process by which Y comes into existence. Take the process by 
which wine comes into existence as an example. Here we start with grapes; 
however, when we get wine, grapes are no longer – strictly speaking – parts of 
wine. Thus, depending on the case at hand, the Xs may keep on existing or go out of 
existence.  
 If there is a composition relation between the Xs (the constituents of a Mexican 
wave) and Y (a Mexican wave), and because Y continuously looses and gains some 
of its Xs over time, the relation of composition cannot exhaustively determine the 
existence of Y at any particular time instant t, since neither the Xs nor Y are wholly 
present at any particular time instant t. If this is correct, we can say the following 
about the Xs and Y in our example of a Mexican wave: if Y has temporal parts not 
restricted to any specific time instant t – in that, Y has temporal parts spread out in 
time and in space – then Y can at best be partly present – in contrast to wholly 
present – at a particular time t or at each particular stage over an interval, t1, …, tn. 
 
3.7. Status and further reflections 
 
I have presented two arguments for the claim that metaphysical building relations, 
contrariwise to their standard formulation, may hold diachronically. The first 
argument was: A building relation holds diachronically in cases where the building 
relation in question cannot hold between the very same relata. I presented this 
argument by discussing the composition relation between water and water 
molecules. The second argument was: A building relation holds diachronically in 
cases where the building relation cannot exhaustively determine the existence of 
some higher-level phenomenon at a particular time instant t or at each particular 
stage over an interval, t1, …, tn, because neither the parts nor the whole are wholly 
present at any particular time instant t or at each particular stage over an interval, t1, 
…, tn. I presented this argument with the example of a Mexican wave and the 
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process of writing a cheque. I now wish to add a few more points of contrast 
between the synchronic view and the diachronic view.  
 
3.7.1. Direction of dependence 
 
The standard view of synchronic building relations presupposes that building 
relations relate entities at different levels in a vertical, bottom-up direction of 
determination, whereas diachronic relations hold horizontally between entities at the 
same level. Bennett provides this diagram illustrating the standard view of 
synchronic building relations (Forthcoming, p. 45):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Illustration of the assumption that building relations hold vertically, whereas 
diachronic relations hold horizontally. The vertical axis represents synchronic 
building (or, relative fundamentality). The horizontal axis represents time.  
 
The case of David and Piece fits snugly with this diagram. The constitution relation 
between Piece (P1) and David (M1) holds entirely at t1 (represented by the vertical 
arrow). The constitution relation holds between David and Piece in a vertical, 
bottom-up direction of determination, while is it in virtue of a causal or diachronic 
relation that Piece and David persists over time (represented by the horizontal 
arrow). In other words, the constitution relation between David and Piece is vertical 
precisely because it holds synchronically. If this is true, it restricts metaphysical 
building relations to the vertical axis of the diagram. But, as we have seen, there are 
cases in which building relations may arguably be said to hold diachronically. On 
the standard view, however, diachronic relations are not building relations, since 
diachronic relations are assumed to be horizontal relations, viz., that such relations 
are strictly intralevel relations. If am correct to insist that building relations may be 
diachronic, it follows that, at least sometimes, the relevant distinction between 
vertical (synchronic) and horizontal (diachronic) relations is false.  
Karen Bennett.  DRAFT of February 2012.  Please do not cite or circulate without permission. 
 
3.  CAUSING 
Building is determination or dependence.  It might seem natural to say that it is noncausal 
determination or dependence.  In this chapter I argue that doing so would be a mistake.  That is, I 
argue that the standard distinction between causal and noncausal determination is both less clear 
and less useful than that typ cally assumed
As a warm-up exercise, let’s review that standard distinction.  The thought is that there 
are two quit  differ nt types of ‘because’ and ‘makes it the case’ talk.  One corresponds to my 
notion of building: for example, a certain pattern of low-level physical activity makes it the case 
that my coffee mug exists and has the mass that it does.  The other is causal:  my throwing the 
mug in a certain directio  mak s it the case th t there is a big splat er of coffee on the wall.  That 
distinction turns up, implicitly or explicitly, all over philosophy.  Indeed, we even have a deeply 
ingrai ed spatial m tap or for it.  Causal determination is horizontal, and noncausal building is 
vertical.  Th  metaphor is reflected in the familiar diagrams frequently used to illustrate various 
worries about the possibility of mental causation:  
M1 → M2 
 
↑ ↑ 
 
P1 → P2 
 Figure 1 
Note that it is worth pausing to ask what exactly the axes are supposed to be here.  The 
horizontal axis represents time.  But what about the vertical axis?  This is otherwise mystifying, 
but my account of building yields a tidy answer:  relative fundamentality.  What we indicate 
when we draw such pictures is our belief that the thing on the bottom is, as the word suggests, 
more fundamental than the thing on the top.   
At any rate, the question on the table is whether it is right to insist so firmly on the 
distinction between horizontal and vertical—between causal and non-causal—determination.  I 
say no.  Building is causally tainted.  It is tainted in two senses.  First, the building family 
includes causation itself.  Second, the building family includes particular relations that are in 
various ways partially causal.  Defending these two claims, and their consequences, will occupy 
the rest of the chapter.  But let me begin by simply clarifying what they say. 
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Bennett suggests that we should conceive of diachronic building relations as neither 
vertical nor horizontal but rather as holding diagonally. Consider again the Mexican 
wave. The Mexican wave, Y, has temporal parts, the Xs, which are not restricted to 
any specific time instant t or to any particular stage over an interval, t1, …, tn. 
Indeed, the Xs of Y are spread out over time and in space in such a way that Y and 
the Xs are precluded from being wholly present at any particular time instant t or at 
any particular stage over an interval, t1, …, tn. That is, just as Y can only be partially 
present in time and in space due to having temporal parts spread out in time and in 
space, the composition relation, R, can only be partially present at a particular 
instant t. In fact, we might say, following Bennett, that R is vertical; however, 
whenever R is vertical, R is only partly present. Similarly, R connects temporal parts 
that are not restricted to one unique time instant t, but that unfolds across an 
interval. In this sense, R is operating horizontally – or, across time and space. 
Because R holds both vertically and horizontally, R, in the case of the Mexican 
wave, holds diagonally.  
 
3.7.2. Mutually exclusive relations 
 
Insofar as diachronic conceptions of constitution and composition, for example, are 
justified options, it follows that if conceived of as general frameworks for the study 
constitution and composition, the synchronically based view and the diachronic 
view are mutually exclusive. That is, it cannot be true both that the composition 
relation R, say, that holds between some Xs and some Y is ontologically synchronic 
and that R that holds between the very same Xs and Y is ontologically diachronic. 
Let me qualify this claim. I do not claim that choosing one of the two is equivalent 
to choosing between two large-scale pictures of the reality of composition. That is, 
if you opt for one, it does not entail the rejection of the other, simpliciter. I am all 
for plurality. In fact, I have consistently argued that ontological synchronicity, in the 
case of David and Piece, for example, is an entirely coherent view. More generally, 
ontological synchronicity is a live option in cases where the relata are wholly 
present at some time instant t or at each particular stage over an interval, t1, …, tn. If 
one is inclined towards pluralism, claiming that ontological synchronicity and 
ontological diachronicity are mutually exclusive amounts to the following, more 
limited claim, namely that ontological synchronicity and ontological diachronicity 
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cannot be true of a single phenomenon – viz., of one and the same phenomenon in 
relation to one and the same level of analysis.  
 
3.7.3. Four-dimensionalism 
 
If one were inclined towards four-dimensionalism, one might apply an atemporal 
perspective, within which every constitution or composition relation is synchronic. 
Four-dimensionalism is the view that everyday objects (including people) are space-
time worms that persist through time by having temporal parts none of which are 
said to be identical with the particular object itself (Brogaard 2000; Sider 2001). 
However, I am not convinced that adopting the “atemporal perspective” of four-
dimensionalism exhaustively supports the general claim that constitution or 
composition must be ontologically synchronic. The four-dimensionalist might say 
that in the case of a Mexican wave, Y’s temporal parts at t are, atemporally, part of 
the larger (so-called) space-time worm that is Y (in its entirety or throughout Y’s 
career). That is, as Sider points out, “we can think of the four dimensionalist’s 
notions of atemporal parthood, and atemporal exemplification generally, as being 
those we employ when we take an ‘atemporal perspective’ and contemplate the 
whole of time.” (1997, p. 198) Specifically, according to four-dimensionalism, the 
statement that the Mexican wave exists is loose talk for the following: “[…] only 
stages of objects exists, but […] objects have four dimensions in the sense that they 
have an unfolding temporal dimension in addition to the three spatial ones.” 
(Brogaard 2000, p. 343) Brogaard defines a stage as follows: “I take a stage to be an 
infinitely thin slice of an object along this temporal dimension. No stage is wholly 
present at more than one time; every stage is wholly present at exactly one time. 
There is a new stage for every moment at which a given thing exists.” (2000, p. 
343) Consequently, the four-dimensionalist would say the following about the claim 
that a Mexican wave is ontologically diachronic: at each moment at which the 
Mexican wave exists it is wholly present precisely because at each particular point 
in time, there is an instantaneous stage of the Mexican wave. So the Mexican wave 
is both wholly present at t and over its career (atemporally speaking, of course).  
It is not my aim to challenge the four-dimensionalist here – an important task 
for another time – but it certainly seems to me that insofar as the four-
dimensionalist is correct to insist on a synchronic interpretation of a Mexican wave, 
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she may do so, but only because she does so from a very abstract perspective, and, 
as a result, ignores fine-grained temporal details involved in the phenomena under 
scrutiny. Beyond this quibble, even within the four-dimensionalist perspective, 
phenomena will vary along many dimensions of differences including homogeneity 
or heterogeneity of the parts and of the whole, and their respective, overlapping, 
continuous, and discontinuous “lengths” along the parameter of time. Therefore, the 
constitution or the composition relation must characterize a very wide variety of 
phenomena, and the proposed diachronic account helps to sufficiently broaden the 
metaphysics of building relations to account for more heterogeneous and dynamic 
phenomena.  
 
3.8. Conclusion 
 
This concludes my development of a few initial steps toward a diachronic view of 
metaphysical building relations. I now turn to engage in discussions of the 
diachronic view and the synchronic view – discussions that I think are pertinent to 
my first thesis aim, namely the metaphysical foundations of EC. In the next chapter, 
I start by considering the issue of cognitive assembly in EC, where I explore a 
potential relation between the process of cognitive assembly (Clark 2008; Hutchins 
2011a) and the special composition question in metaphysics (van Inwagen 1990).  
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4. The process of cognitive assembly: Further evidence for 
the diachronic view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When addressing the extended cognition thesis (EC), there are two explanatory 
targets that one must be careful to distinguish between. The first is the assembly 
process involved in orchestrating an extended cognitive process and/or an extended 
cognitive system. I refer to this as the process of cognitive assembly (the process of 
CA). Notice that when addressing the process of CA, we may ask over which 
timescales, and by which principles, different entities (e.g., certain neural 
operations, saccadic eye movements, cultural practices, tools) combine to put 
together or compose a temporally distributed cognitive process and/or system. The 
other target concerns the newly assembled device once it has been assembled or 
composed. I call this the product of cognitive assembly (the product of CA). In 
relation to the product of CA, we may ask questions about the difference in 
properties between the various parts, how information flows and its propagated 
between the different parts, and how it is that an extended cognitive system 
instantiates such “processes in ways that ideally solve some problem.” (Clark 2008, 
p. 122)  
In this chapter, I attempt to muster additional support for my diachronic 
account of metaphysical building relations by exploring a recent debate in EC 
between Clark (2008, 2011) and Hutchins (2011a) concerning the process of CA. 
My independent motivation for this is twofold: first, to sort out some of the 
positions one might take in this discussion between Clark and Hutchins; and second 
to defend that at least one of those choices marks a step towards a third-wave 
version of EC. 
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4.1. Arguments 
 
When addressing the process of CA, what I call the usual account is as follows: 
Only processes operating in the here-and-now are responsible for the process of CA 
and such processes are primarily bodily and neural processes. Prominent advocates 
of this view include Clark (2008, 2011) and Clark & Chalmers (1998). I should add 
that the usual account of EC is what has recently been referred to as first-wave EC. 
Defenders of first-wave EC ground their arguments for EC on the ideas that (i) 
external artifacts are incorporated into the cognitive system of an individual in 
virtue of the right kind of causal coupling, and (ii) functional similarity between the 
causal roles of internal and external occupiers. Alternatively to first-wave EC, 
defenders of second-wave EC go beyond parity and focus instead on 
complementarity between internal and external states and properties (Sutton 2010) 
and their consequent integration into a cognitive whole (Menary 2007).  
 In this chapter, I explore one possible route by which to gesture at but also 
argue for a third-wave version of EC. Specifically, I follow work by second-wave 
theorists, who are driving particular visions for a third-wave of EC. In particular, I 
shall propose one approach to the process of CA that exemplifies Sutton’s recent 
gesture towards a third-wave of EC: a version “which dissolves individuals into 
peculiar loci of coordination and coalescence among multiple structured media [and 
practices].” (2010, p. 213) This suggestion echoes, I think, what Menary has 
recently called “enculturated cognition” (EnC). EnC is the “idea that our cognitive 
abilities are transformed by a cognitive species of cultural practices […]. What we 
are able to do is augmented and transformed by the acquisition of cognitive 
practices.” (2012, p. 148) Both of these suggestions for a third-wave of EC 
emphasize the deconstruction of the individual organism as the locus of the process 
of CA and allow for cultural practices as playing a central role in close coordination 
with neural and bodily processes.  
 I aim to unpack this articulation of a third-wave of EC in a way that has not 
been done before. That is, I will discuss the process of CA in conjunction with work 
on the relation of composition in metaphysics. I should add that even though the 
debate about the process of CA is not (strictly speaking) about the metaphysics of 
composition, those involved in the discussion over CA ask structurally similar 
questions to those involved in debates about composition in metaphysics. In debates 
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over composition, what is known as the special composition question (SCQ) (van 
Inwagen 1990) concerns the circumstances under which entities assemble or 
compose another entity. Indeed, both the process of CA and SCQ ask questions 
concerning the conditions under which entities combine to compose or assemble 
another entity (or whole). In so doing, both SCQ and the process of CA take as their 
target the Xs – the constituents – that compose or assemble Y, and analyze the 
conditions under which the Xs come together to compose or assemble Y.  
 The first argument that I will develop turns on the fact that composition is 
understood as a synchronic relation of dependence, and that a synchronic notion of 
composition is inconsistent with the temporal dynamics inherent in the process of 
CA. To make this claim, I aim to establish that the restriction of the verb “compose” 
in the expression “the Xs compose Y” to the present tense is metaphysically 
problematic when considering the nature of time continuous processes such as those 
involved in the process of CA. This picture, familiar as it is, of X (or the Xs) 
composing Y at an instant t, finds no corresponding image in contemporary debates 
about the process of CA. In fact, when Clark states that his own targets in 
Supersizing the Mind (2008) are processes operating in the here-and-now, nowhere 
does Clark’s temporal qualification “here-and-now” adhere to the assumption that 
the verb “compose” must be understood to imply “compose at an instant t”. 
Consequently, serious inquiry of the process of CA and the SCQ must begin by 
scrutinizing the actual meaning of the term “now” as it is used to express the claim 
“the Xs compose Y now or in the here-and-now”. What I shall argue is that the 
process of CA must be stated without implicating a notion of composing or 
assembling that is synchronic, where “synchronic” means that the Xs are composing 
Y at an instant t. This is important, since I will show that only by problematizing the 
notion of synchronic composition is it possible to provide a properly motivated 
answer to the process of CA. That is where the metaphysical action lies in this 
chapter.  
The second argument considers the debate between Clark and Hutchins on the 
process of CA, with the aim of establishing that as soon as we leave room for the 
non-trivial role of cultural practices in the process of CA – even when the processes 
unfold in the here-and-now – this requires that we look beyond the system made up 
of the individual agent and artifact. That is, we must include into our explanation of 
the process of CA such features as cognitive norms (Menary 2007) and patterned 
! 85 
(cultural) practices (Hutchins 2011a; Menary 2007; Roepstorff et al. 2010). By the 
end of the chapter, I hope to have established that developing a diachronic account 
of the process of CA lends support for a third-wave of EC.  
 
4.2. Overview 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 4.3, I consider difficulties with 
giving a satisfactory answer to the qualification that the verb “compose” is to be 
understood in the present tense – i.e., as right now some Xs are composing some Y. 
In section 4.4, I make use of the outcome of my discussion in section 4.3 to discuss 
one of Clark’s examples of the process of CA: Gray & Fu’s (2004) studies on the 
soft-assembly of interactive microstrategies employed by the brain to solve a given 
problem. In section 4.5, I consider the debate between Hutchins and Clark on the 
process of CA. In the final section, I tease out several implications of the discussion 
in this chapter.  
 
4.3. Discussing the terms “now”, “right now” and “here-and-now” 41  
 
Under what circumstances do a collection of entities compose some further entity? 
As we saw in the introduction of this chapter, this is van Inwagen’s SCQ (1990). 
Some answer never (see e.g., Rosen & Dorr 2002), some say sometimes, yet only 
sometimes (see e.g., Markosian 1998; van Inwagen 1990), whereas some say 
always (see e.g., Lewis 1986; Sider 2001)42. In this section, I do not consider any of 
these options for when (or if) composition holds. Instead, I start by considering 
difficulties with providing an answer to the assumption that the verb “compose” in 
the expression ‘the Xs jointly combine to compose Y’ is to be understood as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 I use the terms “now”, “right now”, and “here-and-now” interchangeably.  
42 These different answers express three different attitudes toward composition: 
first, nihilism, which is the view that there are no conditions under which the Xs 
compose some Y; second, restrictivism, which states that there are some conditions 
under which the Xs compose some Y and there are some conditions under which the 
Xs do not compose some Y; and thirdly, universalism, which is the view that there 
are no conditions under which the Xs fail to compose something.  
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meaning ‘right now, the Xs combine to compose Y’. Consider, yet again, what van 
Inwagen says about tense and composition in Material Beings:  
 
“The verb ‘compose’ in the predicate ‘the xs compose y’ is to be understood 
as being in the present tense, and the same point applies to ‘are’ in ‘are parts 
of’. Thus, ‘are parts of’ and ‘compose’ should be read ‘are now parts of’ and 
‘now compose’. Strictly speaking […], our definiendum should have been ‘the 
xs compose y at t’, and our “primitive” mereological predicate should have 
been ‘x is a part of y at t.” (1990, p. 29)  
 
On this view, for the Xs to compose Y now is to claim that the Xs compose Y at t. 
By my lights, this is a rather elusive way to characterize the idea of “now” with 
respect to composition, since it leaves it an open question whether van Inwagen 
means either (i) that composition is a relation between the Xs and Y at time t, where 
the extension of t may include ‘over a short interval’ or (ii) that composition is a 
relation between the Xs and Y at a momentary (i.e., durationless) instant. Consider, 
however, how Bennett conceptualizes composition in her survey of metaphysical 
relations: “Composition is a synchronic or atemporal many-one relation […].” 
(2011, p. 81) Furthermore, what we might call the usual account of composition 
depicts composition as a vertical relation of dependence between the Xs and Y, 
where ‘vertical determination’ is understood to exclude ‘horizontal determination’ 
(Bennett, forthcoming; Gillett 2007a; Kim 2005). That is to say that if there is a 
relation of vertical determination between some Xs and some Y, then that relation 
of determination does not unfold across a time interval. By contrast, if a relation is a 
relation of horizontal determination such as causation, then the determination in 
operation is a diachronic (or temporal) kind of determination. So, the usual account 
of composition – both in metaphysics and in the metaphysics of science – turns on 
the presupposition that composition is a relation that holds between some Xs and 
some Y at a durationless instant t.  
Prima facie, at least, it seems to me that ordinary folk are quite familiar with the 
idea of “now” or “right now”. For instance, when we talk about something presently 
taking place such as executing a tennis serve, engaging in a conversation with a 
friend, stirring the pasta sauce, and so on, we (implicitly) appeal to the temporal fact 
that something – which we may or may not engage in – is happening or taking place 
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right now. If the folk are right, which they may or may not be, it would make the set 
of events to which the term “now” applies include events the temporal duration of 
which unfolds over milliseconds, seconds, and even minutes. It may only take me a 
few seconds to stir the pasta sauce, whereas it may take me a few minutes to 
execute the proper move in a chess game43.  
In metaphysics things are different from the opinions of the folk. For example, 
in the debate over “now”, as we have seen, “now” is usually conceived as “at an 
instant t.” A different way of understanding the meaning of “now” is the result of a 
specific discussion in metaphysics. Following Markosian (2004), it is possible to set 
up a distinction between two different senses of the notion “X exists now”. The first 
sense is what Markosian calls the temporal location sense, where the expression “X 
exists now” is meant to be synonymous with “X is present”. This is the received 
view of presentism in metaphysics (Markosian 2004). The second sense of “X exists 
now”, Markosian calls the ontological sense. According to the ontological sense, 
the expression “X exists now” is understood as shorthand for the claim that X “is 
now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, whether it is present, like 
you and me, or non-present, like Socrates.” (Markosian 2004, p. 48) This is the 
view commonly expressed as non-presentism. Presentism and non-presentism make 
competing claims about temporal ontology (Sider 2006). Presentism is the view 
that, necessarily, it is always true that only present entities exist, whereas non-
presentism is often formulated in an atemporal language that is hostile to presentism 
(Sider 2001). That is, on the non-presentist view, past and future entities, such as 
dinosaurs and me 10 years from today, all exist. However, for the presentist, but not 
the non-presentist, there is something ontologically special about the now, in the 
sense that only entities that are currently present, exist.  
For my purposes, it matters little whether presentism or non-presentism is 
ultimately true, in that, all I wish to highlight is that both of these (hotly debated) 
doctrines in metaphysics are also elusive when it comes to pinning down the precise 
meaning of the notion “now”. First, the presentist states that only present entities 
exist. But what might this claim amount to in the context of this thesis, which is 
embedded in the philosophy of cognitive science (broadly speaking)? Consider, for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 I should point out that the duration of “now” is also discussed in the philosophy 
of time consciousness under the heading of specious present (see e.g., Varela 1999).  
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instance, the Hodgkin & Huxley (1952) model of the action potential discussed in 
Craver (2007).  
Action potentials consist of both rapid and fleeting changes in what is known as 
the electrical potential difference in a neuron’s membrane. This electrical potential 
difference (measured as the voltage difference across the membrane) is known as 
the membrane potential. The membrane potential consists of a separation of charged 
ions on either side of the membrane. As Craver specifies: “In the neuron’s resting 
state, positive ions line up against the extracellular surface. In typical cells, this 
arrangement establishes a polarized resting potential (Vrest) of –60 mV to –70 mV. 
In an action potential, the membrane becomes fleetingly permeable to sodium (Na+) 
and potassium (K+). This allows the ions to diffuse rapidly across the cell 
membrane.” (2007, p. 50)  
Unconventional as this example may be in the context of presentism, the 
question I wish to consider goes to the heart of the ambiguity of how to understand 
“present” or “now”. That is, is the action potential present in the presentist sense? 
Let us start with the (arguably) uncontroversial assumption that insofar as an action 
potential is present now (whatever we take “now” and “present” to imply), the 
action potential requires for it to be present that it unfolds over a region of space-
time. In other words, an action potential’s nature is such that it is temporally 
extended in contrast to being completely or wholly present at a momentary instant. 
This follows from the brute fact that an action potential irreducibly consists of (i), 
(ii), and (iii) – that is, of (i) a quick increase in mV to a maximum of +35 mV, (ii) a 
rapid decrease in mV to certain values below Vrest, and (iii) a prolonged after-
potential period during which the neuron is less excitable – and the manifestation of 
any of these three stages or parts take time (measured in milliseconds). The 
presentist is committed to the ontological claim that only present entities exist. 
However, consider some event – the rapid rise in mV to a maximum value of 
approximately +35 mV – that is happening right now. Too late! That event is over, 
in the sense that the mV is already rapidly declining to a value below Vrest. If we 
take seriously that it is only present entities that exist, it follows that the first stage 
of the action potential is now entirely in the past. However, according to the 
presentist, everything that is either in the past or in the future (or both) does not 
strictly speaking exist; only entities that exist now are present.  
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I do not intend this to be a refutation of presentism; however, if this is indeed one 
possible outcome of presentism, then it raises a counter-intuitive situation: that the 
first stage that the action potential consists of is not – or, no longer – part of the 
action potential, because of the fact that the mV is presently on the decline. 
Furthermore, what is now part of the action potential – for example, stage two – 
will, in a very short period of time, cease to be a part of the action potential because 
it will be entirely in the past. For the cognitive scientist as well as philosophers of 
cognitive science this result, I suspect, will be unbelievable. For example, in 
mechanistic philosophy of cognitive science (Bechtel 2008; Craver 2007), lower-
level parts compose higher-level entities by the parts being organized in a certain 
temporal, spatial, and causal fashion. But, the parts themselves will not cease to be 
part of some higher-level components due to the fact that they operate over different 
temporal frequencies.  
Non-presentism will do no better for my purposes, because non-presentism is 
stated tenselessly or timelessly, thus completely ignoring one of the central 
principles of research across cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Engel et al. 2001; Friston 
2010), cognitive psychology (e.g., Ballard et al. 1997; Spivey 2007), as well as 
dynamical and enactive approaches to cognition (e.g., Clark 1997; Gibson 1979; 
van Gelder 1998; Varela et al. 1991; Wheeler 2005), namely that cognition happens 
in time (not in some timeless vacuum), and that time constrains as well as limits the 
production of cognitive activity. Wheeler captures this emphasis on temporality 
nicely, as he states:  
 
“In the psychological arena, such phenomena [i.e., temporally rich 
phenomena] include (i) the rates of change within, the actual temporal 
duration of, and any rhythmic properties exhibited by, individual cognitive 
processes, and (ii) the ways in which those rates of change, temporal 
durations, and rhythms are synchronized both with the corresponding 
temporal phenomena exhibited by other cognitive processes, and the temporal 
processes taking place in the cognizer’s body and her environment.” (2005, p. 
106)  
 
The central problem with both the standard synchronic notion of composition, on 
the one hand, and the doctrines of presentism and non-presentism, on the other, is 
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that none make concessions to the fact that time is continuous (Spivey 2007): one 
that impedes the treatment of time in terms of arbitrary, discrete step time (t1, t2, 
etc.)  
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the standard composition theorist is a 
synchronic composition theorist, in that, she/he accepts that the primitive ‘X exists 
at time (or temporal interval) t’ implies ontological synchronicity with respect to t. 
That is, the synchronic composition theorist claims that if X exists at t and if X is 
part of Y, then X is part of Y at t – this will be so no matter how continuous or 
discontinuous, transient or durable the interval and sub-intervals may be.  
This practice of casting the temporal conditions under which X (or the Xs) 
composes Y into some lockstep or stepwise progression (t1, t2, etc.), involving a 
sequence of discrete states – such that X1 composes Y1 at t1, X2 composes Y2 at t2, 
and so on, until tn – highlights an important difference between temporally complex 
forms of composition and the kind of composition most metaphysicians have in 
mind.  
To further highlight this difference, consider the following example of 
returning a tennis serve, in van Gelder & Port:  
 
“The ball is approaching; you are perceiving its approach, are aware of the 
other player’s movements, are considering the best strategy for the return, and 
are shifting into position to play the stroke. All this is happening at the same 
time. As you move into place, your perspective on the approaching ball is 
changing and hence so is activity on your retina and in your visual system … 
the path of the approaching ball affects which strategy would be best and how 
you move. Everything is simultaneously affecting everything else.” (1995, p. 
23; italics in original) 
 
In this example, claiming that a system S instantiates Y (returning a tennis serve), 
and Y is composed of some particular Xs, at a particular point in time t, boils down 
to saying that during that period of time Y was composed by the Xs. Keep in mind 
that we have independent reasons for being suspicious about the term “temporal 
instant t”. Consequently, in the process of CA, we should go on to define the 
relationship between parts and whole as follows: over some period of time, the Xs 
compose Y, and over that period of time, none of the Xs completely overlap Y.  
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With respect to the notion that either Y or X (or both) exists right now, the standard 
construal of composition, which implies that “now” or “right now” is to be 
understood in terms of ontological synchronicity, cannot account for the dynamical 
and temporally extended phenomena such as returning a tennis serve and an action 
potential. That is, nothing in the standard account of composition allows for 
continuous processes unfolding in real time. Unlike material objects, which might 
be timeless in the sense that they exist whole and complete at an instant t, processes 
such as the Mexican wave (chapter 3), an action potential (this chapter), and 
transactive remembering (the next chapter) are temporally extended in nature. At 
the beginning of a process, the process as such has not yet achieved its end. 
Likewise, at the end of a process, its beginning is over. It would obscure the basic 
temporal nature of processes if processes were supposed, confusedly, to be 
composed exhaustively at a durationless instant t. Importantly, processes such as an 
action potential, returning a tennis serve, the Mexican wave, etc., are continuous 
processes. Clark provides the following definition of a continuous process:  
 
“A continuous process is one in which the time-series of explanatorily 
relevant sub-states cannot be reduced to a sequence of discrete states with 
jumps in between, but instead requires a genuine continuum of states.” 
(1998b, p. 356)  
 
In the tennis example, it makes little sense to insist that Y is composed wholly 
within and only within each particular sub-interval of t and that each transition from 
one sub-interval to the next involves a complete transition of X and Y such that both 
X and Y are wholly present within one and only one particular sub-interval at a 
time44.  
Similarly in the debate about CA, I submit. For example, when Clark adopts the 
short-term timescales of the here-and-now to explore just how the brain participates 
in what (from the perspective of EC) are new distributed cognitive products, Clark !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 As Spivey mentions: “Real time does not function like a digital computer’s clock. 
It does not move forward and then stop to be counted, and then move forward again 
only to stop again. At the level of human behavior, real time does not have an 
objective functional unit.” (2007, p. 30) 
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wants to analyze which neural and bodily processes assemble temporally distributed 
wholes right now. As Clark mentions: “In depicting the processes of on-the-spot 
recruitment and exploitation as neurally-centered, I meant only to stress the pivotal 
role, on all these shorter time-scales, of the specifically neural changes that 
immersion in those cultural practices presumably inculcate.” (2011, p. 459) For 
instance, in Supersizing the Mind (2008), most of the case studies referred to by 
Clark are studies that emphasize the short-term, but varied, temporal scales of 
bodily and neural operations – timescales that unfold over courses of 50 to 300 
milliseconds.  
In contrast to the standard view of composition in metaphysics, when Clark 
states that it is the processes, which operate in the here-and-now that assemble (or, 
compose) distributed ensembles, what Clark is actually saying is that it is the short-
term timescales over which most neural and bodily processes operate that during 
that short period of time assemble or put together some distributed cognitive whole.  
Here it is enlightening to consider that the use of “right now” in CA is closely 
related to how the folk consider the notion “right now”. In EC, occurrent distributed 
cognitive wholes are considered to temporally unfold everywhere from 50 
milliseconds and up to a few hours in the case of occurrent emotions and extended 
instances of decision-making. Similarly, as I argued above, if the folk are right, then 
the term “right now” would refer to occurrences ranging from 2-3 hours in their 
entirety to 200-300 milliseconds (and faster). That is, from entire cricket matches to 
the completion of one saccadic eye movement. Furthermore, as with most (if not 
all) processes, cognitive processes have subprocesses as well as subphases. For 
example, the typical time span of a single episode of voluntary biographical 
remembering is roughly 10 seconds and this trajectory can have any number of both 
continuous and discontinuous sub-phases and sub-processes (Sutton, personal 
comm.).  
Thus, just as the processes making up a tennis serve return, the processes and 
subprocesses that compose a token episode of voluntary biographical remembering 
are time continuous – that is, both cases involve continuous processes, and 
continuous processes and their relevant subprocesses as well as subphases cannot be 
reduced to a sequence of discrete states instantiated within a discrete temporal slice 
or stage of time. Spivey expresses this idea, as he says:  
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“[Claiming] that a system was in a particular “state,” X, at a particular point in 
time, really boils down to saying that the average of the system’s states during 
that period of time was X. This kind of coarse averaging measurement is often 
a practical necessity in science, but should not be mistaken as genuine 
evidence for the system actually resting in a discrete stable state.” (2007, p. 
30; bold and italics in original)  
 
It is, of course, possible to distinguish conceptually between long-term evolutionary 
timescales, timescales running over developmental and/or cultural-historical time, 
and the short-term timescales of hours, seconds, and milliseconds (Clark 2011)45. 
But, regardless of how we conceptually carve up time, time is, I submit, continuous 
(Clark 1998b; Port & van Gelder 1995; Spivey 2007)46. It seems highly unlikely 
that the components assembled on the spot to complete a tennis serve return 
function in what van Gelder & Port call arbitrary step time (t1, t2, etc.). That each 
new second or millisecond signals, as Spivey puts it “an instantaneous and 
simultaneous updating of the discrete state of each and every unit in the system.” 
(2007, p. 30; italics in original) This complaint applies to the standard view of 
synchronic composition, in the sense that the standard view delineates time into !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 But these conceptual distinctions may not apply objectively. As Smart (1963), for 
instance, argues against the A-theory of time, according to which “past”, “present” 
and “future” are understood to objectively apply to the universe, Smart argues that 
this way of carving up time is an entirely anthropocentric account of time. That is, 
distinctions of past, present, and future are distinctions made from a particular 
(human) point of view (Smart 1963, p. 132; see also Sider 2001; for an overview of 
the A-theory of time, see e.g., Mellor 1998)  
46 Two interesting questions arise at this point: (a) is time in fact continuous? And 
(b) if time is continuous, is this a necessary or contingent fact about time? I do not 
discuss (b), because it would take me too far away from the intended topic of this 
thesis. With respect to (a), I take my metaphysics of time from research in 
dynamical systems theory and the applications of dynamical systems theory to 
cognition. I am aware that some philosophers have argued that there is no such 
thing as “time” (cf. McTaggart 1908). Even though this topic is important and 
worthwhile engaging with, it is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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discrete chunks with jumps in between them. In the standard cases, the Xs compose 
or assemble Y only if the Xs and Y are wholly present at each particular instant at 
which they exist.  
The problem, in short, is that even though both the SCQ and the CA address the 
question ‘under which circumstances, and by which principles’ do certain entities 
compose or assemble other entities, the SCQ is formulated synchronically and, 
therefore, leaves out the temporal dynamics of actually occurring instances of 
composition. What we really need is a temporally qualified version of the SCQ; call 
it the Temporal Special Composition Question (TSCQ). Unlike the SCQ, the TSCQ 
does not presuppose a temporal restriction on the verb “compose” or on the verb 
“assemble” such that these would imply ‘compose or assemble at this very instant’. 
Instead, the TSCQ asks the question ‘over which timescales do processes operate 
when they jointly compose (or, assemble) a whole?’  
In addition, “wholes” may be temporary and a one-off ensemble, a temporary 
and repeatable one, or something more permanent (Wilson & Clark 2009). Whether 
it is one or the other is an empirical question – not a question to be settled by 
metaphysical analysis.  
If I am right that the claim ‘the Xs compose or assemble Y right now’, at least 
when considering time continuous processes, is an abstraction and should not be 
mistaken as evidence for the claim that some Xs assemble Y at an ontologically 
synchronic instant, then the evaluation of empirical evidence supporting my claim 
must be sensitive to this fact. Fortunately, the empirical evidence is sensitive to this 
fact. Here, then, is another difference between the understanding of “time” in the 
standard account of composition, on the one hand, and the kind of composition we 
find in time continuous systems, on the other. In the former, time is portrayed as a 
dimension that is neutral, i.e., time exists independently of the events or states, or 
processes, etc., that occur in time, while time (or temporal unfolding) plays a 
fundamental role in the latter. For example, in their discussion of the role of the 
body (or, embodiment) in cognition, Ballard and colleagues say the following:  
 
“When the production of intelligent behavior by the body-brain system is 
taken into account, the constraints of time and space intervene to limit what is 
possible.” (Ballard et al. 1997, p. 723)  
 
! 95 
If I am correct, synchronic composition treats time only as a specification of the 
proposition “the Xs compose Y” as taking place at a time. Thus, the locution “P is v 
at t” implies that the expression in place of P refers to a proposition (e.g., the Xs 
compose Y), the expression in place of v refers to a truth value (it is either true or 
false that P), and the expression in place of t refers to a particular time instant such 
that on the standard view “P is v at t”.  
To proceed with this temporality-driven critique of synchronic composition, 
and to hook it up with the discussion of the process of CA, what we need, in the 
context of the debate over the process of CA, is positive empirical evidence that 
time really matters for just how and for which processes are assembled in order to 
solve a given problem47. That is, we shall look at an example that Clark argues 
shows the “balanced use of a set of potentially highly heterogeneous resources 
assembled on the spot to solve a given problem.” (2008, p. 13)  
 
4.4. The process of cognitive assembly: short-term temporal frequencies 
 
Consider Clark’s employment of a series of experiments conducted by Gray & Fu 
(2004) targeting how patterns of interactive behavior emerge at the level of 
embodiment and how soft-constraints – at the embodiment level – determine which 
of the possible strategies – for solving a given problem – are most likely to be 
selected given the task environment. 
A few points of clarification first: like other researchers in embodied cognition 
(see e.g., Ballard et al. 1997), Gray & Fu take the notion “embodiment level” to 
refer to the timescales over which several neural and bodily operations begin to 
cohere into certain patterns of activity that compose or assemble the bases of 
interactive behavior. These operations include what Gray & Fu refer to as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 One might object to my claim that dynamical cognitive science is incompatible 
with tenseless accounts of time, in that, you can account for change in tenseless 
terms as Russell showed (1906, 1946). Briefly, what it is for an entity E to undergo 
change is for E to have a property X at t and a property Y at t1 rather than X at t1. 
But, notice, if we want to understand (i) the evolvement of the system from t to t1, 
and (b) how that particular temporal evolvement gives rise to a property difference 
in E from t to t1, then a synchronic explanation comes up short.  
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elementary cognitive, perceptual, and action operations that have a typical time-
course of 300 milliseconds (2004, p. 362). Thus, in this case, and with respect to the 
TSCQ, the timescales over which processes operate when they jointly compose or 
assemble certain cognitive products to solve a given problem is the short-term 
timescale of 300 milliseconds it takes various neural processes to combine with 
each other to form a specific “microstrategy” (Gray & Fu 2004, p. 364) – where 
“microstrategy” refers to patterns of behavior invoked to accomplish a cognitive 
task. Such microstrategies, Gray & Fu stress, are softly constrained, suggesting that 
there are many possible routes rather than just one (determined route) by which 
various neural/bodily processes may combine or come together in order to solve a 
given cognitive task (2004, p. 361).    
In the first set of experiments (Gray & Fu 2004), subjects were presented with 
the task of having to program an on-screen simulation of a VCR control panel. The 
idea of the experiment was to manipulate the time-course as well as time-cost 
involved in accessing the information required to program a VCR in order to assess 
whether the task environment facilitates or discourages the use of  “knowledge in-
the-world for knowledge in-the-head.” (Gray & Fu 2004, p. 364)  
In the experiment, subjects were divided into three groups. In the first group 
(the Free-Access condition), the information was clearly visible in front of the user 
so that she freely could access the information via saccadic eye movement. In the 
second group (the Gray-Box condition), the window was partly visible, although the 
required information (about channel, start time, etc.) was covered with a gray box. 
To uncover the information the user had to remove the gray box via a mouse click 
on the gray box. The final group (the Memory-Test condition), who, unlike the 
others, had memorized all the information required, had to remove the gray box and 
type in the information. In order to determine the time-course and time-cost 
involved in each of these three conditions, Gray & Fu analyzed two components: 
first, the time needed for perceptual-motor access to the information; and second, 
the time needed for memory retrieval (see Fig. 9).  
What Gray and colleagues found was that time costs of information retrieval, 
measured in milliseconds, are what determine the combination of processes 
(biological memory, motor actions, shifts of attention, etc.) assembled to solve the 
problem. As Clark puts it:  
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“[The] subjects settled on whatever strategy yielded (at that phase of the 
programming) the least cost (measured by time) information retrieval. In fact, 
they did this even when the fastest mix of resources sacrificed perfect 
knowledge in the world for imperfect knowledge in the head. Only when the 
in-the-world data could be accessed with less effort (measured by time) than 
the data stored in biological memory was it recruited and were calls to the 
external store “built into” the dominant strategy.” (2008, p. 119) 
 
Estimates (in ms) of perceptual-motor and memory retrieval effort by condition 
 
Condition       
 
Perceptual-motor access Memory retrieval 
Free-Access 
Gray-Box 
Memory-Test 
500 
1,000-1,500 
1,000-1,500 
500-1,000 
500-1,000 
100-300 
 
Fig. 9 Overview of the time needed to access the information on each condition. 
Estimates are in milliseconds (adapted from Gray & Fu 2004, p. 368).  
  
If Gray & Fu are correct, what this example clearly indicates is that the 
psychological phenomena of using softly constrained patterns of information 
retrieval cannot be appropriately explained without an appeal to richly temporal 
processes, insofar as various cognitive, perceptual, and motor elements combine to 
compose such transient microstrategies. In other words, the timescales over which 
the Xs operate when they assemble Y fail to accommodate the temporally restricted 
assumption that the Xs do so at right now – at this instant t. Indeed, rendering the 
verb “compose” in “the Xs compose Y” either tenseless (as the non-presentist 
would insist on) or in present tense (as the presentist would insist on) makes little 
sense in this dynamical and time continuous domain.  
As Clark mentions, temporal “cost-benefit trade-offs are said to provide a soft 
constraint […] on the mix of motoric, perceptual, and biomemory-based resources 
that will, other things being equal, be automatically recruited to perform a given 
information-processing task on a given occasion.” (2008, p. 120) That is, Gray & Fu 
show that the Free-Access group favor perceptual-motor access over memory 
retrieval, whereas the Memory-Test group favor memory retrieval strategies given 
that that route of retrieval is much faster than perceptual-motor access. It would 
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seem, therefore, that the timescales over which various cognitive, perceptual, and 
motor elements combine to compose transient microstrategies are ineliminably 
context-sensitive and will, consequently, differ accordingly to the constraints of the 
task environment. That is, it is wrong to require that each case of the verb 
“compose” in the expression “the Xs compose Y” must be true or false once and for 
all, viz., independently of time and context. Processes preclude instantiation at a 
particular time instant t, in the sense that what it is to be a process – that is, what it 
is to persist as a process – involves, necessarily, unfolding over time (Hofweber & 
Velleman 2011). Therefore, even on the short-term timescales of neural operations, 
neural processes are not wholly present at any singular instant t. For my purposes, 
then, the real power of the example discussed by Clark is that it shows that even on 
the short-term timescales over which neural and bodily processes operate, it is 
ontological diachronicity all the way down.  
We have here a consequence for those involved in the debate over CA in EC 
and for metaphysicians with a synchronic persuasion. First, and to repeat what I said 
in section 4.3, insofar as Clark states that it is the processes that operate here-and-
now that orchestrate the assembly of hybrid, distributed cognitive wholes, this claim 
boils down to saying that it is the short-term timescale of bodily and neural 
processes that during that period of time orchestrated the assembly process of some 
distributed cognitive whole, and should not be mistaken as evidence for the claim 
that processes actually assembling some distributed cognitive whole do so at a time 
instant t. As I understand Clark’s position – or, the best way to interpret Clark’s 
insistence on the timescale of the here-and-now – is precisely that it is the processes 
that unfold over short-term, but varied, timescales that assemble or compose 
distributed cognition. Second, if the metaphysics of composition is to apply to 
dynamical processes involved in the process of CA, then the synchronic account of 
composition is problematic. Thus, the process of CA must be stated entirely such 
that it does not implicate assumptions about composition as ontologically 
synchronic.  
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4.5. The process of cognitive assembly – distributed over multiple timescales 
and multiple resources 
 
So far I have argued that any adequate analysis of the SCQ in the context of CA 
should accept a diachronic conception of composition. I wish now to examine what 
is presupposed in the argument for the process of CA provided by Clark, namely 
that it is only the processes operating here-and-now that are responsible for the 
assembly of distributed cognitive processes and/or systems in conjunction with the 
claim that those processes primarily responsible for such assembly are bodily and 
neural processes.  
As Clark explicitly states: “My own targets, in the discussion in [Supersizing 
the Mind] of cognitive assembly, were the processes operating in the here-and-
now.” (2011, p. 459) And as Clark specifies the kinds of processes in operation in 
the here-and-now:  
 
“It is indeed primarily (though not solely) the biological organism that, 
courtesy especially of its potent neural apparatus, spins and maintains (or 
more minimally selects and exploits) the webs of additional structure that then 
form parts of the machinery that accomplishes its own cognizing.” (2008, p. 
123)  
 
“Just as it is the spider body that spins and maintains the web that then […] 
constitutes part of its own extended phenotype, so it is the biological organism 
that spins, selects, or maintains the webs of cognitive scaffolding that 
participate in the extended machinery of its own thought and reason. 
Individual cognizing, then, is organism centered even if it is not organism 
bound.” (2008, p. 123) 
 
There are two assumptions at work in Clark’s project. The first assumption is that 
only processes operating here-and-now are responsible for the assembly of 
distributed cognitive processes or systems. The second assumption is that the 
processes most directly responsible for such assembly are bodily and/or neural 
processes. With respect to the example above, these two assumptions highlight that 
it is the short-term temporal frequencies at the embodiment level, made up of 
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perceptual, motor, and cognitive processes, which are primarily responsible for the 
process of integrating appropriate resources into an extended cognitive whole. But, 
this combination is not the only coherent and live option in the literature. That is, if 
we call Clark’s first assumption “A”, and call the second assumption “B”, then 
these assumptions leave open any of the three following combinations: (i) accept 
(A) and (B) – this is Clark’s position in his (2008); (ii) accept (A) but deny (B); and 
(iii) deny both (A) and (B). That is:  
 
1. Only processes operating here-and-now are responsible for CA, and such 
processes are bodily and neural processes. 
2. Only processes operating here-and-now are responsible for CA, but this does not 
prevent non-neural and non-bodily processes from significantly contributing to 
the process of CA.  
3. Neither processes operating here-and-now nor bodily and neural processes are 
primarily responsible for CA.  
 
All three of these combinations have seen defenders in the contemporary literature, 
although, I suspect, whether there really are exponents of the third combination 
depends on interpretations of key selected passages. For example, Clark (2011) has 
attacked Hutchins’ “Hypothesis of Enculturated Cognition” (Hutchins 2011a) for 
presupposing that “cultural practices are sufficient to account for all the crucial work 
of cognitive assembly.” (2011, p. 459; italics in original) And as Clark specifies: “I 
think Hutchins is failing to attend to important differences concerning the shape and 
timescale of the processes concerned.” (2011, p. 459) By stating that Hutchins is 
failing to attend to different aspects concerning timescales, Clark means:  
 
“Hutchins’ response might be that we should simply reject the conceptual 
separation between the processes operating on […] various timescales. […]. 
That is how I read his key suggestion that “both the constraints of cultural 
practices and the malleable internal microdemons can be seen as elements of a 
single adaptive system”. But while I agree that these are indeed (also) 
elements of a single long-term adaptive system, that does nothing to diminish 
the conceptual separation between the long-term evolution of cultural 
practices, the medium-term effects of my immersion in such practices, and the 
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short-term processes by means of which my brain then participates in what 
(from an extended mind perspective) are new hybrid cognitive routines that 
productively criss-cross brain, body, and world.” (2011, p. 460) 
 
On this interpretation of Hutchins’ position, it appears that Hutchins endorses the 
third combination, namely that neither processes operating in the here-and-now nor 
bodily and neural processes are what primarily assemble distributed cognitive 
wholes. Hutchins himself states that one way to avoid the option of combining (A) 
and (B) is “to abandon the assumption that the biological brain is the essential 
element. Doing so, of course, requires that one look elsewhere for the apparently 
impartial forces that assemble cognitive systems.” (2011a, p. 439) As Hutchins 
proposes: “A good start to understanding this process of recruitment would be to 
notice the role of cultural practices in the orchestration of soft-assembly of extended 
cognitive systems.” (2011a, p. 440)  
A worry about the third combination, however, is that its general formulation 
allows for the following claim: that certain evolutionary conditions for some present 
cognitive functioning (e.g., from 100,000 years ago) could be actively orchestrating 
the process of CA here-and-now. I am not aware of any philosophers that have 
defended such a suggestion, but it is within the logical space of the formulation of 
the third option. 
However, in other passages, Hutchins’ own position is much closer to the 
second option. Clark mentions this possibility as well, as he states: “For as Hutchins 
himself says, it is only the ‘special super-flexible medium’ of the brain that allows 
such shared practices to come to orchestrate human learning and response in the 
first place.” (2011, p. 459; italics in original) Or, as Hutchins states:  
 
“In this perspective, the brain appears as a special super-flexible medium that 
can form functional subsystems that establish and maintain dynamic co-
ordination among constraints imposed by the world of cultural activity, by the 
body, and by the brain’s own prior organization.” (2011a, p. 445)  
 
Thus, depending on how one interprets Hutchins’ position, it is possible to place 
him in either option two or three. Even though I say that all three combinations are 
coherent, it should be clear that not any one of these is free of difficulty. In addition 
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to Clark’s criticism of Hutchins’ hypothesis of enculturated cognition, Hutchins has 
argued that the first combination – the one Clark opts for in much of his latest work 
(Clark 2008, 2011) – is problematic, since endorsing the view that only bodily and 
neural processes are responsible for the process of CA excludes from view that 
much of the “heavy-lifting” – as Hutchins is fond of calling it – in the assembly of 
distributed cognitive ecologies is performed by cultural practices that unfold over 
longer timescales than those of the here-and-now48.  
A similar sort of ambiguity is present in Clark’s authorship, especially when 
one compares some of Clark’s earlier work such as Being There (1997) as well as 
articles such as “Beyond the Flesh: Lessons from a Mole Cricket” (2005a) and 
“Word, Niche and Super-Niche: How Language Makes Minds Matter More” 
(2005b) and his latest book Supersizing the Mind (2008). In fact, one may also 
locate a similar kind of ambiguity just by reading through his (2008). The ambiguity 
consists in the following: whereas Clark, in his earlier work, is much closer to the 
combination “accept (A) but deny (B)”, he is much more in favor of, as we have 
seen, the combination “accept (A) and (B)” in his latest work. Consider, for 
example, the following combination of quotes: first, “[my] own targets, in the 
discussion in [Supersizing the Mind] of cognitive assembly, were the processes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Another critique of the combination of (A) and (B) comes from Rupert (2009). 
However, whereas Hutchins’ objection to this combination is intended to move the 
EC paradigm towards a more “enculturated” point of view (a third-wave of EC), 
Rupert’s attack of the (A)-(B) combination is meant to show the following: if Clark 
adopts that combination, rather than supporting EC, the combination “offered is 
much more in the spirit of an embedded view (Rupert [2004]): the organism is the 
seat of cognition and locus of control.” (2009, p. 47) Whether Rupert’s assessment 
is successful is a difficult question to answer, and controversy rages as I am writing 
this. But the success of Rupert’s argument is beside the point, in that, if it turns out 
that Rupert is correct, he would still be forced to accept the diachronic account that I 
am pushing here. As I argued in the introduction, there is no entailment relation 
from diachronic building relations (such as composition) to EC. Recall, however, 
that the consequent is not the case, in the sense that if the metaphysical 
underpinnings of EC are to be underpinned or firmly grounded, this forces EC to 
accept DIACHRONIC (or some variety of DIACHRONIC).  
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operating in the here-and-now.” (2011, p. 459) And, as Clark specifies, where those 
processes are primarily located: “Just as it is the spider body that spins and 
maintains the web that then […] constitutes part of its own extended phenotype, so 
it is the biological organism that spins, selects, or maintains the webs of cognitive 
scaffolding that participate in the extended machinery of its own thought and 
reason. Individual cognizing, then, is organism centered even if it is not organism 
bound.” (2008, p. 123) Here Clark is explicit about endorsing option one – that is, 
the acceptance of (A) and (B).  
But, consider the following couple of quotes, the first from his (2008) and the 
second from his (1997): first, “[this] is not to deny, of course, that much of the 
spinning is done by social groups of organisms spread out over long swaths of 
history.” (2008, p. 243; footnote 18) And second: “[The] brain in its bodily context, 
interacting with a complex world of physical and social structures. These external 
structures both constrain and augment problem-solving activities of the basic brain, 
whose role is largely to support a succession of iterated, local, pattern-completing 
responses.” (1997, p. 191) Thus, whereas the first set of quotes puts Clark squarely 
in the first option, this latter set of quotes puts him firmly in the second option.  
It is certainly true that one way to read these ambiguities in both Clark’s and 
Hutchins’ work is that they indicate that not any one of the three options can be 
defended on metaphysical grounds. That is, it is an empirical question just how 
often and how much of the assembly is performed through the combination of (A) 
and (B), (A) and not (B) or not (A) and not (B). It is an empirical issue how much 
and how often the integration is orchestrated internally and how much and how 
often the integration is assembled externally. This, I suspect, is the correct way by 
which to understand the ambiguity present in both Clark and Hutchins concerning 
the process of CA.  
However, this raises a different question, namely might there be reasons for 
favoring one option or combination over the other even though the two 
combinations are not mutually exclusive? I think that there are such reasons, 
especially reasons that lend support to the combination “accept (A) but deny (B)”. 
One worry with the first combination is that it threatens to screen-off the fact that 
even in the here-and-now, history and culture are always already embedded and 
carried along in the practices and artifacts individuals are engaging with (Menary 
2007; Sutton 2008, 2010; see also Haugeland 2002). Indeed, the option of taking the 
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second combination on-board is much more in line with a distinctive third-wave of 
EC theorizing (Sutton 2010; see also Cash 2013; Kirchhoff 2012). That is, even in 
the here-and-now, across the short-term timescales of hours, minutes, seconds, and 
so on, the process of CA is not primarily orchestrated by bodily or neural processes 
but is also sculptured by socially embedded and culturally transmitted practices (see 
also Sterelny 2010).  
As we have seen, Clark’s position is (in certain works) consistent with the 
second option, thereby bringing Clark into contact with a third-wave of EC 
research. Because of this, I shall consider a case study discussed by Clark on how 
expert bartenders, when faced with a multiple drink order in noisy and crowded 
environments are able to successfully solve the problem49. Since Clark articulates 
this example within the framework of niche construction (NC) (Laland et al. 2000), 
I start by giving a brief introduction to the central tenets of NC. NC, as defined by 
Laland et al. (2000), refers to:  
 
“[The] activities, choices and metabolic processes of organisms, through 
which they define, choose, modify and partly create their own niches. […]. 
For example, to varying degrees, organisms choose their own habitats, mates, 
and resources and construct important components of their local environments 
such as nests, holes, burrows, paths, webs, dams, and chemical 
environments.” (2000, pp. 132-33) 
 
Organisms adapt to environmental pressures. But organisms also construct, alter, 
and modify their own environmental niches. Some make burrows, webs, shelters, 
and other resources. Earthworms are a good example of what is called pragmatic 
engineering. Earthworms engage in burrowing activities, often resulting in a 
transformation of the structure and chemistry of the soil in which they live (Laland 
et al. 2000, p. 134). This burrowing activity is important because earthworms, prior 
to their presence on land, were originally aquatic organisms (Laland 2004, p. 321). 
As Laland says: only by “co-opting the soils that they inhabit and the tunnels they 
build to serve as accessory kidneys that compensate for their poor structural 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 The actual case study is due to Beach (1988).  
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adaptation […],” (2004, p. 321) can earthworms tackle the physiological demands 
of a different water- and salt-balance on land.  
Many organisms not only alter and transform their environmental niches 
pragmatically. Much niche construction is a mode of epistemic engineering, in the 
sense that active niche-constructors modify and alter the informational character of 
the environment (Sterelny 2010, p. 470). For instance, ants lay scent trails between 
nest and food source. Humans off-load information “onto” the environment to ease 
the burdens on “internal” memory processing (Donald 1991). Other organisms, like 
hawks, simply choose the best spot from which to maximize the view of their 
hunting territory. In a comprehensive study on the “intelligent use of space,” Kirsh 
argues that rearranging spatial relations between environmental resources 
transforms the problem solving space by reducing the descriptive complexity of the 
task environment (1995, 2009). Especially in the human lineage, the ramification of 
epistemic engineering is the establishment of a cumulatively constructed cognitive-
developmental niche (Sterelny 2010; Stotz 2010).  
Epistemic (and pragmatic) engineering is not only cognition-enhancing in the 
heat of some problem-solving scenario, since some modifications to the physical 
and informational environment are transmitted downstream to the following 
generation. As Sterelny puts this point, “cumulative downstream epistemic 
engineering” implies transmission of both socio-cultural structures and ecological 
and technical know-how or expertise enabling the transmission and acquisition of 
new knowledge (2010, p. 470). In all these cases of NC, both pragmatic and 
epistemic varieties, what matters, as Laland et al. (2000) emphasize, is that the 
activity of NC leads to new feedback cycles.  
In most cases of NC, those feedback cycles run over evolutionary timescales. 
However, for Clark’s purposes, what really matters is that “this whole process has a 
direct analogue within lifetime learning.” (2005a, p. 256) As Clark states:  
 
“Here, the feedback cycles alter and transform the processes of individual and 
cultural learning. For example, both educational practices and human-built 
structures (and artifacts) are passed on from generation to generation in ways 
that dramatically alter the fitness landscape for individual lifetime learning.” 
(2005a, p. 256) 
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The example that Clark considers is how an expert bartender, when faced with a 
multiple drink order in very noisy and crowded circumstances, is capable of solving 
the problem successfully. Or, alternatively, just how learning within a pre-structured 
niche with cultural practices and differently shaped glasses, makes it possible for a 
novice bartender to perform competently. In lifetime learning, or across 
developmental timescales, the expert bartenders learn how to line up differently 
shaped glasses in spatial sequences, which, in turn, correspond to the temporal 
sequence of drink orders. As Clark states: “The problem of remembering what drink 
to prepare next is thus transformed, as a result of learning within this pre-structured 
niche, into the problem of perceiving different shapes and associating each shape 
with a kind of drink.” (2005a, p. 256; italics added) In this sense, the cultural 
practices of knowing what to do, and how to do it, when facing a multiple drink 
order are shaped by the niche constructing activity of previous individuals, and 
these practices constrain our epistemic access to the world by orchestrating what to 
attend to and see when so attending (Hutchins 2008). This resonates deeply with 
Haugeland’s idea that normative practices have a certain kind of “normative 
gravity” (2002, p. 32). In becoming normalized in the practice of bartending, if we 
take Haugeland’s view, what are normalized are not so much behaviors but rather 
dispositions to behave. But even if normal practices or behaviors might never be 
exactly alike, they are sufficiently alike to be within the same “orbit”. Thus, 
according to Haugeland: “when an individual’s dispositions stray from producing 
behavior within these orbits (that is, types [of normative practices]), they are ‘pulled 
back in’.“ (2002, p. 32) Another way of articulating this idea is due to the patterned 
practice approach by Roepstorff et al. (2010). As they mention: “From the inside of 
a [cultural] practice, certain models of expectancy come to be established, and the 
patterns, which over time emerge from these patterns, guide perception as well as 
action.” (2010, p. 1056)  
Insofar as both of these views are correct, it is not primarily bodily and neural 
processes that orchestrate a bartender’s ability to get the job done but rather neural 
processes in coordination with normative, cultural practices that come together to 
assemble such abilities.  
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4.6. Implications 
 
The combination of ontological diachronicity with the TSCQ implies that whenever 
the statement ‘the processes involved in the process of CA are those processes 
operating in the here-and-now’ is made, it follows that we must understand this 
statement as expressing ‘the processes involved in the process of CA are those 
processes operating in the here-and-now during that period of time’. This particular 
view, it seems to me, is the implicit view of several philosophers of cognitive 
science as well as some cognitive scientists themselves (see e.g., Ballard et al. 1997; 
Beer 2000; Chemero 2009; Clark 1998b; Kirchhoff 2013a; Spivey 2007; Varela et 
al. 2001; and others). One important implication this has for any synchronic notion 
of composition – such as the SCQ – is that not only is it ill fitted to analyze 
temporally complex phenomena; it can never be made to analyze such temporal 
phenomena simpliciter.  
Once we make room for a robust diachronic account of the circumstances under 
which entities of different kinds assemble or compose another entity, and once room 
has been made for the pivotal role of cultural practices in this process of assembly 
or composition, it requires (non-trivially) that we look beyond the system made up 
of the individual agent and artifact. Notice that there is nothing special about 
endorsing option 1 above: only processes operating in the here-and-now are 
responsible for the process of CA and such processes are primarily bodily and 
neural processes. Indeed, prominent advocates of this view include Clark (2008, 
2011) and Clark & Chalmers (1998). As we saw in chapter 1, this particular version 
of EC is what both Menary (2010) and Sutton (2010) refer to as first-wave EC. 
Defenders of first-wave EC ground their arguments for EC on the ideas that (i) 
external artifacts are recruited into the cognitive system of an individual due to the 
right kind of causal coupling, and (ii) functional similarity between the causal roles 
of internal and external physical occupiers. If the arguments for EC focuses on how 
artifacts are integrated into an individual’s cognitive system, then it is not surprising 
that first-wave versions of EC usually adopt an account of the process of CA along 
the lines of option 1. That is, in Hutchins’ words, “if culture is reduced to a 
collection of lifeless artifacts” (2011a, p. 444), then the active dynamic processes 
involved in the process of CA must be bodily and neural. But, if cultural practices 
may be conceived of as playing a central role in the process of CA, then it follows 
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that some of the active dynamic processes involved in the process of CA lie beyond 
the system made up of the individual agent and artifact. If this turns out to be 
correct, then what we have is an account of the process of CA that grounds Sutton’s 
gesture towards a third-wave version of EC: a version “which dissolves individuals 
into peculiar loci of coordination and coalescence among multiple structured media 
[and practices]”. (2010, p. 213)  
I wish to finish this chapter by considering whether it is possible to apply this 
metaphysical contribution to the debate over the process of CA to settle any 
disputes in the literature. I think that this is entirely possible. Consider, for example, 
how Hutchins attempts to push Clark into a strictly neural-oriented position with 
regards to the process of CA by exploiting an apparent bias in the phrase “on the 
spot”. As Hutchins says:  
 
“According to Clark, this exploitation happens “on the spot,” but the 
constraints that determine which resources are exploited and how they are 
related to one another is not entirely formed “on the spot”. The “on the spot” 
phrase highlights the opportunistic nature of cognitive systems. However, 
without additional discussion, this wording may also bias the solution toward 
the biological brain by isolating the activity from the context of cultural 
historical processes.” (2011a, p. 441)  
 
One cause for concern about Hutchins’ interpretation of the phrase “on the spot” is 
that there is nothing about the phrase “on the spot” that conceptually entails a 
commitment to the view that it is the brain that is the most active element in the 
assembly of distributed cognitive products. An example will make this more 
concrete. Consider, again, a passage from Hutchins:  
 
Cultural practices shape active sensing and ways of seeing the world by 
highlighting what to attend to and what to see when so attending. Clark 
mentions the activity of seeing a star. A far more interesting example is seeing 
a constellation, since a constellation exists only by virtue of someone enacting 
it via a cultural practice that allocates visual attention in a particular way.” 
(2011a, p. 441)  
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Whichever processes combine to produce the capacity to see a star constellation do 
so on the spot – on the timescales of seconds or, perhaps, minutes. The question is: 
over which other timescales would such processes be active? Instead of juxtaposing 
the short-term timescales and long-term timescales (e.g., historical timescales), 
Hutchins would be better off arguing that there is no problem with depicting the 
process of CA as unfolding over the short-term timescales of the here-and-now, 
provided that you leave room for the central roles of cultural practices in the 
processes that unfold here-and-now. Insofar as the meaning of “now” is such that it 
may, in the right circumstances, include a dynamical interval of time, and insofar as 
the cultural practices within which the cognitive task is carried out unfold within 
such a dynamical interval of time, then cultural practices may be part of the 
processes assembling some cognitive ability. That is the real point that one will be 
able to make by opting for the combination (A) and not (B) above. Consequently, 
Hutchins cannot appeal to the notion “on the spot” in order to assert that Clark 
privileges the brain in the process of CA, since the meaning of “on the spot” is 
entirely contingent – as I have argued – on the time and place of the utterance.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
What I hope to have shown in this chapter is that when considering the process of 
CA, that is, when we analyze over which timescales certain processes combine to 
compose distributed cognitive products, there is no ontologically synchronic instant 
t at which this is possible. I wish to finish this chapter by pointing to the following: 
metaphysical analysis cannot settle the question over which timescales the processes 
involved in CA are predominantly active. That is a matter of empirical 
investigation. However, by scrutinizing the metaphysics of what it means for certain 
Xs to compose a certain Y here-and-now, it is possible, I think, to turn what might 
look like a purely metaphysical dispute into a productive recipe for empirical 
research and to set certain constraints for how such research must be carried out.  
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5. Transactive remembering – diachronic compositional 
organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that when we consider the process of CA, that is, 
when we ask over which timescales processes operate when they combine to 
compose hybrid, distributed cognitive processes and/or systems, there is no 
ontologically synchronic instant in which such processes are/or systems are 
instantiated.  
Instead of continuing to explore the process by which distributed cognitive 
systems or processes are put together, my aim in this chapter is to analyze what kind 
of compositional organization certain distributed cognitive systems or processes 
have during and once they have been established.  
The strategy I use consists in offering a case study of transactive remembering. 
My reasons for choosing this cognitive phenomenon are as follows. First, in recent 
years, transactive remembering has been put to use in justifying EC, especially as a 
socially distributed mode of EC (Theiner 2009, 2011, 2013; Theiner & O’Connor 
2010; Theiner et al. 2010; see also Barnier et al. 2008; Sutton et al. 2010). Second, 
especially Theiner and colleagues have argued that when people regularly engage in 
remembering things together – e.g., as intimate couples, families, or work teams do 
– such collaborative remembering may result in strongly organization dependent 
modes of socially distributed forms of transactive memory systems.  
I do not dispute using transactive remembering to motivate empirical cases for 
EC. Indeed, I support the view that transactive remembering is a mode of socially 
distributed cognition (Kirchhoff 2013a, 2013b; Kirchhoff & Newsome 2012). What 
I will dispute is the attempt of Theiner and colleagues to establish the claim that the 
particular mode of organization in transactive remembering takes the form of 
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mechanistic composition that contravenes Wimsatt’s conditions for aggregativity 
(see e.g., Wimsatt 1986, 2000). I do not dispute this because compositional 
organization violates Wimsatt’s conditions for aggregativity; rather, I dispute this 
because of the following: (a) mechanistic composition is ontologically synchronic; 
and (b) the organization of transactive remembering is not well understood by way 
of synchronic composition.  
 
5.1. Overview  
 
In section 5.2, I provide a short introduction to transactive memory. In section 5.3, I 
lay out the theory behind mechanistic organization and its relation to composition. 
While doing so, I illustrate why mechanistic composition is synchronic. In section 
5.4, I consider Theiner and colleagues’ argument for why transactive remembering 
or transactive memory systems are mechanistically composed. Finally, in section 
5.5, I argue that processes of transactive remembering and the transactive memory 
systems in which such processes are instantiated are not well understood by way of 
synchronic mechanistic composition.  
 
5.2. Transactive remembering – a short introduction 
 
Wegner (1987) introduced the concept “transactive memory systems” (TMSs) in an 
attempt to explain how individual members in long-tenured groups, intimate 
couples, etc., rely on each other to obtain, process, and communicate knowledge 
from different domains. Indeed, and as Harris et al. mention, remembering “often 
occurs jointly in social groups” (2011, p. 268; see also Barnier et al. 2008). As 
Harris et al. go on to say: “People in close relationships are likely to be 
behaviorally, emotionally, and cognitively ‘interdependent’ […] – that is, in 
collectives such as couples, families, […], and work teams, remembering is an 
interactive activity where memories are dynamically and jointly constructed […].” 
(2011, p. 268)  
Often, though not always, such dynamically and collaboratively constructed 
modes of remembering will both emerge from and result in a division of labor and a 
specialization of knowledge between couples, friends, work teams, and so on. Lewis 
puts this nicely, when she says: “According to transactive memory theory, group 
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members divide the cognitive labor for their tasks, with members specializing in 
different domains. Members rely on one another to be responsible for specific 
expertise such that collectively they possess all of the information needed for their 
tasks.” (2003, p. 587) Transactive memory theory describes both the processes 
involved in actual instances of transactive memory and the benefits for memory that 
may occur when remembering is shared between two or more individuals (Barnier 
et al. 2008; Harris et al. 2011; Lewis 2003; Theiner & O’Connor 2010; Wegner 
1987).  
A TMS is a species of cooperative and mnemonic division of labor in learning, 
remembering, and communicating within dyads, triads or larger social groups. For 
example, Moreland and colleagues have demonstrated that team members trained 
on the same task tend to develop differentiated but also highly specialized 
knowledge and are able to collaboratively recall a greater amount of task-specific 
information than any one individual alone (Moreland et al. 1996; Moreland & 
Myaskovsky 2000) As Lewis states: “These findings support Wegner’s (1987) 
contention that distributing responsibility for different knowledge domains 
increases the amount of relevant information available for team tasks.” (2003, p. 
587)  
What are some of the key characteristics of TMSs? According to Moreland and 
colleagues (see also Lewis (2003) and Theiner & O’Connor (2010)), three factors 
are central: credibility, specialization, and coordination. That is, different 
individuals will often possess “different pieces of lower order information relevant 
to a particular topic […].” (Harris et al. 2011, p. 268) To combine this differentiated 
information, the members must coordinate their interactions. And, for those 
interactions to be successful, the individual members must not only rely on one 
another but must also trust in the specialized knowledge of each member (Lewis 
2003, p. 590).  
It is helpful to draw a distinction between transactive memory and TMSs (cf. 
Lewis 2003). First, transactive memory is knowledge about the memory system of 
another individual. In order to benefit from another individual’s knowledge, it must 
be retrieved. As Lewis says, retrieving “the information stored in another person’s 
memory […] depends on transactions (communication, interpersonal interactions) 
between individuals.” (2003, p. 588) In this sense, transactive memory is “meta-
knowledge” (Lewis 2003, p. 588) of what the other person knows in conjunction 
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with the transformation of the knowledge oneself has based on that or those 
transactions. For example, consider this modified version of the example of Otto put 
forth by Clark & Chalmers (1998) developed by Tollefsen (2006). In this example, 
Otto is named Olaf and rather than suffering from Alzheimer’s as Otto does, Olaf is 
a philosopher who often gets lost in his work and has a lot of difficulty 
remembering his appointments, important phone numbers and addresses of 
colleagues, friends, places, etc. Instead of constantly relying on writing all these 
things down in his notebook (as in the case of Otto), Olaf turns out to be married to 
Inga. As Tollefsen says: “Inga [unlike Olaf] has a sharp mind and because they 
spend a great deal of time together Inga provides Olaf with all of the information 
that he needs in order to get through his day.” (2006, p. 143) Compare this to one of 
Harris et al’s older male participants, who said: “No, I don’t use memory aids… Oh 
hang on, [wife] carries a diary with her all the time… Oh well, if she’s got the diary, 
we’re always together and that’s it.” (Harris et al., forthcoming) Both are examples 
of an individual’s transactive memory. That is, what Olaf is able to remember when 
it comes to addresses, phone numbers, etc., is deeply dependent on Inga’s 
specialized knowledge, Olaf’s trust in that knowledge, and their continued 
coordination throughout their daily activities. 
Inga is an external memory aid for Olaf. But do Inga and Olaf form a coupled 
system? Adapting Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) criteria for when artifacts may be 
part of some distributed cognitive system, Tollefsen suggests that Inga meets those 
conditions. First, Inga is always readily available when Olaf needs her, and Olaf 
typically relies on Inga to accomplish some cognitive task. Second, Olaf trusts the 
information he acquires from Inga. Whenever Olaf needs information, it is easily 
accessible, because Inga is always present. Finally, Olaf has typically endorsed the 
information he receives from Inga at a previous time. Even though Tollefsen argues 
that long-term couples like Inga and Olaf meet these criteria, and thus qualify as a 
bona fide distributed cognitive system, it is less clear that the species of interaction 
between Olaf and Inga meets the conditions for establishing a TMS. That is, a 
transactive memory system is manifested when two or more people “cooperatively 
store, retrieve, and communicate information.” (Lewis 2003, p. 588) As Lewis 
continues: “Whereas transactive memory exists in the mind of an individual, a 
transactive memory system exists between individuals as a function of their 
individual transactive memories.” (Lewis 2003, p. 588; italics added) It is evident 
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that Olaf’s individual capacity for remembering is augmented by his ongoing 
interactions with Inga. But in this particular example, it is at best unproven whether 
Inga’s capacities for remembering are augmented or transformed in similar or 
different ways as well. In a fascinating study on the effects of collaborative 
remembering in long-married couples, Harris et al. (2011) suggest that there is 
empirical support for the claim that some long-term married couples might develop 
and instantiate the existence of a TMS (Barnier et al. 2008; Sutton et al. 2010). 
 To explore the effects of transactive remembering in long-term couples, Harris 
et al. (2011) conducted interviews with twelve couples. This procedure was done at 
their homes over two occasions, one week apart from one another. On each 
occasion, participants were asked to learn and recall a list of words, to recall various 
personally relevant semantic information such as the date of their engagement, the 
names of some of the wedding guests, and to engage in extensive episodic 
remembering of significant events in their past. In comparing the individual recall 
data with the data gathered from the collaborative recall tasks, Harris et al. found 
that certain couples, when compared with the more general semantic descriptions 
given in the individual interviews, adopted a transactive style of shared 
remembering. Here is one of the dialogues, where a couple is successfully 
coordinating a division of cognitive labor in remembering the beginning of their 
relationship (Harris et al. 2011, p. 291): 
 
Husband: No, I asked her out that night, but she said she couldn’t go.  
Wife: No, that’s right.  
H: So then I started to pester her the next week.  
W: You did, you turned up after my [classes]. 
H: [Cooking classes].  
W: On Monday night.  
H: That’d be it.  
W: And took me for coffee.  
H: Yes, the next Monday night.  
W: And impressed me. 
H: Yes. 
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As Sutton et al. mention about this case: “Compared with the more general semantic 
descriptions provided in the individual interviews, the joint description of this event 
in the collaborative interview was emotionally richer and more detailed at a 
phenomenological and linguistic level, as the couple co-construct an account of his 
“pestering”, and of her being “impressed”. (2010, p. 551) In TMSs, therefore, both 
individuals cultivate one another as external memory aids and develop a “shared 
system for encoding, storing, and retrieving information.” (Wegner et al. 1991, p. 
923)  
 
5.3. Composition and mechanistic organization 
 
With this brief introduction to transactive remembering, and before I develop the 
argument provided by Theiner and colleagues for why TMSs are mechanistically 
composed, we need a firmer grip on the theory behind mechanistic organization.  
 
5.3.1. Compositional organization of mechanisms 
 
According to defenders of mechanistic explanation, scientific explanation in terms 
of mechanisms turns, in part, on the idea that most fundamentally, relations between 
levels in mechanisms are a species of compositional, or part-whole, relations 
(Craver 2007; Craver & Bechtel 2007; Machamer et al. 2000). As Craver says: 
“Levels of mechanisms are levels of composition. […]. The interlevel relationship 
[that holds between acting entities at different levels] is as follows: X’s Φ-ing is at a 
lower mechanistic level than S’s Ψ-ing if and only if X’s Φ-ing is a component in 
the mechanism for S’s Ψ-ing.” (2007, p. 188)  
Following from Wimsatt (1986), mechanists distinguish systems that are 
mechanistically organized, that is, systems exhibiting a strong form of organization 
dependence, from mere aggregative systems. As Craver states (2001, pp. 58-59): 
“Suppose that a property Ψ of the whole S is a function of the properties {Φ1, Φ2, 
…, Φn} of the parts {X1, X2, …, Xn}. Then a Ψ property of S is an aggregate of the 
Φ properties of Xs when:  
 
(W1) Ψ is invariant under the rearrangement and intersubstitution of Xs;  
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(W2) Ψ remains qualitatively similar (if quantitative, differing only in value) 
with the addition or subtraction of Xs; 
(W3) Ψ remains invariant under the disaggregation and reaggregation of Xs; 
and  
(W4) There are no cooperative or inhibitory interactions among Xs that are 
relevant to Ψ.” 
 
Mechanistically organized systems contravene these conditions for aggregativity. In 
addition to non-aggregativity, mechanisms are hierarchically organized. According 
to Craver, the circulatory system has a hierarchical mechanistic organization, in 
that, the activities Ψ of the circulatory system S, are implemented by the heart’s 
different Xs and their Φ-ing – e.g., the activity of the heart’s pumping blood, the 
kidney’s filtration of blood, and the venous valves’ regulation of the direction of 
blood flow (2001, p. 63). That is: “The relationship between lower and higher 
mechanistic levels is a [compositional] part-whole relationship with the additional 
restriction that the lower-level parts are components of (and hence organized 
within) the higher-level mechanism.” (Craver 2001, p. 63) That the compositional 
relation holds between mechanisms and their components implies that the relata 
spatially and materially coexist. That is: “Given the compositional relations between 
mechanisms and their components, the space-time path of the mechanism includes 
the space-time path of its components. They coexist with one another, and so there 
is no possibility of their coming to spatiotemporally intersect with one another.” 
(Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 552; italics in original) 
 
5.3.2. Levels in mechanisms  
 
In hierarchically organized mechanisms, to say that some entities are 
compositionally related to entities at another level is to say that those entities are 
related vertically. That is, the entities stand in a relation to one another such that 
entities at a higher level are dependent (metaphysically) on entities at a lower level. 
In mechanistic terms: “[An] item X is at a lower level than an item S if and only if 
X is a component in the mechanism for some activity Ψ of S. X is a component in a 
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mechanism if and only if it is one of the entities or activities organized such that S 
Ψs.” (2007, p. 548)  
The relationship between levels in mechanisms is vertical, because it is 
synchronic and noncausal. In contrast to vertical interlevel relations, intralevel 
relations are horizontal. Recall from chapter 3, horizontal relations are typically 
understood to be diachronic relations such as causation. This way of distinguishing 
between vertical (synchronic) relations and horizontal (diachronic) relations is 
explicitly endorsed by Craver, as he states: 
   
“At least since Hume, many philosophers have held that causes and effects 
must be logically independent. If one endorses this restriction on causal 
relations, then one should balk at positing a causal relationship between 
constitutively [or compositionally] related properties. Finally, because the 
[composition] relationship is synchronic, Φ’s taking on a particular value is 
not temporally prior to Ψ’s taking on its value.” (2007, p. 153) 
 
Because of this, when it comes to the compositional relation between levels in 
mechanisms, defenders of mechanistic explanation keep intact the assumption that 
diachronic relations are strictly intralevel, whereas compositional relations hold 
between levels – in a vertical and synchronic fashion. That the mechanists intend 
their vertical perspective on composition to be synchronic can be brought further to 
the fore by exposing how Craver & Bechtel (2007) distinguish between causation, 
on the one hand, and composition, on the other. Ever since Hume, they note, most, 
if not all, theories of causation have presupposed that causes and their effects must 
be wholly distinct and that causes (in principle) precede their effects. To underpin 
this claim, Craver & Bechtel refer to Lewis, who states:  
 
“C [cause] and E [effect] must be distinct events – and distinct not only in the 
sense of nonidentity but also in the sense of nonoverlap and nonimplication. It 
won’t do to say that my speaking this sentence causes my speaking this 
sentence or that my speaking the whole of it causes my speaking the first half 
of it; or that my speaking causes my speaking it loudly, or vice versa.” (2000, 
p. 78; quoted in Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 552) 
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Causes and their effects on this account are independent events insofar as an effect 
may be followed by a cause and, depending on the time interval between the cause 
and its effect, it is possible (prima facie, at least) to imagine that a cause and its 
effect never exist simultaneously or instantaneously. In contrast to causation, Craver 
& Bechtel say this about the compositional relation:  
 
“If a conserved quantity is possessed by one of the components (say, a certain 
mass or a charge), that conserved quantity is also possessed by the whole. 
[That is, if] one of the parts bears a mark, that mark is always already born by 
the whole (by virtue of being born by its parts). The marks do not need to be 
transmitted upward or downward to have their ‘effects;’ their effects are 
inherited [compositionally], not causally.” (2007, p. 552; italics added)  
 
5.4. Argument for why TMSs are mechanistically composed 
 
In a series of recent papers, Theiner and colleagues (Theiner 2009; Theiner & 
O’Connor 2010; Theiner et al. 2010; Theiner 2013) have argued that transactive 
memories are excellent candidates “for socially manifested cognitive processes (i.e., 
cognitive processes of individuals that can be realized only insofar as those 
individuals participate in groups of a certain kind).” (Theiner & O’Connor 2010, p. 
97; see also Wilson 2004a, 2005) I wholly agree with this. However, I disagree with 
Theiner and colleagues, when they state that the organization of TMSs is 
compositional in a mechanistic sense (2010, p. 85).  
Specifically, Theiner and colleagues argue (amongst other things) that TMSs 
display their emergent cognitive properties in virtue of their strong organization 
dependence. Like the mechanists, Theiner and colleagues follow Wimsatt in 
understanding this species of organization dependence as a failure of aggregativity. 
Similarly to Craver (2007), Theiner & O’Connor define this species of dependence 
as follows: “Let s1 to sm stand for the m components of a system S (relative to some 
decomposition D); p1 to pn for the n properties of S’s components; and F for the 
organization or mode of interaction between pi(sj), such that a system property P(S) 
is determined by the composition function: P(S) = F[pi(sj) for i = 1 to n, and j = 1 to 
m].” (2010, p. 84) That is, if P(S) is to count as merely aggregative, P(S) must 
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satisfy the familiar conditions (for a decomposition D of S) provided by Wimsatt 
(2000, pp. 275-76; reformulated in Theiner & O’Connor 2010, p. 85):  
 
1. IS: P(S) is invariant under the inter-substitution of parts of S, or any other 
parts taken from a relevantly similar domain. 
2. QS: P(S) remains qualitatively similar (differing only in value) under the 
addition or subtraction of parts.  
3. DR: P(S) is invariant under the decomposition and re-aggregation of parts.  
4. CI: There are no cooperative or inhibitory interactions among parts.  
 
As Theiner & O’Connor go on to claim: “a group S instantiates a cognitive property 
P(S) just in case P(S) is emergent relative to a decomposition of S into its members, 
their behavioral and psychological properties, and their modes of social interaction 
[…].” (2010, p. 85)  
Here is an example by Theiner & O’Connor (2010) of a three-man team with an 
established TMS for assembling a radio, where the emergent properties are a mix of 
partly declarative and partly procedural knowledge about a complex task that none 
of the individual team members knows how to perform individually (2010, p. 95). 
The relevant task concerns assembling a radio. In this example, Theiner & 
O’Connor ask us to imagine the following: “[…] that member A knows how to 
insert all the mechanical components into the circuit board, B knows how to handle 
the electronic components, and C knows how to connect each component to all the 
others in the proper manner.” (2010, p. 95) In this particular case, the socially 
manifested TMS violates the conditions for aggregativity. First, because of their 
specialized and differentiated knowledge, IS is violated. It is not possible that P(S) 
remains invariant if one or more of the members are inter-substituted. Second, if 
member A is removed from the job and not replaced with another member with the 
same specialized knowledge, this contravenes QS. DR fails, because decomposing 
the TMS prevents the individuals from transactively engaging with one another. 
Finally, condition CI fails, because “member’s awareness of how expertise is 
distributed affects their individual likelihood of acquiring, recalling, and 
communicating memory items pertaining to specific categories of information.” 
(Theiner & O’Connor 2010, p. 96)  
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A similar argument, I submit, can be given for the claim that TMSs in elderly 
couples (Harris et al. 2011) are mechanistically organized, although this is no part 
of Harris et al’s own investigation (but see Sutton et al. (2010) for an application of 
such conditions to TMSs). What we could call the Wimsatt conditions for 
aggregativity are all violated in the case of transactive remembering in the elderly 
couple referred to in section 5.2. First, because of their differentiated ability to recall 
certain episodic events, condition IS clearly fails. Second, condition QS fails 
because the couple succeeds in remembering the events of their first date precisely 
because of their interactive, dynamic style of collaboration. Third, condition DR 
fails if we remove either the husband or the wife. Finally, condition CI fails because 
without cooperation there would be no TMS. Therefore, all of the Wimsatt 
conditions for aggregativity equally fail in this case.  
 
5.5. Diachronic composition over synchronic composition 
 
A failure of aggregativity is indicative of an integrated mode of organization. It is 
an explanatory virtue of applying the Wimsatt conditions for aggregativity to 
species of socially distributed cognition that this application allows one to 
emphasize that the type of integration in long-married couples, say, is strongly 
interdependent. It is from the fact that TMSs implement this particular strong kind 
of organization dependence that Theiner and colleagues conclude that TMSs are 
“good candidates for socially manifested cognitive processes […].” (2010, p. 97) 
This exact strategy seems to work best if the Wimsatt conditions for aggregativity 
are used for explanatory purposes such that we need not be committed to more than 
the claim that mechanistic explanation in terms of the Wimsatt conditions for 
aggregativity is an epistemic endeavor. But, there is an underlying metaphysical 
presupposition that I will argue that we need not agree with.  
First, the Wimsatt conditions for aggregativity presuppose the existence of a 
composition function such that the emergent properties (e.g., new detail of 
information, the quality of information, new understanding of previous events in 
TMSs) of the system can be mechanistically explained in terms of component parts, 
their activities, and their particular mode of organization. Second, however, the 
composition function of a system such as a TMS implies that the relationship 
between the parts and the whole is non-causal and synchronic. It is the fact that the 
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composition function in mechanistic composition is presupposed to be synchronic 
that I will argue (in the next section) is problematic. I find this assumption 
problematic for two reasons. I will briefly mention these reasons here, before 
discussing each one in more detail.  
Insofar as the composition function that exists between the Xs and S’s Ψ-ing is 
synchronic, it follows that the Xs and S’s Ψ-ing must be wholly present at a 
particular time t or at each particular stage across an interval, t1, …, tn. What else 
could it mean? Recall from chapter 3, an entity is wholly present at t if and only if 
the identity of that entity is intrinsic to that time. This is the identity-based version 
of “wholly present” provided by Hofweber & Velleman (2011). A different, 
although related, version of the concept “wholly present” is provided by 
Wasserman, who states: “x is wholly present at t =df x exists at t and x does not have 
a proper temporal part at any time other than t.” (2004a, p. 77) The key for our 
purposes is that if an entity is wholly present that entity is exhaustively determined 
at a specific instant in time, t. In this sense, if an entity is wholly present at t, it is 
completely and exhaustively present at a moment in time, t.  
If the assumption that the composition relation that exists between the Xs and 
S’s Ψ-ing does not imply that the Xs and S’s Ψ-ing are wholly present at a 
particular time t or at each particular stage across an interval, t1, …, tn, then the 
composition function will fail to be ontologically synchronic. We can safely assume 
that the prefix “ontological” in the notion “ontologically synchronic” is the intended 
prefix by Theiner and colleagues here, because the metaphysics of composition 
aims to carve nature “at its joints” (so to speak) rather than merely expressing an 
epistemological aspect of mechanistic organization. However, in the case of TMSs, 
the presupposition that the composition function is ontologically synchronic is 
inconsistent with the fact that in TMSs, S’s Ψ-ing is a temporally extended process 
composed of different parts – given the condition that temporally extended 
processes fail to be wholly present. It is, of course, important to note that it does not 
follow from this that processes – even though processes are temporally extended in 
nature – cannot exhibit certain properties at particular times within that process. 
This is, however, not what is being disputed. What I am disputing is that S’s Ψ-ing 
can be wholly present at any particular time instant t or at any specific temporal 
moment across an interval, t1, …, tn. If this is true, the assumption that TMSs have 
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their emergent properties grounded due to a synchronic composition function is 
problematic.  
Emergent properties such as remembering episodic events in TMSs are not 
dependent on any synchronic composition function for their existence due to the 
fact that they are diachronically emergent properties. As Silberstein says about 
diachronically emergent properties: “[…] P only emerges as, at least in part, a 
function of some dynamical lower-level or more basic process that unfolds in time. 
As the system evolves in time new ‘higher-level’ properties will come into being as 
a function of the unfolding of the more fundamental dynamical processes.” (2012, 
p. 630) Because emergent properties, in TMSs, become available over a certain 
time-course of collaboration, it makes little sense to insist that TMSs have their 
emergent properties determined at a particular time instant. This is wholly 
consistent with transactive memory theory, which predicts that new emergent 
properties of shared remembering will develop over time. As Harris et al. state: 
“[The] longer a group has shared the encoding and retrieval of information, the 
more efficient their shared remembering.” (2011, p. 272) 
 
5.5.1. Processes in TMSs are temporally extended processes  
 
In their studies on transactive remembering in long-married couples, Harris et al. 
(2011) found, among other things, that certain implicit processes of collaborative 
cross-cuing and co-construction may lead to S’s Ψ-ing having such emergent 
properties as new information (in terms of quantity), richer emotional and vivid 
remembering (in terms of quality), and sometimes to new understandings of the 
same shared event (Harris et al. 2011, p. 292).  
In each case, S’s Ψ-ing is a temporally extended process, in the sense that the 
particular way that Ψ persists depends on Ψ unfolding over time. In philosophy, the 
terms endurance and perdurance are commonly understood to denote two different 
ways in which entities persist (Hofweber & Velleman 2011; Olson 2006; Sider 
2001). One might think that it is enough to show that Ψ persists by unfolding 
through time – or, more technically, Ψ’s persistence necessarily involves that it 
extends through a fourth dimension, namely time (Sider 1997) – to show that Ψ 
persists through time by perduring rather than enduring. But, unfolding through 
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time is neutral between perdurantism and endurantism. Thus, it is not enough to 
establish that Ψ unfolds through time to ground the claim that Ψ persists through 
time by perduring. If that were all there was to the debate between perdurantists and 
endurantists nearly everyone would agree. What does distinguish perdurantism from 
endurantism, and vice versa, is how Ψ is understood to persist through time.  
A caveat: I am fully aware that the endurance-perdurance debate is standardly 
presupposed to be a debate about how material objects persist. I will ignore this 
restriction, since it will help me establish a problem with the assumption that TMSs 
have their emergent properties synchronically determined in an instantaneous, 
upward relation of determination.   
 Consider the central difference-maker between perdurantism, on the one hand, 
and endurantism, on the other, concerning how entities persist. On the perdurantist 
view, entities persist through time by (a) unfolding over time, and (b) at no single 
(snapshot) instant in time t (if there indeed is such an instant) do entities persist by 
being wholly present at that time t. Processes, I have argued, are good candidates 
for entities that persist by perduring, in the sense that processes, unlike material 
objects, are creatures of time – as Noë says (2006). If we apply S’s Ψ-ing to the 
perdurantist template, it follows that Ψ persists through time by having 
compositional parts at times other than t. That is, Ψ is temporally extended in nature 
and as such can never be whole in the ontologically synchronic sense of ‘whole’. On 
the endurantist view, by contrast, entities persist through time by (a) unfolding over 
time, and (b) at each time instant t being wholly present. In this sense, enduring 
entities such as material objects are timeless, that is, they exist wholly and 
completely at a moment of time. Applying this template to our case of S’s Ψ-ing, it 
follows that Ψ persists through time by being exhaustively or wholly present at a 
particular instant t or at each stage or point over a time interval, t1, …, tn. That is, 
insofar as Ψ is wholly present at t, then Ψ exists at t and does not have a temporal 
part at any time other than t. That is the usual account of endurantism (Olson 2006).  
 If we combine these two different frameworks for how entities persist with one 
of our examples of TMSs, we get the result that S’s Ψ-ing persists by perduring 
rather than enduring. Nothing about S’s Ψ-ing could ever persist in the 
ontologically synchronic sense of endurantism. As Goldie, for example, puts the 
issue concerning emotions such as grief: “grief is a kind of process […], which 
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unfolds over time, and the unfolding over time is explanatorily prior to what is the 
case at any particular moment.” (2011, p. 119) Recall from chapter 3, where I made 
a similar point by reference to the process of writing a cheque (Hofweber & 
Velleman 2011) and the Mexican wave. Consider the example of transactive 
remembering in long-term married couples from section 5.2 due to Harris et al. 
(2011, p. 291):  
 
Husband: No, I asked her out that night, but she said she couldn’t go.  
Wife: No, that’s right.  
H: So then I started to pester her the next week.  
W: You did, you turned up after my [classes]. 
H: [Cooking classes].  
W: On Monday night.  
H: That’d be it.  
W: And took me for coffee.  
H: Yes, the next Monday night.  
W: And impressed me. 
H: Yes. 
 
I depict this temporal process of transactive remembering as follows (see figure 10):  
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Fig. 10 Diagram of a temporally extended process, where each blue dot refers to the 
Husband and where each red dot refers to the Wife in the dialogue. For simplicity I 
represent the entire process to unfold over 11 seconds, with each transaction taking 
1 second. Harris et al. (2011) do not depict the process in this way. I use this 
diagram in order to highlight that a temporally extended process consists of 
temporal parts.  
 
S’s Ψ-ing is a temporally extended process that consists of 11 transactions between 
husband (blue dot) and wife (red dot) over a time interval. For example, the husband 
(the first blue dot) states at time 1: “No, I asked her out that night, but she said she 
couldn’t go”, while the wife (the first red dot) says at time 2: “No, that’s right”, and 
so on until time 11, where the husband (last blue dot) says, “Yes”.  
When an entity occupies an interval of time by being wholly present in each 
constituent moment, it is said to endure. Even though some have argued that this 
conception of endurance is problematic (Hofweber & Velleman 2011), it is the 
usual account of endurantism. In our example, S’s Ψ-ing is a temporally extended 
process and is decomposable or divisible into parts. The facts that S’s Ψ-ing is 
temporally extended is entailed by its existing throughout a period of time. I have 
attempted to depict this idea in figure 10 above. But how S’s Ψ-ing persists is 
inconsistent with it enduring. To see this, let me begin with an example I used in 
chapter 3, namely Hofweber & Velleman’s (2011) case of writing a cheque.  
 Writing a cheque is a temporally extended process – it takes time from the 
beginning of writing a cheque to the finished product. Furthermore, insofar as the 
process of writing a cheque is a temporally extended process, it follows that the 
process consists of temporal parts each of which involves the laying down of 
successive drops of ink. As Hofweber & Velleman put the point: “What there is of 
the process at a particular moment – the laying down of a particular drop – is not 
sufficient to determine that a cheque is being written.” (2011, p. 50; italics added) 
That is, “the process [is not present] in its temporal entirety within the confines of 
the moment: it is not fully determined by the events of the moment to be the process 
that it is. Within the moment, it is not all there and it is not fully itself.” (2011, p. 50; 
italics added) On the identity-based account of “wholly present”, it follows that the 
process of writing a cheque is inconsistent with the requirement that for this process 
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to persist at a time t or over an interval t1, …, tn, that process must be wholly present 
at each particular time instant t at which it exists.  
 Similarly with TMSs. S’s Ψ-ing is a temporally extended process, that is, it 
unfolds over time (in figure 10, from time 1 until time 11). The fact that it is a 
temporally extended process equally implies that it consists of temporal parts each 
of which consists of an individual engaging in an interactive sort of transaction (in 
figure 10, from the husband at time 1 until the husband at time 11). Following 
Hofweber & Velleman’s example above we can then say: what there is of the 
process of S’s Ψ-ing at a particular instant is insufficient to determine that a 
collaboratively and transactive species of remembering is unfolding. Or, in other 
words, what there is of this process at time t is insufficient to determine the 
existence of transactive remembering insofar as transactive remembering requires 
for its existence spatiotemporal continuity. Thus, and to echo Goldie’s statement 
from above, the unfolding over time of a process is explanatorily prior to what is the 
case at any one or particular moment. Thus, S’s Ψ-ing cannot be wholly present at 
each particular instant t at which it exists. Consequently, S’s Ψ-ing cannot be 
exhaustively composed at an ontologically synchronic instant t.  
 I need to say a bit about the notion “temporal part,” because as I am construing 
it here, I am breaking ranks with the usual account of the concept “temporal part” in 
metaphysics, in the sense that temporal parts are standardly understood to be 
material objects themselves. This can be illustrated with the fact that the use of 
temporal parts talk is typically invoked while seeking answers to the traditional 
paradoxes surrounding the problem of colocated or coincident material objects. 
Problems that pertain, especially, as we saw in chapter 2, to the material constitution 
relation.  
 Here, however, I want to speak of temporal parts with regards to temporal 
processes, and where the parts are processes themselves. Call the following 
definition of temporal parthood the usual account (Olson 2006): “x is a temporal 
part of y =df x is a part of y, and x exists at some time, and every part of y that does 
not overlap x exists only at times when x does not exist.” (Olson 2006, p. 739; see 
also Sider 1997, p. 205; 2001, p. 59) In discussing temporally extended processes 
such as S’s Ψ-ing, the usual view of temporal parts implies that insofar as the 
husband’s transaction at time 1 is a temporal part of S’s Ψ-ing, say, it follows that 
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the husband’s transaction at time 1 overlaps everything of S’s Ψ-ing at time 1. 
Whether or not it is fruitful to talk in terms of complete overlap in this case I am 
doubtful about. However, in order to avoid begging the question against this 
received view of temporal parts, and in order to take seriously that S’s Ψ-ing is a 
diachronically extended process, I shall give the following definition of what 
temporal parthood talk amounts to in the case of TMSs. The definition is 
accordingly: X (the first blue dot in figure 10) is a temporal part of S’s Ψ-ing during 
that period of time (circa one second) = df (i) X unfolds during, but only, during that 
period of time, (ii) X is part of S’s Ψ-ing during that period of time and (iii) X 
overlaps everything that is part of S’s Ψ-ing during that period of time.  
 
5.5.2. Diachronically emergent properties  
 
In the previous section, I deliberately focused on S’s Ψ-ing and the temporal parts 
that make up S’s Ψ-ing. In so doing, I engaged in a discussion that was entirely on 
the same level – so to speak – looking only at S’s Ψ-ing as a temporally extended 
process with temporal parts. I did not analyze the interlevel relationship between the 
emergent properties of S’s Ψ-ing and the temporal parts of S’s Ψ-ing from which 
S’s emergent properties arise. It is this particular task that I wish to engage in now.  
Mechanistic composition – in part underpinned by contravening the Wimsatt 
conditions for aggregativity – assumes that emergent properties are mechanistically 
organized in virtue of the mechanisms giving rise to these emergent properties 
having an ontologically synchronic composition function. But, the presupposition 
that TMSs have their emergent properties due to the TMS having an ontologically 
synchronic composition function sits uneasily with emergent properties in TMSs. 
The reason for this is that emergent properties in TMSs are diachronically emergent 
properties. I consider diachronic emergence in detail in chapter 7. Here, however, I 
wish to explore the argument that an ontologically synchronic view of composition 
is incompatible with the diachronic nature of emergent properties in TMSs such as 
those implemented by long-married couples.  
Recall the distinction between transactive memory and TMSs (Lewis 2003). In 
addition to each individual’s transactive memories, TMSs include the kind of 
processes the individuals bring to bear in order to combine their transactive 
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knowledge (Lewis 2003, p. 590). This is an important point, because not all trans-
actions between two or more individuals result in successful joint remembering. For 
example, Harris et al. found that certain processes such as the inability to combine 
and integrate individual memories as well as the use of corrections by one or both of 
the individuals had negative effects on successful joint remembering (2011, p. 289).  
The first implication I want to draw is the following: while the Wimsatt 
conditions for aggregativity as well as synchronic mechanistic composition 
emphasize the co-existence of novel ‘higher-level’ properties with properties and 
components existing at a ‘lower-level’, the Wimsatt conditions and synchronic 
mechanistic composition fail to emphasize the inherently temporal and historical 
features of TMSs. This follows, I submit, from the fact that one can apply each of 
the conditions for aggregativity (IS, QS, DR, and CI) to couples failing to 
successfully engage in joint remembering. In either case of joint remembering, that 
is, whether or not the enacted processes lead to successful joint remembering, S’s 
Ψ-ing will not remain invariant under intersubstitution (violation of condition IS), 
will not remain qualitatively similar under subtraction (violation of condition QS), 
will not remain invariant if decomposed (violation of condition DR), and 
presupposes, necessarily, cooperation (violation of condition CI). It is therefore not 
possible to determine whether the compositional organization of TMSs yield 
successful modes of shared remembering by looking only at such synchronic 
conditions between higher-level properties of a TMS and its lower-level properties, 
components, and their organization.  
This result is not too surprising, since emergent properties in TMSs come about 
in virtue of some diachronic and historical patterns of interaction between two or 
more individuals. Indeed, because emergent properties in TMSs become available 
over a certain time-course of collaboration, this speaks against the view that TMSs 
have their emergent properties determined synchronically.  
For example, Harris et al. (2011) report that insofar as both the husband and the 
wife were able to differentiate their expertise, recognize one another as experts at 
remembering different aspects of episodic events, and given the particular 
transactive processes enacted, interactive transactions between couples would lead, 
in the right circumstances, to emergent properties such as remembering new details 
that both individuals could not remember alone as well as emotionally richer 
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descriptions of the event(s) (Harris et al. 2011, p. 291). As Harris et al. mention: 
“[…] this implicit process of collaborative cross-cuing and co-construction seemed 
to produce elaborations and new information, and to lead to more detailed, episodic, 
emotionally richer recall.” (2011, p. 292) Insofar as emergent properties in TMSs 
are mechanistically composed, and insofar as collaborative cross-cuing and co-
construction are parts of the TMS giving rise to emergent properties such as 
remembering more detailed and emotionally richer descriptions of episodic events, 
it follows that these properties are emergent due to a diachronic composition 
function. That is, even though the processes giving rise to emergent properties in 
TMSs operate in the here-and-now, none of these determine the existence of 
emergent properties in TMSs at an ontologically synchronic instant t, because the 
lower-level processes are themselves dependent on spatiotemporal continuity for 
their existence. That is, neither higher-level emergent properties nor lower-level 
processes giving rise to emergent properties are wholly present at a particular time 
instant t or at each point over an interval t1, …, tn. Indeed, the statement that 
emergent properties in TMSs are emergent in virtue of their compositional 
organization must not be mistaken for the statement that the lower-level processes 
are organized in such a way at a particular instant t that they wholly determine the 
existence of P, some higher-level emergent property.  
 
5.6. Conclusion  
 
I hope to have achieved two things in this chapter. First, I hope to have shown that 
by providing an analysis of transactive remembering, it is possible to show that 
insofar as TMSs are concerned, their compositional organization contravenes 
conditions for synchronic composition. Second, even though my critical target in 
this chapter has been Theiner and colleagues work on TMSs, I hope that my critical 
discussion of this work establishes a further development in this area of research.  
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6. Species of realization and the free energy principle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous three chapters, the focus has been on a diachronic explication of 
composition either in relation to specific metaphysical presuppositions or in relation 
to issues and case studies pertinent to EC. In this chapter, and in the chapters that 
will follow, I start to move beyond the composition relation and to consider 
relations of realization (this chapter), supervenience and emergence (chapter 7), and 
constitution (chapter 8). 
This chapter considers the realization relation. Especially, I examine the 
potential confluence between work on the metaphysics of realization in analytical 
philosophy (see e.g., Aizawa & Gillett 2009a, 2009b; Gillett 2002, 2003, 2007a; 
Polger 2007, 2010; Shapiro 2004; and Wilson 2001, 2004a, 2004b) and research on 
the free energy minimization formulation in cognitive neuroscience (see e.g., Clark 
2013; Friston 2002, 2003, 2010, 2011; Friston et al. 2012; Hohwy et al. 2008). The 
free energy principle is a variation of the so-called predictive brain hypothesis, 
which states that the brain is constantly making predictions about potential future 
events. It is the growing consensus in theoretical as well as systems neuroscience 
that a fundamental feature of neural computation is that the brain is always trying to 
reduce prediction error50.  
In the philosophical literature, no work has yet been done to examine whether 
these two fields of research can be brought together. In this chapter, I address some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 According to the free energy formulation, all biological systems are driven to 
reduce or minimize an information-theoretic property known as “free energy” 
(Friston et al. 2012, p. 1). In addition to its information-theoretic rendition, the free 
energy principle is mathematically similar to physical entropy in thermodynamics 
(Friston 2011).  
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of the issues that arise when such a potential confluence is scrutinized. My reasons 
for exploring this potential confluence are threefold.  
First, in his “Whatever Next? Predictive Brains, Situated Agents, and the Future 
of Cognitive Science” (2013), Clark indicates that the free energy principle fits 
snugly with extended approaches to cognition. That is, active construction of the 
niche – over the timescales of phylogeny, ontogeny, and the here-and-now – yields 
extra-neural resources for minimizing prediction error, thus suggesting that 
perception and action team up with the more slowly evolving backdrop of culturally 
distributed practices to minimize prediction error. If this is correct, the free energy 
minimization formulation might well turn out to be a natural ally of EC.  
Second, the free energy principle portrays the mind-body relationship as one of 
free energy minimization, and the most prominent application of the realization 
relation has been to address the mind-body problem. As a first approximation, this 
suggests that the realization relation and free energy minimization can be brought 
together.  
Finally, in various writings, Wilson (2001, 2004a, 2004b) has argued that 
insofar as the relation of realization is metaphysically wide, the realization relation 
may be used to ground the metaphysics of EC. By extension, then, if EC is 
consistent with the free energy principle, and if the metaphysics of EC is consistent 
with wide realization, then the free energy principle is consistent with wide 
realization. This follows from transitivity.  
It is one thing that it follows logically. Whether it follows as a matter of 
empirical fact is a different issue entirely. Because it is an empirical question 
whether free energy minimization is realized by certain physical entities, and since I 
aim to provide a philosophical treatment of this question, I shall frame my 
arguments conditionally. I provide an overview of these arguments in section 6.2. 
Before I state my arguments, however, I need to provide the reader with some 
information about realization. We are already familiar with some of this background 
information from chapter 2. So, here I expose only the most important issues for my 
purposes.   
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6.1. Species of realization 
 
First, the realization relation is considered by many to be a relation of ontological 
dependence (Gillett 2007a, p. 166). The received view amongst realization theorists, 
regardless of their different persuasions, is that this form of dependency is 
synchronic and noncausal. For instance, as Bennett, in her survey of metaphysical 
dependence relations, specifies: “Building relations do not unfold over time. If 
property P realizes property Q, it does so at some time t […]. Causation, by 
contrast, is paradigmatically diachronic, and that idea is frequently invoked to 
distinguish causation from relations like [realization].” (2011, pp. 93-94; italics in 
original)51 Thus, realization and causation are distinct modes of determination, since 
one holds diachronically (causation), whereas the other holds synchronically, or at a 
durationless instant t (realization).  
Second, consider the distinction between what Gillett calls the “flat” view, on 
the one hand, and the “dimensioned” view, on the other. What Gillett terms the flat 
view of realization is a one-one relation between properties and/or property 
instances instantiated by the same individual, and where the realizer/realized 
properties are individuated by their causal role (Gillett 2002, p. 317). Furthermore, 
the flat view – or, as Gillett also calls it, the standard view – is the conjunction of 
two metaphysical theses. The first thesis concerns sufficiency such that property P 
realizes property Q only if the causal powers of Q are a subset of P. Gillett calls this 
the metaphysical sufficiency thesis: “(1) Property instances P1-Pn are realizers of 
property instance F, at time t, if and only if P1-Pn are a minimal combination of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!51!Or, as Aizawa & Gillett put it: “[We] should mark that relations like realization 
are obviously a species of determination relation, but are different from causal 
relations. The ‘horizontal’ determination involved with causation is temporally 
extended, relates wholly distinct entities and often involves the transfer of energy 
and/or the mediation of force. In contrast, compositional relations are not temporal 
in nature, since their ‘vertical’ determination is synchronous, does not relate wholly 
distinct entities, and does not involve the transfer of energy and/or mediation of 
force. Composition is thus a variety of what has been termed ‘non-causal’ 
determination.” (2009a, p. 198) Note that Aizawa & Gillett use the term 
‘composition’ broadly so that it includes the realization relation.!
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property instances which are together metaphysically sufficient for an instance of F 
at t. (MS-thesis).” (2007a, p. 174; italics in original) Wilson also states that the 
standard view of realization takes the form of sufficiency: “realizers are 
metaphysically sufficient for the properties or states they realize.” (2001, p. 4)52 The 
second thesis of the flat view concerns the individuals in which the realizer/realized 
properties are instantiated. Gillett frames this view accordingly: “A property 
instance X realizes a property instance Y only if X and Y are instantiated in the 
same individual.” (2002, p. 317; italics in original) Wilson dubs this for the 
constitutivity thesis of the standard view: “realizers of states and properties are 
exhaustively physically constituted by the intrinsic, physical states of the individual 
whose states or properties they are.” (2001, p. 5)53 Gillett thinks that the flat view is 
inadequate, and offers, in its stead, a dimensioned view of realization. Advocates of 
the dimensioned view think that realization only trades in properties as relata54. 
Also, that the realizer/realized properties are usually qualitatively distinct. Take !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!52!Gillett refers to both Kim (1998) and Shoemaker (2001) as proponents of the flat 
view of realization and, consequently, the MS-thesis. For instance, as Shoemaker 
states: “… property X realizes property Y just in case the conditional powers 
bestowed by Y are a subset of the conditional powers bestowed by X …” (2001, p. 
78; cited in Gillett 2002, p. 318) And as Gillett frames Kim’s view: “A property 
instance X realizes a property instance Y only if the causal powers individuative of 
the instance of Y match causal powers contributed by the instance X (and where X 
may contribute powers not individuative of Y).” (2002, p. 318)!
53 Philosophers like Kim (1998) and Shoemaker (1999) express commitment to 
something like the constitutivity thesis. As Kim states: “It is evident that a second-
order property and its realizers are at the same level […] they are properties of the 
very same individual.” (1998, p. 82; italics in original) Or, as Gillett (2002) frames 
Shoemaker’s view: “A property instance X realizes a property instance Y only if X 
and Y are instantiated in the same individual.” (2002, p. 317; see Shoemaker 1999, 
p. 297) As expressed in the constitutivity thesis, both Kim and Shoemaker demand 
that realizer/realized properties are contained in the same individual. 
54 Opponents of the dimensioned view such as Polger (2010) do not discriminate as 
to which kinds of entities – e.g., properties, processes, objects, and so on – are 
related by realization. 
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Gillett’s example of a cut diamond, S* (2002). S* has the realized property of being 
very hard, H. Suppose H is composed by carbon atoms S1-Sn, and that S1-Sn have 
the properties of being bonded, B1-Bn, and being aligned, A1-An. S* has H but has 
neither A1-An nor B1-Bn. Similarly for the carbon atoms, which have A1-An and 
B1-Bn but not H. In addition to these features, the dimensioned view takes 
realization to be a many-one relation rather than a one-one relation – e.g., many 
carbon atoms combine to compose one diamond. Moreover, in their recently offered 
accounts of realization, Gillett (2007a) and Aizawa & Gillett (2009a, 2009b) reject 
both the use of the constitutivity thesis and the metaphysical sufficiency thesis of 
the flat view in providing accounts of realization. These accounts reject the 
constitutivity thesis, since the realizer/realized properties may, in the right 
circumstances, be instantiated in different individuals, whereas the flat view 
presupposes that realized properties are exhaustively dependent on the internal 
properties of the individual whose properties they are (Wilson 2001, p. 4). As 
Gillett states this feature of the dimensioned view: “H is not identical to any of the 
particular properties/relations of any individual carbon atom, for H is instantiated in 
the diamond whilst particular relations of bonding and alignment are instantiated in 
some carbon atom.” (2002, p. 319) We should also note that H comprises different 
causal powers than any of the causal powers instantiated by the properties of 
bonding and alignment of a carbon atom (Gillett 2002, p. 319). On the dimensioned 
view, then, parts and whole are individuals, which bear powerful causal relations to 
one another. The dimensioned view rejects the metaphysical sufficiency thesis of 
the flat view, since the dimensioned view is indexed against background conditions, 
while the sufficiency thesis presupposes the necessity of background conditions 
(Gillett 2007a). In this sense, realizers are spatially contained within the individual 
that is the composed entity.  
The distinction between the flat view and the dimensioned view, together with 
the fact that realization is understood to be a relation of synchronic dependence, 
give us some idea for the different varieties of theories of realization. However, I 
want to finish this sketch of different species of realization by introducing the wide 
realization view proposed by Wilson (2001, 2004a, 2004b; Wilson & Clark 2009). 
According to Wilson, there are cases of the realizer/realized relation in which the 
realizers of some realized property P extend beyond the boundary of the individual 
bearer, IB, who has P. This characterization rejects the constitutivity thesis of the 
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flat view. As Wilson states: “[…], wide realizations […] extend beyond the physical 
boundary of the individual, they are not exhaustively constituted by the intrinsic, 
physical properties of the individual subject, and so do not satisfy the constitutivity 
thesis.” (2001, p. 12) However, the wide realization view accepts the metaphysical 
sufficiency thesis, in the sense that it is only the physical properties constituting a 
total realization together with the appropriate background conditions that 
metaphysically suffice for P. As an example of putatively wide realization, Wilson 
claims that: “Fitness is a dispositional property of individual organisms (or even 
whole species), this disposition is not individualistic, since physically identical 
organisms may differ in fitness because they have been or are located in different 
environments.” (2001, p. 13) According to the wide realization view, then, in the 
right circumstances, only properties instantiated within the individual together with 
properties instantiated beyond that individual’s brain and/or entire bodily 
constitution metaphysically suffice for some realized property.  
 
6.2. Arguments 
 
With this sketch of different species of realization in hand, I now turn to set up the 
arguments that I shall pursue in order to discuss the potential confluence between 
the metaphysics of realization and free energy minimization.  
The first argument is the following: If the world is such that physical realizers 
are metaphysically sufficient for what they realize, and if the physical realizers are 
wholly instantiated within the same individual as the realized property, then the 
following view of realization holds: the relationship between realizer/realized 
cannot be such that the physical realizers can be exemplified in individuals different 
from the realized property. On a first pass, this argument turns on and, as a result, 
supports Gillett’s critiques of the flat view of realization. That is, if the world is 
such – as purported within the free energy framework – that the property of free 
energy minimization and its realizer properties are instantiated within disparate 
individuals, then the following claim about realization holds: the relationship 
between realizer/realized properties may, in the right circumstances, be instantiated 
in different individuals. However, on a second pass, this argument rejects Gillett’s 
presupposition that the components, whose properties enter into relations of 
realization, are spatially contained within the individual associated that is the 
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composed entity. That is, if the world is as it is claimed to be in the free energy 
framework, then the systemic components and their properties that realize the 
property of free energy minimization may, in the right circumstances, outstrip the 
boundaries of the skin-and-skull to include properties of that individual’s extra-
neural and/or extra-bodily environment. If this is correct, it follows that free energy 
minimization is widely realized (Wilson 2001).  
To underpin both of these claims, consider that on its thermodynamic axis, the 
free energy principle starts from the premise that biological systems are dissipative 
systems. A dissipative system is an open system, which operates far-from-
thermodynamic equilibrium by exchanging energy or entropy with the surrounding 
environment (Friston & Stephan 2007). Here I should note that according to the free 
energy framework, biological systems preserve their order, despite being immersed 
in an environment that is irrevocably becoming more disordered, since the 
environment “unfolds in a thermodynamically structured and lawful way and 
biological systems embed these laws into their anatomy.” (Friston & Stephan 2007, 
p. 422) As a result, the realizers of entropy minimization include, necessarily, 
properties of that individual’s extra-neural and extra-bodily environment. If we 
maintained the internal structure associated with (or which is) the individual 
composed, whose realized property of free energy minimization it is, but varied the 
nature of the extra-neural and/or extra-bodily environment, the realized property 
would alter radically.  
I will provide a similar argument as I consider the information-theoretic axis of 
the free energy principle. If manipulation of environmental structures, embedded in 
continuous loops of perception and action, affords extra-bodily circuitry for the 
minimization of prediction error, then this violates the view that the physical 
realizers of P (that is, the minimization of prediction error) must be spatially 
contained within an individual S. Hence, if the world is as suggested by the free 
energy principle, then the realization base of P must be wide. We thus have two 
arguments: one that contravenes the flat view, in the sense that the realizer/realized 
properties need not be exemplified within one individual; and another argument that 
contravenes the dimensioned view: that the components, whose properties enter into 
relations of realization, are spatially contained within the individual associated with 
(or which is) the composed entity.  
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The second argument I shall examine turns on the idea that the received view of 
realization is a synchronic (and noncausal) relation. The form of the argument is 
conditional. Irrespective of one’s preferred version of realization, if the world is 
such that realization and free energy minimization can be brought together, then it 
follows that: the relationship between realizer/realized is such that there is a 
synchronic relation between the realized properties and their physical realizers. As 
we have seen, the presupposition that realization is a synchronic (durationless or 
atemporal) relation of dependence is a commonly accepted condition on realization 
– one endorsed by defenders of the flat view, the dimensioned view, and the wide 
view. However, if the world is such – as stated by the free energy principle – that 
free energy minimization is a property of dynamical systems, whose components 
are orchestrated in temporally extended processes with properties such as 
nonlinearity, then the following claim holds: free energy minimization is a property 
of temporally unfolding processes, and the latter are themselves composed of 
temporally unfolding processes. If this is true, then the synchronic conception of 
realization is problematic.  
A clue to the needed account: the difference between objects and their 
properties, on the one hand, and processes and their properties, on the other. 
Objects, such as a chair, and its properties, such as being brown, are timeless, in the 
sense that they exist whole and complete at a synchronic instant t. A diamond’s 
property of being hard is wholly present at each moment in time during which the 
diamond persists. In this sense, objects or object-like entities have no temporal 
extent (Noë 2006). But, processes, and their properties, are temporally extended in 
nature. To suppose that the property of free energy minimization exemplified in 
dynamical systems is complete at a synchronic moment in time would be to confuse 
the relation between processes and their properties with the relationship between 
object-like entities and their properties.  
In addition to this, consider that a common strategy by which to identify what 
“constitutes” the realization base of some realized property, is by appealing to what 
plays the most salient causal role(s) in relation to the instantiation of that realized 
property (Cosmelli & Thompson 2010, p. 364). But, if the systems that minimize 
free energy are complex (nonlinear, self-organizing, and temporally dynamic) 
systems – as argued by proponents of the free energy principle (Friston & Stephan 
2007) – then the question of what plays the most salient role will be difficult to 
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answer. The reason for this is that the behavior of single neurons and/or neuronal 
assemblies cannot be determined independently of global brain activity and the 
timescales over which such activity unfolds. As Cosmelli & Thompson explain: “In 
dense nonlinear systems in which all state variables interact with each other, any 
change in an individual variable becomes inseparable from the state of the rest of 
the system.” (2010, p. 365) Moreover, in nonlinear systems, individual neurons or 
neuronal assemblies operate over multiple different time-courses, even though the 
activity of different neurons or neuronal assemblies may operate synchronously 
(Friston & Stephan 2007; Varela et al. 2001). Thus, if the world is as suggested by 
the free energy principle, it follows that the minimization of free energy refuses 
realization at a synchronic instant. Perhaps this shows that the realization relation is 
apt for a diachronic-friendly extension. That is, could we not simply say that such-
and-such temporal features realize free energy minimization? In this chapter, I will 
not argue for this point; rather, my aim is to show that the synchronic constraint of 
the received views on realization is ill fitted to do the job.  
 
6.3. Overview 
 
In section 6.4, I deal with the first argument outlined in section 6.2. In so doing, I 
will problematize the adequacy of both the flat view and the dimensioned view. In 
section 6.5, I develop the second argument outlined in section 6.2, where I will 
scrutinize the synchronicity constraint of the usual theories on realization. I 
conclude this chapter differently than the rest of the chapters, in the sense that the 
best I can hope to show is that given certain conditions, it is (arguably) the case that 
free energy minimization cannot be brought together with the realization relation.  
 
6.4. Argument #1: Realization, wide realization, and the free energy principle  
 
6.4.1. Argument from thermodynamics 
 
Recall that the flat view of realization states that the world is such that the realizers 
are metaphysically sufficient for what they realize, and that the physical realizers 
are instantiated in the same individual as the realized property. If true, the 
relationship between realizer/realized properties cannot be such that physical 
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realizers are instantiated in individuals different from that of the realized property, 
and the realizers are, necessarily, sufficient for the exemplification of the realized 
property. However, according to the free energy minimization formulation, the 
world is not like this. If the world is as the free energy principle claims, the relation 
between realizer/realized properties is such that these properties are, in the right 
circumstances, instantiated in different individuals.  
Consider that the free energy principle states that all physical systems (in order 
to survive) must actively resist a natural tendency for disorder (Friston 2003, 2010, 
2011; see also Ashby (1952) and Haken (1983)). This is the thermodynamic starting 
point of the free energy principle, and it brings the free energy principle into 
alignment with principles of dynamical systems, the central premise of which is that 
physical systems, in general, and biological systems, in particular, belong “to a class 
of systems that are both complex and that exist far from thermodynamic 
equilibrium.” (Thelen & Smith 1994, p. 51; italics in original) Biological systems 
are complex, in the sense that such systems typically consist of many components, 
and these components tend to be different with disparate properties as well as causal 
powers. In addition, biological systems exist far-from-thermodynamic equilibrium, 
because such systems contravene the second law of thermodynamics. The second 
law of thermodynamics states that entropy (i.e., a measure of disorder, or, more 
simply, the number of way the components of a system can be rearranged) of closed 
systems increases over time (Friston 2010, p. 127).  
We know that organisms are capable of maintaining reduced levels of entropy 
in the face of fluctuations and increasing levels of entropic disorder in the external 
environment. In his discussion of which kinds of properties and components must 
be involved in realizing such a capacity, Kemp (1982) mentions, among other 
things, the role of temperature regulation to sustain appropriate levels of internal 
temperature. But this is not possible without some sort of blood filter (i.e., 
circulatory system), the property of which is to filtrate and pump blood throughout 
the body. We do not need to add additional components and properties to this 
example in order to establish the following: that the capacity of organisms to 
maintain entropy is realized in a number of different components. If Gillett (2002, 
2007a) is correct to insist that components are individuals, then it follows that the 
capacity of entropy minimization is a property of organisms realized by different 
individuals. Here I have highlighted intralevel components, i.e., constituent 
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components. But we should note that the same point holds between systemic levels. 
Although the microphysical parts involved in realizing entropy minimization may 
be qualitatively different, they combine to compose the qualitatively different 
property of entropy minimization.   
In this case, we have an argument against the assumption of the flat view, that 
the realization relation is a one-one relation that holds within one and only one 
individual. As a first approximation, this supports the dimensioned view. First 
approximations, however, are not always correct. This is one of those occasions. 
That is, I shall now show that Gillett’s presupposition that the components, whose 
properties enter into relations of realization, are spatially contained within the 
individual associated with (or which is) the composed entity is problematic – at 
least in the case of free energy minimization. If the world is as stated by the free 
energy principle, then the systemic parts and their properties that putatively realize 
free energy minimization are not spatially contained within an individual but 
includes components and properties of that individual’s extra-neural and/or extra-
bodily environment.  
Consider that in contrast to closed systems, biological systems are open systems. 
Open systems are also called dissipative systems, which is meant to specify that 
such systems preserve their order, while being immersed in a dynamical 
environment, by exchanging energy or matter with that environment. Using this 
terminology, we can state that the amount of entropy in a system is negatively 
correlated with its potential for survival (Friston & Stephan 2007, p. 423). In short, 
for biological systems to avoid phase-transition (e.g., from being alive to being 
dead), they must exchange entropy with the environment.  
Combining the thermodynamics of free energy minimization with the realization 
relation, let us start with the following. Call H the property of self-maintenance, X 
the property of drawing energy from the environment, P the property of 
manipulating an energy source, and R for the property of dissipation. Here X can at 
best be a partial realization of H – and similarly for P and R. A partial realization is 
what Shoemaker (1981) calls a core realization, which is a particular component of 
the central nervous system, say, that is identifiable as performing a core role in 
bringing about H. If this turns out to be correct, which is the norm in the literature, 
then partial realizations alone will not satisfy as metaphysically sufficient for H. 
This does not yet provide us with an argument against the flat view. But that core 
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realizers are insufficient for H identifies the need for something extra. That is 
precisely what Shoemaker (1981) provides. According to Shoemaker, when 
considering the relation between some realized state or process (e.g., H), and the 
system, S, in which H is realized, one must distinguish between core realizations 
and total realizations. In his discussion of Shoemaker’s account, Wilson provides 
the following definition of core- and total-realization (2001, p. 8; italics in original): 
 
(a) Core realization of H: a state of the specific part of S that is most readily 
identifiable as playing a crucial role in producing or sustaining H.  
 
(b) Total realization of H: a state of S, containing any given core realization as a 
proper part, that is metaphysically sufficient for H.  
 
Wilson does not discuss the case of self-maintenance, even though he uses the 
placeholder H in his definitions. With this clarified, consider that total realizations 
of H (that is, the property of self-maintenance) includes X, P, and R. In this sense, 
total realizations are complete realizations. However, if the world is as stated by the 
free energy principle, then even if total realizations are complete, they are still 
metaphysically insufficient for H, since – as Wilson would say – the total 
realization of H “excludes the background conditions that are necessary for there to 
be the appropriate, functioning system.” (2001, p. 9; italics in original)  
If we consider the thermodynamic formulation of the free energy principle, it 
becomes apparent why it is only the physical states that make up the total realization 
in conjunction with appropriate extra-bodily properties that will metaphysically 
suffice for realizing H. A total realization of H includes X, P, and R. However, 
excluded from the total realization of H is the necessary fact that the environment 
itself “unfolds in a thermodynamically structured and lawful way […]” (Friston & 
Stephan 2007, p. 422), which is necessary for the system S to function the way it 
does. Strictly speaking, for an open system to maintain its structure and function it 
must engage in energy exchange with the environment. But, for this to be possible, 
the environment itself must be able to continuously consume and dissipate energy55. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Shapiro points to one aspect of this in his discussion of homeostasis as a 
constraint upon biological systems. For instance, noting that the external 
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Call these extra-bodily or environmental realizers of H, ER. Importantly, ER’s are 
not part of the total realizations of H, instantiated in S, since the ER’s are not 
properties of S – the individual within which the total realizations of H are spatially 
contained. Thus, if H is a realized property, the properties realizing H are not 
wholly spatially contained within the individual S, where S is the individual 
instantiating H. This fact counts against the dimensioned view of realization.  
There is at least one reason to believe that this outcome (against the 
dimensioned view) is premature. For example, Gillett (2007a) provides a critique of 
the appeal to “external” entities as actual physical realizers due to the fact that such 
an appeal turns on the view that such “external” entities are elements of a 
metaphysical sufficiency condition for the realized entity. On Gillett’s view, 
however, metaphysical sufficiency “leads to scientific hyper-extension by placing 
realizers, and parts, beyond the normal scientific limits and understanding.” (2007a, 
p. 176) Gillett argues, that in scientific examples, realizers are not metaphysically 
sufficient for realized properties, because – strictly speaking – only realizers 
together with entities that function as background conditions are sufficient for the 
realized properties. Gillett’s view is based on what he terms “[our] well-confirmed 
scientific theories,” (2007a, p. 176) which he finds in his analysis of examples from 
chemistry and biology.  
Even if Gillett is correct in what he takes to be our well-formed scientific 
theories in chemistry and biology, it is important to mention that the free energy 
minimization formulation is “premised [on the fact] that the environment unfolds in 
a thermodynamically structured and lawful way and that biological systems embed 
these laws into their anatomy.” (Friston & Stephan 2007, p. 422) Here we have a 
scientific theory that takes it as an integral fact that certain non-neural and extra-
bodily properties of the environment – that environmental order is assured in the 
face of irreversible disorder by the fact that the environment is thermodynamically 
structured – are an inherent part of a physical organism’s capacity to reverse an 
increase in physical entropy over time. As a result, and viewed under counterfactual !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
environment is less dilute than an organism’s internal environment, the external 
environment enables an organism to regulate its temperature by ‘pulling’ water 
from the organism, “drying it out and altering its concentration of ions.” (2004, p. 
88) 
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conditions, if we maintain the “internal” realizers but varied the nature of the 
environment such that it is not thermodynamically structured, then this would 
radically change the capacity of organisms to preserve their order.  
It is also worth stressing that Gillett’s appeal to spatial containment, as he 
specifies that components and their properties be spatially contained within the 
individual that is associated with (or which is) the entity composed (2007a, p. 166), 
does not find any corresponding image in contemporary physics (Ross & Ladyman 
2010, p. 159). As Ross & Ladyman state: “The types of particles which physical 
theory describes do not have spatiotemporal boundaries in anything like what 
common sense takes for granted in conceptualizing everyday objects, and in that 
respect are not classical individuals – the philosopher’s little things (French & 
Krause 2006).” (2010, p. 156) So, with the insights from the thermodynamic 
rendition of the free energy principle, we might even question the spatial 
containment condition of the dimensioned view. I do not think that this provides 
trouble free evidence for the claim that if the world is as purported by the free 
energy formulation, the realization relation must be wide. But, what it does establish 
is potential limitations with the dimensioned view of realization, while lending 
additional plausibility to a wide view of realization.  
 
6.4.2. Introducing predictive processing in the free energy principle 
 
Similar problems with both the flat view and the dimensioned view of realization 
arise when we consider the free energy principle from its information-theoretic 
perspective. Before arguing for this, I need to introduce several core aspects of the 
free energy principle in cognitive neuroscience. I begin exposing the relationship 
between free energy and Bayesian inference.  
According to Friston et al., free energy “bounds surprise, conceived as the 
difference between an organism’s predictions about its sensory inputs […] and the 
sensations it actually encounters.” (2012, p. 1) “Surprise,” in this context, does not 
refer to personal-level or conscious surprise (e.g., the kind of surprise one 
experiences when somebody organizes a surprise party for you). Instead, “surprise” 
in the free energy principle is understood as a measure of improbability from 
information theory. Similarly to the thermodynamics of the free energy principle, 
the information-theoretic formulation states: “organisms that succeed […] do so by 
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minimizing their tendency to enter into this special kind of surprising (that is, non-
anticipated) state.” (Friston et al. 2012, p. 1) That is: “For the brain to be 
energetically efficient and for our behavior to be optimal and adaptive, we [our 
brain] utilize knowledge from previous experiences to make predictions about the 
future and minimize the cost of surprise.” (Brown & Brüne 2012, p. 1)  
Free energy minimization is modeled in the framework of Bayesian inference. 
As Brown & Brüne state: “Bayesian statistical inference is a mathematical method 
of inference which incorporates priors, or prior beliefs learned from previous 
experiences that generate internal models [i.e., probabilistic representations] of a 
predicted outcome, and consequently acts as top-down modulators of bottom-up 
sensory input.” (2012, p. 3) According to Hohwy, Roepstorff, and Friston (2008), 
the predictive brain hypothesis explains how the brain, through the implementation 
of Bayesian inference, utilizes probabilistic representations of the causes of its 
sensory inputs to anticipate future events. The brain does this by making operative 
processes the function of which are to optimize a particular kind of prediction error, 
typically associated with the activity of superficial pyramidal cells; these cells being 
the source of the forward and backward connections in the brain (Brown et al. 2011, 
p. 2). In the mammalian brain, prediction error is corrected for within a hierarchy or 
cascade of cortico-thalamic and cortico-cortical processing in which ensembles of 
neurons attempt to predict the input generated at lower levels of computation in the 
architecture on the basis of their own probabilistic representations of the sensory 
input (Mumford 1992, p. 241). The predictions with the highest posterior 
probability (i.e., most probable given the input) fix the content of the sensory input 
(Hohwy et al. 2008, p. 688). If this picture of the brain’s information-theoretic 
processing turns out to be correct, it is evidence for the fact that the brain (in 
Bayesian terms) makes use of a generative model, composed of two elements: 
likelihood (i.e., the probability of sensory input given their causes) and prior 
probability (i.e., how probable the prediction was before the input) (see e.g., Friston 
2002; Hohwy et al. 2008).  
Another feature of the predictive brain hypothesis is the idea that the brain’s 
processing architecture is hierarchical. Hierarchical organization presupposes a 
distinction between forward and backward connections. Forward (bottom-up) 
connections run from lower to higher areas in the brain, while backward (top-down) 
connections go from higher to lower brain regions. Within a hierarchical level, 
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lateral connections connect various other regions (Hohwy 2007; Hohwy et al. 
2008). Neuroimaging studies suggest that forward connections carry sensory input, 
while backward connections modulate bottom-up inputs, viz., have a controlling 
influence over “the probability of certain aspects” of the content transmitted by 
sensory receptive fields (Friston 2003, p. 1328). To successfully suppress error 
signals, leaving only the prediction error to be passed forward in the system, the 
activity of explaining away becomes important. Explaining away involves a process 
of matching the driving sensory signal with a cascade of predictions emerging in 
spatiotemporal activity in the hierarchy. As Clark mentions: “Perception here 
becomes ‘theory-laden’ in at least one (rather specific) sense: what we perceive 
depends heavily upon the set of priors (including any relevant hyperpriors) that the 
brain brings to bear in its best attempt to predict the current signal.” (2013, p. 187) 
Consequently, the brain (rather than being passive) is actively and continuously 
trying to predict the posterior probability – given the recognition density – at each 
processing level of the hierarchy.  
 
6.4.2.1. Argument from predictive processing in the brain 
 
The argument against the flat view above presupposed a particular reading, namely 
that realizers are wholly constituted by “internal” properties of individuals. Here I 
wish to take literally when Wilson specifies that part of the so-called flat view is 
that “realizers of states and properties are exhaustively constituted by the intrinsic, 
physical states of the individual whose states or properties they are.” (2001, p. 5; 
italics added) “Intrinsic properties” are usually understood to be those properties 
that an entity possesses independently of everything else that exists or 
independently of there existing anything else (Ladyman & Ross 2007, p. 135). 
If the world is as the flat view takes it to be, then it follows that realized 
properties are realized by the intrinsic physical properties of the individual bearer, 
whose properties they are. But, if the world is as stated in the free energy principle, 
realized properties prevent realization by intrinsic physical properties, because the 
properties of the realizers are themselves non-intrinsic.  
Consider, firstly, what Rao & Ballard say about the bidirectional connectivity 
in predictive hierarchical architectures: “[Prediction] and error-correction cycles 
occur concurrently throughout the hierarchy, so top-down information influences 
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lower-level estimates, and bottom-up information influences higher-level estimates 
of the input signal.” (1999, p. 80) Or, as Varela et al., in their review of functional 
integration in the brain, say: “With only a few exceptions, the brain is organized on 
the basis of what we can call the principle of reciprocity: if area A connects to area 
B, then there are reciprocal connections from B to A.” (2001, p. 230) To get a grip 
on this idea, consider, secondly, how Hohwy et al. (2008) explain the phenomenon 
of binocular rivalry.  
Binocular rivalry is a form of subjective visual experience that occurs, in a 
special experimental setup, when one stimulus is shown to one eye and another 
stimulus is shown to the other. For example, when an image of a house is presented 
to the right eye, and an image of a face to the left eye, the subjective experience 
tends to unfold in a bi-stable manner by alternating between the house and the face. 
This is what is known as binocular rivalry. As Hohwy et al. explain, to account for 
binocular rivalry, two parts need explanation: first, the selection problem: “why is 
there a perceptual decision to select one stimulus for perception rather than the 
other, and, further, why is one of the two stimuli selected rather than some 
conjunction or blend of them?” (2008, p. 690), and second, the alternation problem: 
“why does perceptual inference alternative between the two stimuli rather than stick 
with the selected one?” (2008, p. 690)  
From the perspective of Bayesian inference, if a subject is currently 
experiencing an image of a face, F, why, then, does the F hypothesis have the 
highest probability, given that F and house H have an equal likelihood? This is the 
selection problem. The alternation problem is to explain why the system (the brain), 
having selected F, say, after only a few seconds de-selects in favor of H. Note that 
for my present purposes, discussion of both the selection and the alternation 
problem is unnecessary, so I shall restrict my attention to the alternation problem 
here. According to Hohwy et al., the predictive processing framework posits a 
hierarchical inversion of generative models of how inputs are caused to explain the 
alternation problem:  
 
“At the higher, hypothesis-generating level only the currently best hypothesis 
is allowed to generate predictions. It seems plausible that inhibition will be 
lateral, in relation to other hypotheses at the same level. This gives high 
activity for the winning hypothesis with the highest posterior and this for the 
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dominant percept, and lower activity for other hypotheses at that level. At the 
lower level there is the opposite pattern: the bottom-up driving signal for the 
dominating percept is explained away by good predictions, meaning the 
prediction error for the dominant hypothesis is suppressed. Conversely, the 
bottom-up error signal for the currently suppressed stimulus is not.” (2008, p. 
691)  
 
As with the property of self-maintenance, free energy minimization is ineliminably 
relational, with all areas (thalamo-cortical, cortico-cortical) working simultaneously, 
yet at different temporal frequencies. Order is maintained in the overall processing, 
Friston & Stephan explain, through synchronous activity in the various top-down 
and bottom-up loops in the computational architecture (2007, p. 443).  
In dichoptic viewing conditions, when F is viewed by one eye and H by the 
other one, the hypothesis with the highest prior probability (how probable the 
prediction was before the input) could be considered as a core realization, viz., a 
specific part of S that is identifiable as playing a crucial role in producing the 
realized property. But, selected hypotheses are metaphysically context-sensitive, in 
the sense that they will realize a visual experience of F, say, only in relation to their 
activity and location within a generative hierarchical organization (Friston 2002).  
While total realizations are said to be complete realizations, the assumption of 
the flat view that realized properties are realized by physical intrinsic realizers is 
inconsistent with the free energy principle, because a crucial property of the process 
of functional integration – in the processing architecture – is temporal synchrony 
(Engel 2010; Engel et al. 2001; Friston 2003; Varela et al. 2001). In contrast to the 
idea that intrinsic realizers realize properties, temporally synchronous patterns are 
extrinsic, relational properties of dynamical systems such as the brain. As a result, if 
the free energy principle is correct, then the flat view of realization is false, since 
the physical realizers are themselves (in part, at least) relational (i.e., non-intrinsic).   
 
6.4.2.2. Argument from wide predictive processing 
 
What I call the argument from wide predictive processing is intended to show that 
the spatial containment constraint of the dimensioned view is problematic. The 
intended argument is as follows: if active manipulation of worldly resources, 
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embedded in on-going loops of perception and action, afford extra-bodily circuitry 
for minimization of prediction error, then the spatial containment condition of the 
dimensioned view is at best unproven in the case of free energy minimization. This 
lends support (prima facie, at least) to a wide conception of realization.  
In their “Enculturating brains through patterned practices,” Roepstorff et al. 
(2010) go on to suggest that the brain is a hierarchically organized predictive 
machine, which attempts to anticipate its sensory inputs based on empirical priors of 
causes in the environment. That idea finds its fullest expression in the patterned 
practice approach in social anthropology and social neuroscience. In Roepstorff et 
al. words:  
 
“The patterned practice approach is highly compatible with these findings 
[predictive brain hypothesis]. […]. The affinities between ‘predictive brain’ 
models and a patterned practice approach may not be merely metaphorical. At 
different levels, they frame the link between action and perception as a 
continuous process of resonance, where networks-in-action order the 
coordination of input and output as networks-in-action form and unfold in 
practice.” (2010, pp. 1056-57)  
 
The idea is that just as top-down predictions modulate bottom-up input so can 
socially embedded and culturally transmitted practices be understood as 
modulatory. Evidence for this is provided by Roepstorff & Frith (2004), who 
consider the concept of “top-top” modulatory control of action in a study of the 
‘Wisconsin card-sorting task’ (WCST). Based on brain imaging experiments, 
Roepstorff & Frith (2004) argue that the state-oriented (here-and-now time 
perspective) “top” in “top-down” driving and modulatory control of action rather 
than being conceived as internal to the experimental participant is in fact socially 
distributed across the experimenter and experimental participant in cognitive 
experiments. Roepstorff & Frith focus on several experiments. I shall focus on one 
of these, namely a study on the cross-species neural correlates of action conducted 
by Nakahara et al. (2002).  
Nakahara et al. (2002) had two macaque monkeys perform a version of the 
WCST. In a WCST, which consists of four cards and 128 response cards with 
geometric figures that vary according to perceptual dimensions such as color, form 
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or number, the experimental participant is presented with cards that display specific 
symbols of one of the three perceptual dimensions, such as three green circles, or 
three yellow triangles, etc. The task requires the participant to find the correct 
classification rule, viz., sorting criteria. During the task, the participant is given 
feedback related to the correctness of their sort. Once the participant chooses the 
correct rule they must maintain the use of this rule irrespective of the fact that the 
stimulus changes. After a certain number of correct matches, the experimenter 
changes the sorting criteria without warning, demanding the participant to discover 
the new classification rule.  
During the task, Nakahara et al. had the two monkeys perform a computerized 
version of the WCST, where the monkeys had to select one of three cards relative to 
the classification rule in use at the time of sorting. The feedback was provided 
visually on the screen and the monkeys received liquid as a reward for choosing 
correct. The MRI results showed that “the main effect of the set-shifting component 
of the WCST was found in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex bilaterally, […] at the 
ventral end of the inferior ramus of the arcuate sulcus.” (Roepstorff & Frith 2004, p. 
191) Nakahara et al. also had 10 human subjects perform the same task. As 
Roepstorff & Frith specify: “In these [human] participants, the main activation was 
found in the posterior part of the bilateral inferior frontal sulcus (Broadmann’s area 
44/45, […]).” (2004, p. 191) These results, both Nakahara et al. (2002) and 
Roepstorff & Frith (2004) agree, confirm that the main sites of activation in the two 
species may be considered functionally and anatomically homologous.  
To perform well in the WCST, the participant must enact and modify a 
particular cognitive set, “which can be used as a template for acting in the world 
[…].” (Roepstorff & Frith 2004, p. 191) According to Roepstorff & Frith, this is a 
clear indication of a top-down control of action in both an anatomical sense (from 
prefrontal to lower brain areas) and in the predictive processing sense (denoting a 
form of hypothesis or prediction-driven processing). Adding to the central 
conclusion by Nakahara et al., that there is evidence of cross-species neural 
correlates of action, Roepstorff & Frith provide an alternative interpretation of the 
experimental outcomes, one that is based on a combination of patterned practices 
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and the different developmental and social trajectories between the macaque 
monkeys, on the one hand, and the humans, on the other56. 
The important thing to note is that whereas it took Nakahara et al. up to one full 
year of training to get the monkeys to perform the WCST in the MRI scanner, it 
only took the human participants 30-60 minutes of verbal instruction to perform 
equally well. Thus, despite displaying similar patterns of behavior and brain 
activation, the learning trajectory between the two species is quite different. In the 
human case, Roepstorff & Frith stress, the internal top-down story breaks down. On 
the standard view, bottom-up effects are driven through sensory inputs established 
“from the outside,” whereas top-down predictions are generated “from the inside,” 
e.g., via knowledge-driven predictions about the causes of the sensorium. But, as 
Roepstorff & Frith argue: 
 
“[The] ‘verbal instructions’ that enable the human volunteers to perform well 
in the task, fail to fit this scheme. The instructions are clearly coming ‘from 
the outside’ and are mediated via the senses, i.e., bottom up, and yet their 
main purpose is to allow for the very rapid establishment of a consistent 
model of how the participants are to interpret and respond in the situation, i.e., 
top-down.” (2004, p. 192)  
 
The main result that Roepstorff & Frith point to is that given this breakdown of the 
conventional model of the “top” in top-down processing, “the origin of the 
‘executive top’ employed in the WCST is out-side the brain of the participant, 
namely [socially mediated by the] experimenter.” (2004, p. 194) They refer to this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Roepstorff et al., define their notion of “patterned practice” as follows: “Everyday 
life is continuously ordered into more or less stable patterns that are specific to 
particular types of situations, defining preferences, predispositions, and expectations 
for actors. […]. These patterns present regularities that arise from everyday 
practices while at the same time shaping them.” (2010, p. 1051) The idea behind the 
patterned practice approach is to highlight the following: “A patterned practice 
approach assumes that regular, patterned activities shape the human mind and body 
through embodiment, and internalization. Vice versa, enacting practices shape and 
re-shape norms, processes, institutions, and forms of sociality.” (2010, p. 1052) 
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socially mediated form of interaction between the experimenter and the participant 
as a “top-top exchange of scripts.” (2004, p. 192) Scripts are “shared 
representations” enacted in situated practices, where shared representations concern 
top-level aspects of control (that is, the goal of the task) instead of low-level 
processes concerning (e.g., how specific movements should be made). According to 
Roepstorff et al:  
 
“From the inside of a practice, certain models [i.e., certain ways of interacting 
with one another] of expectancy come to be established, and the patterns, 
which over time emerge from these practices, guide perception as well as 
action.” (2010, p. 1056)  
 
As with predictive processing in the brain, one property of dynamical processes that 
regulates the coherency and resonance between patterns of expectancy in the brain 
and patterns of expectancy unfolding in the social context is temporal dynamics. For 
instance, forward neural connections mediate their post-synaptic effects over very 
fast timescales, ranging from 1.5-6 ms decay time, while backward neural 
connections are mediated by slower dynamics, with  50 ms decay time (cf. 
Friston 2003, p. 1328).  
According to Friston, slower neural dynamics mediate contextually enduring 
effects, which is why backward neural connections can modulate forward neural 
connections. This difference between forward and backward neural connections, 
Friston refers to as “functional asymmetry,” to emphasize the difference in 
functional role between those neural connections. In the WCST case, the proposal is 
(among other things) that top-down predictions – in the context of culturally 
mediated practices – take the form of socially situated top-top interaction in 
patterned practices. That is, the interaction between experimenter and participant 
display temporal dynamics that are much slower (ranging from 30-60 minutes) than 
forward and backward neural connections. If slower evolving dynamics mediated 
contextual relevant information, it is probable that certain situated practices may 
display modulatory effects. As Roepstorff et al. mention, from the inside of a 
practice, certain expectancies and regularities emerge – and these expectancies and 
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regularities may guide perception and action, and consequently minimize prediction 
error.  
Recall that the dimensioned view of realization presupposes that components 
and their properties are spatially contained within the individual associated with (or 
which is) the composed entity. As a result, the realizer/realized properties are also 
spatially contained with the individual associated with (or which is) the composed 
entity. On Gillett’s view, if we treat cultural practices and other extra-bodily 
components and properties as physical realizers of some property, we fail to 
discriminate between physical realizers and the background conditions (i.e., causal 
conditions) necessary for those physical realizers (2007a, p. 175). But what if 
certain properties of computational processing simply could not be realized in the 
absence of particular ways of being in the world, then we would have reason to 
believe that specific situations and cultural practices are not merely causally 
enabling or necessary background conditions for predictive processing, but also 
realizers. This is the impetus behind Wilson’s account of wide realization (2001; 
Wilson & Clark 2009).  
We usually distinguish between realizers and background conditions through an 
analysis of which parts and other components are plausibly entities that ‘play the 
most salient causal role’ or simply ‘play the role’ of the composed entity. In other 
words, realizers are entities whose productive ‘causal function’ results in productive 
‘causal functions’ of the composed entity. By contrast, entities that are merely 
background conditions do not ‘play the role’ of the composed entity. 
From a patterned practice approach in social cognitive neuroscience 
(Roepstorff & Frith 2004; Roepstorff et al. 2010), it would seem that the patterned 
interactions between experimenter and participant could not simply be screened off 
as background conditions for predictive processing. As Roepstorff et al. stress: 
“From the inside of a practice, certain models of expectancy come to be established, 
and the patterns, which over time emerge from these practices, guide perception as 
well as action.” (2010, p. 1056) If that is correct, then those patterns of expectancy 
play parts of the role of the composed entity: predictive processing. Thus, insofar as 
the patterned practice approach is true, it lends support to the claim that certain 
instances of free energy minimization have a wide realization base.  
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6.5. Argument #2: Realization, synchronicity, and the free energy principle 
 
Thus far I have argued that there are problems with both the flat view of realization 
and the dimensioned view. The account of realization that has seemed most 
promising so far has been the wide realization view.  
I now turn to consider the second argument of the chapter: if the world is such – 
as stated by the free energy principle – that free energy minimization is a property 
of dynamical systems, whose components are orchestrated in temporally extended 
processes with properties such as nonlinearity, then the following claim holds: free 
energy minimization is a property of temporally unfolding processes, and the latter 
are themselves composed of temporally unfolding processes. If this is true, then the 
synchronic conception of realization is problematic.  
The starting point for the argument is that it is coherent to distinguish between a 
conceptual argument for realization and an empirical argument for realization. That 
is, if there is a relation of realization between realizer/realized properties, then that 
relation must hold synchronically by definition. This is a conceptual argument for 
the claim that realization is synchronic. We can outline the argument as follows: (i) 
the synchronic nature of realization serves to distinguish it from causation; (ii) 
causation is a diachronic relation; (iii) therefore, realization is not a diachronic 
relation; and (iv), therefore, realization is a synchronic relation. The inference from 
the premises (i) and (ii) to the conclusion (iii), and the consequent conclusion (iv), is 
valid.  
The problem with the argument is with the evidence for premise (i): that the 
synchronic nature of realization serves to distinguish it from the relation of 
causation. It is at this stage in the argument that things become much more 
uncertain, but, I submit, also much more interesting. That is, if the world is as stated 
by the free energy minimization formulation, viz., that processes and their properties 
involved in the minimization of free energy are embedded in the temporal and 
nonlinear patterns of top-down and bottom-up computational processing, which 
itself is embedded in patterns of temporal and nonlinear activity, then the following 
would be the case: free energy minimization is a property of dynamical 
spatiotemporal processes or patterns, which themselves are composed of 
spatiotemporal processes or patterns of activity, none of which can be completely or 
wholly present at any particular moment in time (see e.g., Kelso 1995).  
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Suppose we agree (as seems empirically plausible) that dynamical systems such as 
the brain fail to instantiate the property of free energy minimization without that 
property being embedded in temporally unfolding and integrated ensembles of 
neuronal assemblies over time (Engel et al. 2001; Engel 2010). We thus agree that 
for the exemplification of free energy minimization to materialize, this necessitates 
the unfolding of highly complex and global temporal dynamics in the brain. That is, 
the rates of change within, the time-course of, and any time-dependent 
synchronization of individual neurons or assemblies of neurons (or groups of 
neurons) are non-trivially part of the realization of free energy minimization. If the 
free energy picture turns out to be correct, and due to the inherent need for temporal 
unfolding for free energy minimization to occur, it would seem that insofar as there 
is a realization base for free energy minimization that this realization base cannot 
determine the occurrence of free energy minimization synchronically. Consider, 
e.g., the following illustration in Friston & Stephan (2007) depicted the quantities 
that define free energy:  
 
Fig. 11 Illustration detailing the quantities that define free energy (Friston & 
Stephan 2007, p. 424) 
 
This illustration informs us of two things. First, it describes the quantities of a 
system’s (m) interaction (or exchange) with the environment. Second, it indicates 
that all the quantities that change do so in order to minimize free energy. The latter 
is shown in the formulation λ = min F (λ refers to systemic quantities, whereas F 
424 Synthese (2007) 159:417–458
2.3 A free-energy formulation
To develop these arguments formally, we need to define some quantities that describe
an agent, phenotype or system, m and its exchange with the environment. This exchange
rests on quantities that describe the system, the effect of the environment on the system
and t effect of the system on the environment. W will denote these as λ, y˜ and α,
respectively. y˜ can be thought of as system states that are caused by environmental
forces; for example, the state of sensory receptors. This means that y˜ can be regarded
as sensory input. The quantities α represent forces exerted by effectors that act on
the environm nt to hange sensory samples. We will represent this dep ndency by
conditioning the sensory samples p(y˜)→ p(y˜|α) on action. Sometimes, this depen-
dency can be quite simple: for example, the activity of stretch receptors in muscle
spindles is affected directly by muscular forces causing that spindle to contract. In
other cases, the depende cy can be m re c mplicated; for example, the oculom tor
system, controlling eye position, can influence the activity of every photoreceptor in
the retina.
The tilde means that y˜ = y, y˙, y¨, . . . covers generalised motion in terms of high-
order temporal derivatives. This allows α to change the motion or trajectory of sensory
input through its higher derivatives by interacting with forces that cause y˜. We will call
these environmental causes ϑ . This formulation means that sensory input is a gener-
alised convolution of the action and unknown or hidden causes. We will unpack these
quantities later. At the moment, we will simply note that they can be high-dimensional
and time-varying. See also Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2 Schematic detailing the quantities that define the free-energy. These quantities refer to the internal
configuration of the brain and quantities that determine how a system is influenced by the environment.
This influence is encoded by the variables y˜ that could correspond to sensory input or any other changes
in the system state due to external environmental forces or fields. The parameters α correspond to physical
states of the system that change the way the external forces act upon it or, more simply, change the way the
environment is sampled. A simple example of these would be the state of ocular motor systems controlling
the direction of eye gaze. p(y˜|ϑ,α) is the conditional probability of sensory input given its causes, ϑ , and
the state of effectors (i.e. action). q(ϑ; λ) is called an ensemble density and is encoded by the system’s
parameters, λ. These parameters (e.g., mean or expectation) change to minimise free-energy, F and, in so
doing, make the ensemble density an approximate conditional density on the causes of sensory input
123
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denotes free energy). ŷ characterizes effects of the environment on the system; a is 
the effects of the system on the environment. According to Friston & Stephan, 
biological systems can minimize free energy by changing the two quantities that 
free energy depends on: (i) a system can act on the environment (a), thus changing 
the sensory input ŷ; (ii) or, a system can change its recognition density by changing 
its internal states, λ. The first path by which biological systems can minimize free 
energy can be represented as a conditional probability formulation of the form p(ŷ) 
→ p(ŷ |"a). In general, embodied manipulation of the environment can change the 
sensory input of m given the general form of the probability condition, i.e., the 
probability of an effect e occurring given that f occurs. Simply put, a system can 
minimize free energy by acting on the world, thus optimizing the accuracy of its 
own predictions by actively sampling and sculpting the environment. More formally 
“(p(ŷ |"υ, a) is the conditional probability of sensory input given its causes, υ, and 
the state of its effectors (i.e., action).” (Friston & Stephan 2007, p. 424) The 
remaining pathway by which a system can minimize free energy is by changing its 
internal states (λ). While portrayed as analytically separable, both pathways have 
functionally and structurally convergent dynamics. As Friston notes: “Internal brain 
states and action minimize free energy […], which is a function of sensory input 
and a probabilistic representation […] of its causes.” (2010, p. 128) Thus, all the 
quantities that can change do so to minimize free energy.  
 One interpretation of figure 11, although arguably an incorrect interpretation, is 
that free energy minimization is physically realized by quantities q(υ, λ) = q(υu; 
λu)q(υy; λy)q(υ,θ; λθ) such that free energy minimization is simultaneously present 
with its realizers. The assumption that free energy minimization is realized at a 
single or durationless moment in time is an assumption that turns, I suspect, on our 
tendency to represent it spatially or pictorially as in figure 11. But the spatial 
representation is misleading, in the sense that the spatial (inert) representation is not 
analogous with the temporal dynamics through which free energy minimization is 
realized.  
 We already know that all quantities involved in free energy minimization 
change to minimize free energy. Consider that the quantities describing both 
environmental (or, hidden) causes, υ, and quantities describing neural states unfold 
and change on a timescale of milliseconds, seconds, and minutes. As Friston & 
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Stephan remind us, environmental causes could be large and heterogeneous in 
number. As they point out, a “key difference among them is the timescales over 
which they change.” (2007, p. 429) In figure 11, these environmental causes are 
partitioned into three sets, υ = υu, υy, υθ, indicating change on a timescale of 
milliseconds, seconds, and minutes. According to Friston & Stephan, the “induces a 
partitioning of the system’s parameters into λ = λu, λy, λθ that encode time-varying 
marginals of the ensemble density.” (2007, p. 429) As they specify:  
 
“The first, λu, are system quantities that change rapidly. These could 
correspond to neuronal activity or electromagnetic states of the brain that 
change with a timescale of milliseconds. The causes υu they encode 
correspond to evolving environmental states, for example, changes in the 
environment caused by structural instabilities or other organisms. The second 
partition λy changes more slowly, over seconds. These could correspond to the 
kinetics of molecular signaling in neurons; for example calcium-dependent 
mechanisms underlying short-term changes in synaptic efficacy and classical 
neuromodulatory effects. […]. Finally, λθ represent system quantities that 
change slowly; for example long-term changes in synaptic connections during 
experience-dependent plasticity, or the deployment of axons that change on a 
neurodevelopmental timescale.” (2007, p. 429)  
 
All of these quantities, then, are part of the physical machinery determining free 
energy minimization, and all of these quantities change to do so in virtue of 
evolving over time. The question this leaves us with is the following: if the world is 
such that a realization synchronically determines that which it realizes, how, then, 
should we explain the synchronic realization of free energy minimization? If we go 
on to accept that the quantities responsible for the production of free energy 
minimization change to minimize free energy, and that these quantities change 
differently across a timescale of milliseconds, seconds, and minutes, then there can 
be no such thing as a synchronic (instantaneous) minimization of free energy.  
 If this is the correct, and if one were to insist on free energy minimization 
having a realization base, then it seems to me that the best we can do is to say the 
following: during that period of time (however long or short that period of time is), 
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free energy minimization was realized by the quantities specified in figure 11. 
However, it does not follow from this that during that period of time, the 
minimization of free energy was synchronically realized by the quantities specifies 
in figure 11, because synchronicity is not a property that unfolds over time.  
 Moreover, if the world is such as stated by the free energy principle, then 
another problem with invoking the realization relation reveals itself by considering, 
as we have already seen, that a common strategy by which to identify what 
“constitutes” a realization base of a certain realized property is by appealing to what 
plays the most salient causal role(s) with regards to the instantiation of the realized 
property (Cosmelli & Thompson 2010, p. 364). However, free energy minimization 
is instantiated in nonlinear dynamical systems. According to Cosmelli & 
Thompson: “In dense nonlinear systems in which all state variable interact with 
each other, any change in an individual variable becomes inseparable from the state 
of the rest of the system.” (2010, p. 365) Or, as Friston states:  
 
“[Brain] connections are not static but are changing at the synaptic level all 
the time. […]. Backward connections are abundant in the brain and are in a 
position to exert powerful specialization of any area or neuronal population. 
Modulatory effects imply the post-synaptic response evoked by pre-synaptic 
input is modulated by, or interacts with, another. By definition this interaction 
must depend on non-linear synaptic and dendritic mechanisms.” (2003, p. 
1330; italics added)  
 
If we accept that nonlinear dynamics is one fundamental property due to which the 
patterns of spatiotemporal neuronal assemblies minimize free energy – e.g., by 
constantly creating predictions about forthcoming sensory events (see e.g., Engel 
2010) – it seems a small step to accept that we cannot identify what “constitutes” 
the realization base of free energy minimization, because the nature of nonlinearity 
in dynamical systems such as the brain would seem to rule that out (Cosmelli & 
Thompson 2010, p. 365). One question that this raises is whether the evidence 
justifies the denial of a physical realization base for free energy minimization. As a 
first approximation, the answer would seem to be ‘no,’ in the sense that we would 
need to have a better understanding of the brain and its nonlinear dynamics to 
justify the claim that talk of physical realization bases is useless in the context of 
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free energy minimization. However, it does substantiate what I set out to show, 
namely that we should be cautious with regards to assuming the relevancy of the 
realization relation in the context of free energy minimization. This leaves it an 
open empirical question whether there really is a relation of realization between free 
energy minimization and certain systemic and environmental properties. But what if 
temporal unfolding or the specific temporal frequencies over which neurons and 
neuronal assemblies make a significant difference to how the brain gives rise to free 
energy minimization? That is, suppose free energy minimization is dependent on the 
integration of multiple different assemblies, and that such integration requires very 
precise temporal dynamics? Would that makes a difference for how to assess the 
relationship between realization and free energy minimization? If the realization 
relation is defined as a synchronic (atemporal) relation between realizer/realized, 
and if the temporal frequencies over which top-down processing in the brain, say, 
“match” with bottom-up inputs matters crucially, then this threatens the plausibility 
of a synchronically conceptualized relation of realization between free energy 
minimization and the quantities responsible for the production of free energy 
minimization.  
 There is ample evidence to suggest that the integration of neuronal assemblies 
that are involved in top-down processing is dependent upon extremely fast and 
synchronous activation both in cortico-cortical networks and in cortico-thalamic 
networks (Engel et al. 2001; Friston & Stephan 2007; Varela et al. 2001; to name a 
few). For example, Engel et al. (2001) goes as far as to suggest that “top-down 
factors can lead to states of ‘expectancy’ or ‘anticipation’ that can be expressed in 
the temporal structure of activity patterns before the appearance of stimuli.” (2001, 
p. 710) Other studies suggest that not only changes in discharge rate of neurons or 
neuronal assemblies, but also changes in neuronal synchrony, can be predictive in 
nature (see e.g., Riehle et al. 2000). This might be so if the brain utilizes a so-called 
temporal binding mechanism through which large-scale neuronal assemblies 
coordinate their activity, as suggested by Engel et al. (2001). If these results hold, it 
would seem that the world is in fact such that synchronic realization fails in relation 
to free energy minimization.  
 Of the different species of realization that I have considered here, wide 
realization, I have argued, is the most promising view of realization with regards to 
free energy minimization. However, suppose that the synchronic constraint on 
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realization does fail, then verdict is out on wide realization: it is equally problematic 
in relation to free energy minimization.   
 
6.6. Conclusion  
 
While it is not possible for me to deny the adequacy of the realization relation for 
future examinations of the “fit” between realization and free energy minimization, I 
hope to have made plausible the claim that insofar as the metaphysics of realization 
remains in the grip of the synchronicity constraint, it is at least prudent to be 
skeptical about such a potential confluence. Given the conditional character of the 
argumentational structure in the chapter, the best we can hope for, I think, is that it 
is unproven that free energy minimization is realized by specific neural and hidden 
quantities. However, I have argued, if the world turns out to be such as stated in the 
free energy principle, this does (prima facie, at least) give us reasons to doubt the 
appropriateness of understanding the relation of dependence with regards to free 
energy minimization as one of realization due to the synchronic conceptualization 
of the realization relation. To some this will seem an overly negative conclusion. By 
my lights, however, this is not the case. Rather, it points to future investigations for 
how to properly ground a clear conceptual framework by which to capture the 
dynamical ontology of free energy minimization.  
 
 
 !
 
 
 !
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7. In search of diachronic ontological emergence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With so much evidence in support of self-organizing, nonlinear, and temporally 
dynamic processes, crisscrossing levels and boundaries, it is peculiar that many 
philosophers still hang onto synchronically infused relations of metaphysical 
dependence. The arguments so far have favored diachronic accounts of dependence 
relations over synchronic ones. This chapter is no different. In particular, it is now 
time to examine the heavily debated topic of emergence, while casting a critical 
perspective at accounts of emergence that presuppose that emergence is grounded in 
the synchronic relation of supervenience (see Broad 1925; Kim 2006; McLaughlin 
1997; Rueger 2000; van Cleve 1990; and others, for accounts basing emergence on 
supervenience).  
Given the temporal, nonlinear, and self-organizing nature of dynamical systems 
and dynamical cognitive systems, what, in principle, stops us from attempting to 
ground the claim that any robust metaphysics (or, ontology) for such dynamical 
systems must go exclusively diachronic? In this chapter, what I aim to do is to argue 
for the following view: in dynamical systems, emergence is best understood as a 
diachronic ontological relation that does not rely upon synchronic relations such as 
supervenience.  
Insofar as there is to be a third-wave of EC, attempting to provide such an 
account – of diachronic ontological emergence, where emergence is inconsistent 
with the supervenience relation – will do a lot of important conceptual work, which 
will help us move forward into a third-wave, where genuinely dynamical relations 
are underpinned by a clear conceptual framework of a dynamical ontology. As with 
the previous chapter, before I set up the arguments to be discussed here, I need to 
say some things about emergence in general, and its relation to supervenience.  
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7.1. Sketching emergence  
 
“Emergence” is a philosophical term of art; it can mean, as Kim reminds us, pretty 
much what you want it to mean, “the only condition being that you had better be 
reasonably clear about what you mean, and that your concepts turn out to be 
something interesting and theoretically useful.” (2006, p. 548) Fortunately for us, 
we do not have to start from scratch when we begin to reflect on how best to 
understand emergence. For example, there are signposts like the following from 
Mitchell, who states that: “The key features of emergence for both philosophical 
treatments and scientific applications are novelty, unpredictability and the causal 
efficacy of emergent properties or structures, sometimes referred to as downward 
causation.” (2012, p. 173)  
Although Mitchell does not do so, she has a different agenda in her article, for 
our purposes it is important to note that this passage contains at least three different 
interpretations of what is at stake in the discussion about emergence. The first 
meaning is epistemological, where emergent properties are usually understood to be 
unexplainable or unpredictable from knowledge of the lower level system (see e.g., 
Bedau 1997). The second meaning is ontological. In fact, there are two different 
articulations of ontological emergence in the passage given by Mitchell, even 
though she does appear to treat them as one and the same in this particular quote. 
The first is that a system, S, has emergent features, Ps, that are not reducible to the 
component parts that make up S, or that are not determined solely by the base or 
lower-level causal processes. As such, the Ps in S may be said to “possess causal 
capacities not reducible to any of the intrinsic causal capacities of the parts nor to 
any of the (reducible) relations between the parts.” (Silberstein & McGeever 1999, 
p. 182)57 The second meaning is distinct from the first, in the sense that emergent 
properties may exhibit causal efficaciousness (the first meaning of ontological 
emergence) and downward causation. As a result, the second sense of ontological 
emergence is that the Ps have a causal influence on the parts of S that is “consistent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57  By “intrinsic” I take it that Silberstein & McGeever want to stress that 
ontologically emergent properties have causal capacities over and above the mere 
sum of the causal capacities of the individual parts that make up S.   
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with, but distinct from, the causal capacities of the parts themselves.” (Silberstein & 
McGeever 1999, p. 182)  
The second sense of ontological emergence is the more controversial of the two 
senses of ontological emergence, yet several philosophers have recently done much 
to explicate this particular notion by studying downward causation in far-from-
thermodynamic dynamical systems (Boogerd et al. 2005; Campbell & Bickhard 
2011; Mitchell 2012; Silberstein 2012; Silberstein & McGeever 1999). The 
distinction between epistemological and ontological emergence may be further 
taxonomized into either diachronic or synchronic relations of emergence. In this 
chapter, I only deal with ontological emergence, and will, consequently, leave aside 
any exposition of epistemological emergence. I will, however, say a bit more about 
diachronic and synchronic ontological emergence.  
Following what O’Connor & Wong (2012) dub “supervenience emergentism,” 
we can state that the standard view of ontological emergence is cashed out in terms 
of synchronic supervenience. In his “Emergence: Core ideas and issues,” Kim sets 
out what he believes to be two necessary conditions for emergence. As Kim says: 
“The conditions are supervenience and irreducibility.” (2006, p. 548) Or, as Kim 
puts this formally:  
 
“Supervenience: If property M emerges from properties N1, …, Nn, then M 
supervenes on N1, …, Nn. That is to say, systems that are alike in respect to 
basal conditions, N1, …, Nn, must be alike in respect of their emergent 
properties.” (2006, p. 550; italics in original)  
 
Consider, also, what Rueger says: “Robust supervenience, I argue, […] provides a 
natural background for reconstructing the notion of (diachronic) property 
emergence in a way acceptable to physicalists.” (2000, p. 466) Or, as McLaughlin 
states: “If P is a property of w, then P is emergent if and only if (1) P supervenes 
with nomological necessity, but not with logical necessity on properties that parts of 
w have taken separately or in other combinations […].” (1997, p. 39) There are 
differences between Kim and McLaughlin, on the one hand, and Rueger, on the 
other. However, what matters for my purposes is that all three authors explicate 
emergence as a supervenience relation.  
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In contrast to synchronic supervenience emergentism, whose proponents usually 
argue that given the subvenient or basal conditions at a particular time instant t, 
there will be some emergent property M at t, defenders of diachronic ontological 
emergence stress that (i) the historical or temporal trajectory of the system matters 
ineliminably in determining which emergent properties are instantiated in a system 
over time, and (ii) that grounding emergent properties by appeal to the relation of 
supervenience is wrong (Bickhard 2004; Campbell & Bickhard 2011; Kirchhoff 
2013c; O’Connor 2000; Seibt 2009). As a result, for the advocate of diachronic 
ontological emergence, there will be an emergent property M in a system S given (i) 
certain dynamical lower-level processes of S that unfold over time, and (ii) in virtue 
of the fact that prior systemic states and processes play an ineliminable role in 
determining which emergent properties come about over time and at a time. 
 
7.2. Arguments 
 
My aim in this chapter is to argue the following: in dynamical systems, emergence 
is best understood as a diachronic ontological relation that does not rely upon 
synchronic relations such as supervenience. Thus, I join the ranks of those that (i) 
favor diachronic ontological emergence, and (ii) are suspicious of the standard view 
of emergence as a supervenience relation. With regards to the two different senses 
of ontological emergence outlined above, the kind of ontological emergence that I 
shall discuss and defend is ontological emergence with downward causation. In 
doing so, I will argue for two points.  
First, claims involving emergence are ubiquitous in discussions of self-
organizing, nonlinear dynamics (Beer 1995; Chemero 2009; Kelso 1995; van 
Gelder 1998), artificial life and robotics research (Brooks 1999; Pfeifer et al. 2005), 
extended and distributed cognition (Clark 1997; Hutchins 1995; Menary 2007; 
Wheeler 2005), enactivism (Di Paolo 2009; Varela et al. 1991), developmental 
systems theoretic approaches in biology (Griffiths & Stotz 2000; Oyama et al. 
2001), and certain divisions in philosophy of science (Boogerd et al. 2005; Wimsatt 
1986). As a result, my first argument is that what these sciences and theories show 
us is that supervenience emergentism cannot explain how higher-level emergent 
phenomena arise and are maintained over time, because the supervenience relation 
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is unable to analyze the context-sensitive, nonlinear, and temporal dynamics that are 
characteristic of dynamical systems and their emergent properties.  
Second, if the world is such that emergent properties in dynamical systems do 
not coincide with the supervenience relation, then it seems to me that there is a 
potential tension within certain accounts of EC. That is, some defenders of EC use 
both ontologically diachronic construals of emergence and the supervenience 
relation to argue for EC. However, many (though not all) defenders of EC take 
extended cognitive systems to be dynamical systems. But, suppose that it is correct 
to state that the emergence of cognitive properties in dynamical systems (when 
those dynamical systems are understood as extended cognitive dynamical systems) 
does not coincide with relations of supervenience, then it follows, I submit, that the 
appeal to the supervenience relation is misplaced. Consider, for example, that in his 
many writings across dynamical, embodied, and extended cognition, Clark (1997, 
2001, 2008) has done much to develop the idea that the study of diachronic 
ontological emergence must sit at the center of the scientific pursuit to understand 
cognition. However, Clark also defends claims of the following variety:  
 
“A recurrent theme in previous chapters has been the ability of body and 
world to act as what might now be dubbed “participant machinery” – that is, 
to form part of the very machinery by means of which mind and cognition are 
physically realized and hence form part of the local material supervenience 
base for various mental states and processes.” (Clark 2008, p. 207; italics 
added)  
 
Perhaps Clark is justified in asserting that neural, bodily, and worldly elements are 
all part of the local material supervenience base with regards to various mental 
states, since “states” in the philosophy of mind has commonly been understood to 
express a discrete mental state instantiated or exemplified at a particular time t (see 
e.g., Kim 2011). Suppose that this is the correct way to articulate the relationship 
between certain physical states and a mental state, then the relation of 
supervenience might be appropriate, since the latter indicates that this relationship – 
between a mental state and the physical states realizing that mental state – is 
synchronic. By extension, if it turns out that mental states emerge from certain 
physical states, and if the relation of supervenience adequately expresses the 
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relationship between this mental state and the physical states, then it follows that we 
have a case of supervenience emergentism.  
However, it is not clear that the claim that processes synchronically supervene 
on a local material subvenient base is justified, because whereas supervenience is a 
synchronic relation, processes are – I have argued throughout the thesis – inherently 
diachronic, viz., in order to persist, processes require continuity in space and time 
(Goldie 2011; Hofweber & Velleman 2011; Kirchhoff 2013a; Seibt 2009; Spivey 
2007). If it turns out to be correct that emergent cognitive processes do not coincide 
with supervenience, then emergent cognitive processes do not supervene on an 
extended subvenient base distributed across parts of the brain, body, and world. I do 
not address whether mental states supervene on a subvenient physical base in this 
chapter. Rather, in terms of the second argument to be developed here, I restrict my 
attention to the problem of positing emergent cognitive processes, on the one hand, 
and claiming that such processes supervene on certain lower-level physical 
elements, on the other.  
 
7.3. Overview  
 
In section 7.4, I consider a couple of examples of emergence in dynamical systems 
to serve as a backdrop for the discussion to come. In section 7.5, I analyze the 
relation between emergence and supervenience. While I will spend most of my 
energy on discussing the philosophical arguments provided by Kim (1999, 2006), 
whose views on this relationship have been influential in shaping the debate about 
emergence, I also consider Rueger’s (2000) argument that diachronic emergence in 
dynamical systems coincides with the supervenience relation. During this 
discussion, I use the test cases as a basis for arguing the following. First, Kim is 
wrong to insist that supervenience is necessary for emergence. Second, Kim is 
wrong in his rebuttal of emergence, because downward causation is less problematic 
than Kim thinks. And third, that Rueger’s argument for why diachronic emergence 
coincides with supervenience ignores that the dependence relation between higher- 
and lower-level activities in dynamical systems may be diagonal rather than strictly 
vertical as presupposed by the supervenience relation. It is my hope that these three 
discussions will be enough to establish the justifiability of diachronic ontological 
emergence. Finally, I discuss the second argument outlined above, namely that there 
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is a potential tension in the literature on EC given the fact that certain defenders of 
EC use both diachronic ontological emergence and supervenience to argue for EC.  
 
7.4. An example  
 
An understanding of emergence that has become widespread in the scientific and 
philosophical models listed above – nonlinear dynamics, artificial life and robotics 
research, extended/distributed cognition, enactivism, developmental systems theory 
in biology, and certain strands of philosophy of science – is that emergence is 
identified with a certain kind of non-aggregative relationship, displaying both non-
linearity and self-organization. That is, a phenomenon will become increasingly less 
aggregative and consequently more likely emergent as the number, duration, and 
complexity of the interactions between its parts increases (Wheeler 2005, p. 260; 
Wimsatt 2000, p. 275) Aggregation we can understand as a simple kind of 
compositional relationship between a whole and its parts, e.g., the weight of a pile 
of rocks is the aggregate weight of each component rock making up the whole. 
However, as Mitchell points out (2012, p. 179), there are different ways in which 
compositional aggregation will fail to pick out the appropriate relationship between 
a whole and its parts.  
 One way is found in the complexity of dynamical systems exemplified by self-
organization and nonlinearity. Consider the example of a fluid heated from below 
and cooled from above. Take some oil, put it in a pan, and apply a heat source from 
below. As the heat is applied it increases the difference in the temperature between 
the top and the bottom of the oil layer. At a critical threshold, an event called “an 
instability” occurs such that the liquid begins to self-organize a coherently rolling 
motion. This motion is a convection roll. What happens is that the cooler liquid at 
the top is denser, thereby falling, whereas the liquid at the bottom is warmer (and so 
lighter), thus tending to rise to the top. Of such a process, Kelso says:  
 
“The resulting convection rolls are what physicists call a collective or 
cooperative effect, which arises without any external instructions. The 
temperature gradient is called a control parameter [but it does not] prescribe 
or contain the code for the emerging pattern. […] Such spontaneous pattern 
formation is exactly what we mean by self-organization: the system organizes 
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itself, but there is no “self,” no agent inside the system doing the organizing. 
[And] the amplitude of the convection rolls plays the role of an order 
parameter or collective variable: all the parts of the liquid no longer behave 
independently but are sucked into an ordered coordinated pattern […]. It is 
this coherent pattern that is described by the order parameter and it is the 
order parameter dynamics that characterizes how patterns form and evolve 
over time.” (1995, pp. 7-8; italics in original)  
 
How is “emergence” used here? Is the emergent property an object, a mechanism, a 
thing or a process? In the case of convection rolls, the emergent phenomenon is a 
process, in the sense that it is an unfolding dynamical pattern. Is the emergent 
pattern novel? With regards to emergent properties, novelty is typically explained as 
either the result of unpredictability or unexpectedness, or both. However, 
convection rolls are not novel, because they are unexpected. The reason for this is 
that convection rolls are not unexpected: given similar start-up conditions, only a 
small variation in the value of the control parameter (the temperature gradient) leads 
to qualitatively similar behavior across different token phenomena. Instead 
convection rolls are novel in virtue of being unpredictable. To get a grip on the idea 
of “unpredictability,” consider how Kim (1999) distinguishes (importantly) between 
inductive predictability and theoretical predictability. Convection rolls are 
inductively predictable, in the sense that given certain start-up conditions, varying 
the control parameter will typically result in the emergence of convection rolls. 
However, what defenders of emergence are denying is the theoretical predictability 
of convection rolls given our knowledge of the ‘basal’ constituents and the 
nonlinear and self-organization of constituents over time. The emergence of 
convection rolls is novel, because they are theoretically unpredictable.  
In what sense is the emergence of convection rolls ontological? Or, is it merely 
epistemic? Consider, first, what Silberstein & McGeever say about epistemological 
emergence:  
 
“A property of an object or system is epistemologically emergent if the 
property is reducible to or determined by the intrinsic properties of the 
ultimate constituents of the object or system, while at the same time it is very 
difficult to explain, predict or derive the property on the basis of the ultimate 
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constituents. Epistemologically emergent properties are novel only at the level 
of description.” (1999, p. 186)  
 
The fact that the appearance of convection rolls is novel due to its theoretical 
unpredictability would suggest that it is emergent epistemologically, and only novel 
at the level of description. Obviously, if this is the case, then this example cannot be 
a case of ontological emergence, in the sense that the definition of epistemological 
emergence precludes ontological emergence. Recall that ontological emergence is 
the case when emergent phenomena are not reducible to their ultimate constituents, 
and may either exhibit causal efficaciousness or downward causation, or both. This 
example, in addition to theoretical unpredictability, exhibits downward causation. 
As Kelso states: “the amplitude of the convection rolls plays the role of [a collective 
variable]: all the parts of the liquid no longer behave independently but are sucked 
into an ordered coordinated pattern […].” (1995, p. 8) That is, the convection cycle 
involves a kind of “circular causation” (Kelso 1995, p. 9; see also Clark 2001) in 
which the self-organized dynamics of the individual component molecules give rise 
to a larger pattern, and this pattern, in turn, enslaves the individual molecules into a 
recurrent pattern of rising and falling. Therefore, we get both epistemic emergence 
and ontological emergence.  
Can we be more specific than this? We can ask whether the kind of emergence 
is diachronic or synchronic, or both? Since this question is the central point of 
discussion of this chapter, and because I will provide a lengthy discussion of this 
question in the following sections, I will only motivate a few points here. Consider 
that while the supervenience relation specifies a relation between certain properties 
of a system at a particular time instant t, convection rolls emerge in a system in 
virtue of a change in the qualitative behavior of a dynamical system over time. In 
dynamical systems theoretical terms, there is a qualitative change in the system’s 
phase space portrait due to differences in the way in which the components interact 
and a change over time.  
Suppose, as Rueger does, that the phase space portrait remains what he refers to 
as “qualitatively the same under perturbations of the dynamics, i.e., small variations 
in the value of p [the control parameter], [then] the system is structurally stable. If 
the perturbations generates a qualitatively different portrait of trajectories, the 
system is structurally unstable.” (2000, pp. 472-73) The example of convection rolls 
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is structurally unstable, in the sense that a relatively small variation in the 
temperature gradient results in a qualitatively different phase space portrait, viz., 
from a phase space with no convection rolls to a phase space with convection rolls. 
Furthermore, for Rueger, insofar as the system is structurally unstable, the emergent 
properties, in that system, are diachronically emergent. But, while Rueger goes on 
to argue that even diachronic emergence is a supervenience relation, in what 
follows, I consider a number of different ways by which to criticize supervenience 
emergentism.  
I start this discussion by providing a detailed examination of Kim’s (1999, 
2006) arguments intended to show that (a) supervenience is a necessary (but not a 
sufficient) condition for emergence, and (b) that emergence is ultimately 
problematic due to problems with downward causation. Having done this, I discuss 
the account given by Rueger for why diachronic emergence is a supervenience 
relation. Before I can discuss Kim’s arguments, we need to know what they are. I 
begin by exposing Kim’s argument that the supervenience relation is necessary for 
emergence (section 7.5), followed by a discussion of this argument (section 7.5.1). 
Then I expose Kim’s argument against downward causation (section 7.6), followed 
by a discussion of this argument (section 7.6.1). Similarly with Rueger, where I start 
with an exposition of Rueger’s argument (section 7.7), followed by a discussion of 
this argument (section 7.7.1).  
 
7.5. Kim’s argument that supervenience is necessary for emergence  
 
Kim argues that supervenience is a necessary condition that any adequate analysis 
of emergence must satisfy. Consider two wholes that have identical microstructure 
(i.e., they are composed of identical basic physical constituents configured in an 
identical structure) yet different concerning the supposedly emergent properties. 
Applying this to the dynamical case of rising and falling fluid, there may be two 
molecule-for-molecule identical systems, although only one of them displays 
convection rolls. If such cases were possible, Kim says, the relation between 
putatively higher-level emergent phenomena and their physical base components 
would be “irregular, haphazard [and/or] coincidental.” (2006, p. 550) In other 
words, what justification could there be for saying that cyclical convection rolls 
emerge from that specific physical configuration rather than another? Hence, Kim 
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rejects the view that an emergent feature of a whole is not determined exclusively 
by bits of matter, in a certain structural organization. As Kim says: “If 
supervenience, or upward necessitation, is taken away, that takes away something 
essential to the meaning of “emergence” […].” (2006, p. 550) Therefore, he 
concludes by stating supervenience is a necessary condition for emergence; that we 
have to accept the following:  
 
“Supervenience: If property M emerges from properties N1, …, Nn, then M 
supervenes on N1, …, Nn. That is to say, systems that are alike in respect of 
basal conditions, N1, …, Nn must be alike in respect of their emergent 
properties.” (2006, p. 550; italics in original) 
 
Kim argues that if M emerges from N1, …, Nn, those properties (M and its emergent 
base properties) must meet the supervenience condition. Dovetailing his account of 
supervenience, with the principle of synchronic determination, Kim advances this 
additional specification: “Supervenience/determination: Property M supervenes on, 
or is determined by, properties N1, …, Nn in the sense that whenever anything has 
N1, …, Nn, it necessarily has M.” (2006, p. 550) 
  
7.5.1. Discussion of Kim’s “supervenience is necessary for emergence claim”  
 
With this description of Kim’s account of the relationship between emergence and 
supervenience, we are now in a position to critically discuss the question whether 
emergent features necessarily supervene on their physical features.  
Does the emergence of convection rolls necessarily supervene on its base-level 
parts and their arrangement? To get us started, I present an alternative account of 
emergence that takes emergence to be ontologically diachronic and non-
supervenient, and then apply our test case from dynamical systems to show that 
emergent phenomena do not necessarily supervene on their lower-level physical 
components and their configuration. The alternative account of emergence I wish to 
consider here is due to O’Connor (2000) and O’Connor & Wong (2005), who argue 
that the standard view of emergence as a supervenience relation is suspect 
(O’Connor & Wong 2012, p. 14). In O’Connor (2000), the target is the relation 
between a neural mechanism and the emergent properties that this neural 
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mechanism gives rise to. Here I substitute O’Connor’s example with my discussion 
of convection rolls. This is the argument provided by O’Connor:  
 Suppose that when a dynamical mechanism H comes to have a particular 
configuration P* at time T0, the baseline emergent feature E is the result at T1. 
Because H is a dynamical system, the specific organization of H is, in part, at least, 
determined by P* as it unfolds. I say that H is “ in part, at least” determined by P* 
during the period of H’s existence. That is because H qua being a dynamical system 
is an open, non-equilibrium system. H is open, in the sense that it interacts with its 
environment – exchanging energy and matter. H is non-equilibrium, in the sense 
that without these interactions, it cannot maintain proper (low) levels of physical 
entropy (Kelso 1995, p. 4). Thus, we cannot presuppose that H is fully determined 
by P* at any point in time, e.g., at T1. P0 is the remaining aspect of H’s internal 
states at T0, and P@ is the summation of factors in H’s immediate environment that 
have an influence on the state of H at T1. Let “➞” represent the causal relation 
between component properties. This gives us the following relationships (O’Connor 
2000, p. 111):  
 
- P* at T0 ➞ E at T1  
And 
- P* + P0 + P@ at T0 ➞ P* + P1 at T1 
 
This last conjunction highlights the total internal state of H at T1, where P1 is the 
remainder beyond P*. In the language of dynamical systems theory, we can 
understand the total internal state of H to be sets of interdependent variables, where 
a variable is a simple entity that can have a different state or value at different times 
(van Gelder 1998, p. 616). According to O’Connor, E at T1 will be a joint 
determiner of H’s physical configuration at T2, but not H’s continuing to have P*. 
Moreover, E may also help in determining, at T2, the emergence of another feature, 
E2. On O’Connor’s account, this looks diagrammatically as follows (Fig. 12):  
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Fig. 12: Diagram of the evolution of emergent features (adapted from O’Connor 
2000, p. 111)  
  
Kim’s invocation of supervenience to deliver a non-coincidental conception of 
emergence raises the question whether there can exist two systems that are alike in 
respect of lower-level features, yet that are not alike in respect to their emergent 
features. Indeed, if such a possibility turns out to exist, which O’Connor’s formal 
argument claims that it does, this suggests the failure of supervenience in accounts 
of ontologically diachronic emergence.  
In our test case, H is a dynamical system comprised of P*, P@ (in this case, 
P@ is the source of heat applied), and P0 at time T0. Because of the inherent 
nonlinearity of H, a liquid heated only weakly from below will not display any 
macro-motion. By “nonlinearity” I mean that if there is an interaction between two 
components, X and Y, say, the value of Y does not increase proportionally to the 
value of X, but may remain at zero, e.g., until X reaches a certain critical threshold 
(Clark 2001, p. 115). However, at a critical value of the temperature gradient, the 
liquid will start to show the familiar macroscopic rolling motion we know as 
convection rolls. In the language of dynamical systems, here the liquid is in a bi-
stable dynamical state such that the convection rolls may rotate in one direction or 
in the other direction. That is, either from right to left or from left to right in its 
rolling motion. The direction of the rolling motion that emerges is random58. This is 
due to the onset of a bifurcation. Before the onset of the rolling motion, when the 
overall value of H is below the critical order parameter value, H can only be in one 
possible state and that is a state of rest – diagrammatically shown by the liquid 
being in a stable (deep) energy well. At the instability point, a bifurcation (or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Microscopically, no two examples will be exactly alike. It is the “motion” in this 
example that reflects the physical entropy production.  
causal capacities on the object that go beyond even the summation of capaci-
ties directly conferred by the object’s microstructure. Its effects might include
directly determining aspects of the microphysical structure of the object as well
as generating other emergent states. In setting forth a general account of how
this might go, I am guided not by abstract intuition about how it must go in any
possible emergent scenario, but about how it is plausible to suppose it goes
with respect to our own mental life, on the supposition that qualitative and in-
tentional mental features of our states are emergent.
On that supposition, it seems plausible that there are enduring baseline men-
tal states that partially underwrite more specific and often momentary mental
states. Suppose, then, that when a neurophysiological system H comes to have
a certain kind of complex configuration P* at time t0, the baseline emergent
state E is the direct result at t1. (P*, of course, will have to be of a sufficiently
general type as to persist through constant and over time dramatic change.) P*
will also partly determine the underlying physical state of H at time t1. Let P0
be the remaining aspect of H’s intrinsic state at t0, and P@ be the summation
of those factors in H’s immediate environment that will bear upon the physical
state of H at t1. Letting “r” represent the causal relation, we have
P* at t0 r E at t1
and
P*!P0!P@ at t0 r P*!P1 at t1
(the latter conjunction being the total intrinsic physical state of H at time t1,
with P1 being the remainder beyond P*). Now E at t1 will help to determine in
part the physical state of H at the subsequent moment, t2, but not its continuing
to exhibit P*, of course, as that would involve causal circularity. E, we may
suppose, will also help to determine the occurrence at t2 of another emergent
state, E2. Diagramatically, the overall picture is this:
(For simplicity of representation, I’m treating ‘P@’ schematically; at each mo-
ment it represents the sum total of those immediate environmental factors bear-
ing on the intrinsic state of H at the subsequent moment.)
We are now in position to answer two standardly asked questions about
any doctrine of mental causation. First, do the emergent properties of H super-
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branching) occurs such that H moves away from its stable state to a bi-stable state – 
diagrammatically shown by the potential of the liquid to be in one of two dynamical 
states. That is, “two rolling motions whose rotation speed is equal but opposite 
emerge spontaneously, [with only] one, of course, realized in the experiment.” 
(Kelso 1995, p. 10) What was previously a stable state becomes an unstable state.  
Consider the status of the baseline emergent feature E, with respect to the times 
T0 and T1 in O’Connor’s diagram. Here E is absent at T0 but present at T1. From 
this specification, O’Connor points out the following: “The underlying physical 
[features] are different, too, but that is not the reason for the difference in emergent 
[features]. For the differentiating factors (P0, P1 and […] P@) are, by hypothesis, 
not directly relevant to the occurrence of E. P* alone is so relevant.” (2000, p. 112) 
It might sound strange to omit P0, P1, and P@ from consideration in this 
discussion. Why does O’Connor do this? On the one hand, Kim clearly states the 
idea of emergence is the thought that a physical system, composed of only bits of 
matter and their organization, can begin to exhibit emergent features. This is what 
P* implies. On the other hand, P0 and PI represent any remaining physical elements 
that do not participate in the generation of emergent phenomena, where P@ is a 
parameter outside of H. For readers familiar with dynamical systems theory, the 
omission of certain parameters, because they are not directly relevant to the 
occurrence of the phenomenon in question, should be familiar (see e.g., Beer 1995, 
p. 181).  
With this clarification out of the way, note that E is absent in T0, but present 
immediately thereafter in T1. Consequently, in the first instantiation of H, no 
emergent features will be present. Even if H at T0 has reached the point of 
instability, this process has to unfold over a period of time; hence, even if H begins 
the branching movement at T0, yet sharing with H at T1 what is specified in P*, 
only one of the physical configurations has E (O’Connor 2000, p. 112). In other 
words, let us say we have two dynamical systems both of which have alike physical 
configuration, represented by P*. In one system the interaction of the molecules is 
faster, because of the higher temperature gradient, where this is not the case in the 
second system; in one system there is rolling motion and in the other system there is 
not rolling motion; but the arrangement of material bits might be the same across 
these two systems at a specific instant.  
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Rolling motions are not the only possibilities. In an open container, for instance, 
surface tension can also affect the flow. According to Kelso: “The net effect of this 
force [surface tension] is to minimize the surface area of the fluid, causing 
tessellation of the surface and the formation of hexagon cells. In the center of each 
hexagon, liquid rises, spreads out over the surface, and sinks at the perimeter where 
the hexagons join.” (1995, pp. 7-8) Plausibly, a couple of dynamical systems might 
exist that are alike with respect to P* at T0, but where one has E (the cyclic pattern 
of convection rolls) at T1, whereas the other has E* (the pattern of liquid rising, 
spreading out over the surface, and sinks at the perimeter) at T1. This is plausible, 
and can be explained by taking into account the mechanisms involved in the 
generations of these two different emergent patterns. As Kelso explains: “An 
important point is that two quite distinct mechanisms – one to do with buoyancy 
and the other surface tension – can give rise to [either] the same pattern [or to two 
different patterns].” (1995, p. 8) Crucially, neither buoyancy nor surface tension are 
elements of P*, since P*, even on the account provided by Kim, is a physical 
system composed only of bits of matter and their organization; however, buoyancy 
and surface tension is neither bits of matter nor the organization of bits of matter – 
both mechanisms are the result of a system organized and unfolding in a particular 
manner.  
If this is true, O’Connor is correct to insist that supervenience emergentism is 
problematic. Once we consider the contribution of a system’s prior trajectory 
through its dynamical state space, we get the picture that prior systemic elements 
play a role in determining emergent features of a system, and that emergent features 
themselves are temporally extended in time. Unfortunately for those insisting on the 
compatibility of emergence and supervenience, the relation of supervenience fails to 
apply to cases in which the relata of emergence are ontologically diachronic.  
Consider, furthermore, that the supervenience/determination condition states 
that if some feature E of a system S supervenes on, or is determined by, features N1, 
…, Nn, then S necessarily has E. However, what the example of convection rolls 
shows is that there can be a divergence between the emergent features of two 
dynamical systems in the face of physical similarity at the base level. As O’Connor 
puts it: “You might have the underlying physical properties P* and P2 without 
having had E2. For E2 is a product of the immediately prior state of H (comprised 
of P*, P1, and E). This prior state presumably could have been different (such that 
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E2 would not occur at t2) […].” (2000, p. 112) Because dynamical systems are open 
and undergo bifurcations over time, open systems may instance the same physical 
properties here-and-now, while instantiating different emergent properties (Kelso 
1995; O’Connor & Wong 2012).  
The example of convection rolls is not special, in the sense that its main 
implications for our understanding of emergence are non-generalizable to other 
phenomena. At this stage, and to provide additional reasons for my skepticism 
against emergence as a supervenience relation, I consider a different example from 
which I draw out two problems with the assumption that emergence is a 
supervenience relation.  
Consider what evidence regarding the molecular structure of water indicates 
about the part-whole relation between the macroscopic pattern of water and its 
component parts, here molecules of water. If the macroscopic pattern of water 
emerges from its lower-level physical constituents, and if one further assumes that 
this relation of emergence is supervenient, this entails that the macroscopic pattern 
of water has its features synchronically. However, water, Ladyman & Ross inform 
us “is composed of oxygen and hydrogen in various polymeric forms, such as 
(H2O)2, (H2O)3), and so on, that are constantly forming, dissipating, and reforming 
over short time periods in such a way as to give rise to the familiar properties of the 
macroscopic kind water.” (2007, p. 21; italics added) That is, water, as Ross & 
Ladyman baldly state, is an emergent feature of a complex dynamical system, and it 
“makes no sense to imagine it having its familiar properties synchronically.” (2010, 
p. 160; italics added)  
Insofar as water has emergent features, the presupposition of the standard and 
representative view of emergence – that this is a supervenience relation – fails to 
capture the dynamics of how the higher level is emergent and how it is maintained 
as it unfolds over time. Furthermore, considering the different phases of water, and 
related thermodynamic considerations of how the macroscopic whole “water” 
relates to its parts, van Brakel begins by asking whether water consists of H2O? At a 
first approximation, water is not composed of H2O, since the part-whole 
composition of water is context sensitive and contingent. By “context sensitive and 
contingent,” I follow Oyama et al. (2001) and take this to mean that the 
“significance of any cause is contingent upon the state of the rest of the system.” 
(2001, p. 2). For instance, in liquid water, water molecules form larger clusters via 
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interaction. Or, in ice, as van Brakel points out, “there aren’t really individual 
molecules. [In fact, in] solid neon one might [even] come across hexamers.” (2010, 
p. 131) 59  But if the different phases of water reflect differences in their 
microstructure, one might think that surely it is possible to identify the relevant 
molecules as being like this? However, according to van Brakel, water “contains 
isotopic variants such as HDO and D2O. The physico-chemical properties of 
deuterium oxide are different from those of ordinary water, and therefore, its role in 
biochemical processes.” (2010, pp. 131-32) Hence, the answer is that we cannot 
identify water molecules as being “like this”. But what if we restrict our discussion 
to only one set of isotopes, then surely all H-atoms (hydrogen atoms) in water are 
identical? Again van Brakel answers this question with a straightforward “no,” since 
there “is [both] ortho- and para-hydrogen, which have different physico-chemical 
properties.” (2010, p. 132) All right the reader might wonder; nevertheless, even if 
the part-whole relation between water and its constituents is context sensitive, is it 
not still the case that a water molecule always behaves as a H2O molecule? 
Fascinatingly, according to van Brakel the answer to this is: “No! […] in some 
circumstances, water molecules are not “seen” as H2O by entities with which it 
interacts, but more like something like H1, 5O.” (2010, p. 132)60 We cannot even 
assume that water always consists of interactions between H and O atoms. Indeed, 
“there is some probability (however, small) that a water molecule will suddenly 
transform into a Neon atom.” (Belyaev et al. 2001; quoted in van Brakel 2010, p. 
132)  
Thus, one problem with the standard account of emergence as a supervenience 
relation is that because of its commitment to supervenience, and since this 
metaphysical relation is a synchronic relation, it misses out on the dynamics by 
which oxygen and hydrogen, in various forms such as (H2O)2), (H2O)3, and so on, 
are constantly forming, dissipating, and reforming over very short time periods, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 A hexamer is considered to be the smallest drop of water, because it is the 
smallest cluster of water that is three-dimensional. 
60 “Schewe et al. (2003): A water molecule’s chemical formula is really not H2O, at 
least not from the perspective of neutrons and electrons interacting with the 
molecule for only attoseconds (less than 10-15 s).” (Cited in van Brakel 2010, p. 132; 
footnote 42) 
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thereby giving rise to the so familiar features of the macroscopic kind water (Ross 
& Ladyman 2010, p. 21).  
This points us in the direction of a related problem, which comes about through 
recognizing that as a part-whole relation, the standard account of emergence as a 
supervenience relation presupposes that relational (i.e., extrinsic) properties 
supervene on non-relational (i.e., intrinsic) properties of its lower-level, subvenient 
base (Lewis 1983; McLaughlin & Bennett 2011). “Intrinsic properties” are normally 
understood to be those properties that an object may possess independently of 
everything else that exists, or independently of whether or not anything else exists. 
For example, the charge and mass of a classical particle are thought to be intrinsic 
properties of an object, whereas “being south of Sydney” is dependent on 
someone’s relation to something else. In the case of water, supervenience fails to 
obtain. It fails because of the context sensitivity and contingency of the part-whole 
relations characteristic of water. If emergent wholes come about through continuous 
and reciprocal interaction between components at the emergent base level, and if the 
features of the parts cannot be determined independently of the context in which 
they are embedded, then this challenges the idea that relational features supervene 
on non-relational features. It challenges the very foundation presupposed by 
supervenience relations, namely that extrinsic stuff supervenes on intrinsic stuff 
(Humphreys 1997; Ladyman & Ross 2007; O’Connor 2000).  
  
7.6. Kim’s argument against downward causation 
 
If it turns out to be correct that at least in cases of dynamical systems, emergence 
does not by necessity presuppose supervenience, Kim has a second argument that 
threatens to render the notion of emergence incoherent. As Kim rightly notes, 
concerning ontological emergence, it “is critically important to the emergentist that 
emergent properties have distinctive causal powers of their own, irreducible to the 
causal powers of their base properties.” (2006, p. 557; italics added) Otherwise, it 
would seem, that putative emergent phenomena would be mere epiphenomena. Any 
account of ontological emergence, including mine, must thus be committed to either 
emergent properties that are causally efficacious or to downward causation, or to 
both.  
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Across numerous publications, Kim has repeatedly used the following argument to 
establish that all forms of non-reductive physicalism (e.g., emergence), which 
separate higher-level features and their compositional lower-level components and 
activities collapses to some form of reductive physicalism. If this argument is 
successful, it leaves no room for ontological accounts of emergence.  
Here is my iteration of Kim’s argument: Suppose there is an emergent feature, 
M, with causal powers, and that some instantiation of it brings about another 
emergent feature M*. But, ex hypothesi, M*, as an emergent feature, must be 
composed by its physical base P*, without which M* would not be present. The 
initial point that Kim wants to make is that for this story to be coherent, we must 
accept that the instance of M caused M* to be instantiated by causing the 
instantiation of P*. However, as an emergent, M must itself have a physical base, 
call this base P. Furthermore, if M supervenes on P, then the instantiation of P 
should be sufficient for the instantiation of M. At this juncture in the argument, Kim 
invokes the principle of transitivity to assert the following: if M is causally 
sufficient for P*, and thereby M*, then P is causally sufficient for both P* and M*. 
Hence, as Kim points out: “This appears to make the emergent property M otiose 
and dispensable as a cause of P*; it seems that we can explain the occurrence of P* 
simply in terms of P, without invoking M at all. […]. If M is somehow retained as a 
cause, we are faced with the highly implausible consequence that every case of 
downward causation involves causal overdetermination (since P remains a cause of 
P* as well).” (2006, p. 558)  
Kim concludes his argument against emergence by stating that if this argument 
cannot be successfully rebutted, it threatens to bankrupt the central idea of 
ontological emergence, namely that emergent features can have causal efficacy over 
and above those of the components making up the base level. As he says: “If 
downward causation goes, so goes emergentism.” (2006, p. 558)  
 
7.6.1. Discussion of Kim’s argument against downward causation 
 
The self-organization and nonlinearity that is characteristic of the dynamical 
complexity in dynamical systems, like the case of convection rolls and water, 
reveals that while deterministic, the emergent behaviors are unpredictable given 
their sensitivity to variations in starting and evolving boundary conditions (Mitchell 
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2012, p. 181). But this gives us only epistemological emergence, whereas Kim’s 
argument against emergence is leveled at ontological emergence with downward 
causation. To problematize Kim’s critical argument, I need to show that the idea of 
downward causation is not as problematic as Kim thinks. Indeed, as Campbell & 
Bickhard (2011) point out, there is no shortage of examples of downward causation. 
Consider, e.g., Couzin & Krause’s (2003) identification of emergence in flocking 
starlings:  
 
“[It] is usually not possible to predict how the interactions among a large 
number of components within a system result in population-level properties. 
Such systems often exhibit a recursive, nonlinear relationship between the 
individual behavior and collective (‘higher-order’) properties generated by 
these interactions; the individual interactions create a larger-scale structure, 
which influences the behavior of individuals, which changes the higher-order 
structure, and so on.” (2003, p. 3; italics added)  
 
Harking back to the language of dynamical systems, an order parameter (or 
collective variable) comes about through the coordination between individuals 
(birds, molecules, etc.), which have an influence on the parts. What the 
contemporary scientific sense of emergence gives us are concrete accounts of how 
and why multiple top-down and bottom-up, forward and reverse feedback, loops (a) 
can result in the theoretical unpredictability of emergent phenomena, and (b) the 
existence of wholly natural modes of downward causation. As Clark says about the 
continuous self-organizing, top-down and bottom-up loops in dynamical systems: 
“This cycle involves as kind of “circular causation” in which the activity of the 
simple components leads to a larger pattern, which then enslaves those same 
components, locking them into a cycle [in the case of convection rolls] of rising and 
falling.” (2001, p. 112)  
While I am sure some will find the validity of Kim’s logic persuasive, there are 
assumptions made that are open to criticism. First, Campbell & Bickhard argue that 
Kim’s argument begs the question. That is, it says that P is nomologically sufficient 
for M. However, since this is precisely the claim of physicalism, it cannot be used 
as a premise in an argument against the possibility of ontological emergence. Even 
if this begs the question, there is a related problem, namely: even if the conditions 
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arising at a higher level are constituted by a particular configuration of components 
and their activities, and if the latter is nomologically sufficient for the emergence of 
the former, this does not rule out the possibility that once generated, the higher-
order features may “act back” upon, and thus shape, the features of the base-level 
constituents. Second, Kim’s argument against downward causation is built on the 
justifiability of supervenience. But, as we have seen, this premise is problematic. As 
O’Connor stresses: “there might be two objects having identical […] physical 
properties […] and existing in the same external circumstances, yet one [is 
emergent] and the other [is not].” (2000, p. 112)  
 
7.7. Rueger’s argument that diachronic emergence coincides with 
supervenience  
 
In a paper pertinent to my claim that diachronic ontological emergence, in particular 
when diachronic and ontological properties emerge in dynamical systems, does not 
rely on the supervenience relation, Rueger (2000) defends the opposite position, that 
even in dynamical systems, diachronic and ontological emergent properties are 
supervening on a subvenient base. Rueger provides two interrelated arguments for 
this claim.  
Take a physical system here-and-now, and describe it (in the terms of 
dynamical systems theory) by way of some set of generalized coordinates (that is, 
position and momentum). These generalized coordinates take on a sequence of 
values over a time interval. This sequence of values is represented as a trajectory 
(i.e., a set of positions in the state space through which the system might pass 
successively) in the system’s phase space portrait (i.e., the representation of the 
system). Alongside these variables, control parameters (i.e., a parameter of a 
system whose continuous quantitative change may lead to noncontinuous, 
qualitative change in the phase space portrait of the system) such as a heat gradient 
(in our case of convection rolls) specify features of the system that are not 
determined by the system’s internal dynamics. As Rueger says: “The combination 
of generalized coordinates and control parameters forms the subvenient base of the 
system. The phase space trajectories express the behavior of the system – the 
collection of its supervenient properties.” (2000, p. 472) For simplicity, consider the 
following illustration provided by Rueger:  
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Fig. 13 Temporal evolution of a system {A, B} into {A*, B*} (adapted from 
Rueger 2000, p. 473) 
 
The vertical arrow represents the synchronic supervenience relation between some 
properties of a system at an instant t, whereas the horizontal arrow represents 
qualitative change over a time interval, e.g., from t1 to t2. The first argument Rueger 
gives for supervenience emergentism turns on structural stability. A physical 
system is structurally stable: if a set of A*-properties supervenes on a set of A-
properties, then “wiggling” some member(s) of the set of A-properties will not 
result in a qualitatively different set of B*-properties, which given the temporal 
evolution of the system supervene on a set of B-properties (Rueger 2000, p. 476). 
That is, if A*-properties supervene on A-properties at t1, then a small change in A-
properties – e.g., a small change in the value of the control parameter – will not 
result in a qualitatively different phase portrait at t2 such as illustrated in the relation 
between {B, B*}. In other words, if A*-properties supervene on A-properties, the 
continuous change of a control parameter will not lead to a noncontinuous, 
qualitative change in the phase space portrait of the system. If this is the case, then 
the set of A*-properties supervene on the subvenient A-properties at t1, and despite 
small changes in A-properties, this supervenience relation will remain as it is at 
each point in time over an interval.  
Even if physical systems may be structurally stable, instabilities do occur, and 
the robustness requirement of the first argument is violated. That is, the condition of 
structural stability is violated. If this is the case, then, according to Rueger, the 
overall evolution of the system exhibits the emergence of diachronically emergent 
properties. The second argument that Rueger provides is set up to establish that 
even though the condition of structural stability is violated, and, as a result, the 
system exhibits diachronically emergent properties, structurally unstable systems 
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Figure 1. Temporal evolution of a system {A, B} into {A*, B*}. 
turally stable. If the perturbation generates a qualitatively different por- 
trait of trajectories, the system is structurally unstable. The notion of a 
qualitative difference between two sets of trajectories (phase space por- 
traits) is spelled out in terms of the portraits being topologically inequiv- 
alent: one set cannot be transformed into the other by any smooth defor- 
mation of the trajectories. 
In somewhat more technical terms7: A dynamical system X, considered 
as the transformations sp: D -* D on the ystem's phase space of initial 
conditions x at some initial time into solutions sp(x) of the dynamical 
equations at other times, is topologically equivalent to another system 1* 
with sp*: D* -+ D* if there exists a homeomorphism h (a one-to-one map- 
ping continuous in both directions) of the phase space trajectories of the 
first system onto the trajectories of the second such that the diagram of 
Figure 2 commutes. That is: 
h [sp* (x)] = sp [h (x)]. 
In other words: two systems are equivalent in this sense if the change from 
SP to Sp* , introduced by the variation of the control parameter p, can be 
compensated by a transformation (h) of the coordinates. A system E is 
structurally stable if every system "close" to E is topologically equivalent 
to S. (The notion of closeness has to be spelled out in whatever topology 
is imposed on the phase spaces.') 
As an illustration consider a linear dynamical system with parameters 
a, b, c, d, described by the differential equations: 
dx/dt ax + by 
dy/dt cx + dy 
7. Adapted from Arnold 1983, h. 3. Cf. also Guckenheimer and Holme  1983, 38f. 
8. Usually one postulates that a map f is close to a map g if g belongs to an ?-neigh- 
borhood off such that every map in that neighborhood agrees withf and its derivatives 
up to ? > 0. 
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are nevertheless explicable in terms of the supervenience relation. Provisionally we 
need to distinguish between individual systems, in the sense that structural stability 
(on Rueger’s account) is defined for individual systems (2000, p. 477) and families 
of systems intended to show that even though a given token system may be 
structurally unstable (under some perturbation), the system S could nevertheless 
belong to a stable type or family of systems. According to Rueger: “If it does, then 
the bifurcation or instability in the system occurs in a structurally stable way: all the 
systems in the family exhibit qualitatively the same bifurcation behavior.” (2000, p. 
479)  
 
7.7.1. Discussion of Rueger’s two arguments 
 
To discuss Rueger’s two arguments for why diachronic emergence coincides with 
supervenience, let us consider our familiar example of convection rolls (figure 14):   
 
 
 
Fig. 14 A pitchfork bifurcation diagram and potential landscape for the emergence 
of convection rolls (adapted from Kelso 1995, p. 10)  
 
Below the critical control parameter value, R, the fluid can be in only one 
macroscopic state, namely rest (Kelso 1995, p. 10). In figure 14, the diagram 
furthest to the left, the solid ball represents the state of the fluid as being in the 
minimum of its potential. V is the potential landscape. Therefore, the diagram 
furthest to the left represents V(q). The arrow represents an instability point (the 
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open ball in the middle diagram to the right). At this stage a “stable solution of the 
dynamics becomes an unstable, and a transition to bistability occurs.” (Kelso 1995, 
p. 11) After the bifurcation, “two rolling motions whose rotation speed is equal but 
opposite emerge spontaneously.” (Kelso 1995, p. 10) Of course, only one particular 
rolling motion actually emerges (represented as either the bottom or the top diagram 
on the left side). If a set of generalized coordinates (to use Rueger’s terms) together 
with R forms the subvenient base, and if the state of the fluid, q, expresses the 
supervenient properties of the system at a time prior to a bifurcation of the overall 
state, then it would seem that V(q) supervenes on a set of generalized coordinates 
together with R at a time prior to a bifurcation of the system.  
However, as Rueger has set up his first argument, the litmus test for whether 
emergent properties supervene on a set of subvenient properties is whether or not V 
(the phase space portrait) remains qualitatively indifferent after a bifurcation 
occurs. Recall, according to Rueger, a system is structurally stable insofar as the 
following holds: if A*-properties supervene on A-properties at t1, then a small 
change in A-properties – e.g., a small change in the value of the control parameter – 
will not result in a qualitatively different phase portrait at t2  
This condition, however, is violated in the example of convection rolls. First, at 
time t1, say, the state of the fluid is in the macroscopic state of rest. Second, at time 
t2, which in the diagram represents the onset of a dynamical instability point, the 
same physical properties at t2 could be in two nomologically possible different 
states – either left or right rolling behavior. Finally, at time t3, after the system has 
undergone a bifurcation, through a small change in R, temporal evolvement from t1 
to t3 has led to the emergence of a qualitatively different phase space portrait. Prior 
to a relative small change in R, the state of the fluid was in the resting state, whereas 
after “wiggling” with R, the state of the fluid is in a continuously rising and falling 
state.  
Before scrutinizing the second argument offered by Rueger, let us consider 
another problem with Rueger’s first argument. Recall from chapter 3, that the 
standard way of distinguishing between synchronic and diachronic dependence 
relations is to conceptualize synchronic dependence as a vertical dependence 
relation, while conceiving of diachronic dependence as a horizontal dependence 
relation. That is precisely what Rueger does (see figure 13 above). That is, just as 
the usual account, the horizontal axis represents time or change over time, while the 
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vertical axis represents synchronic or atemporal determination. The question I 
raised in chapter 3 was whether it is correct to insist so firmly on the distinction 
between horizontal and vertical, that is, between diachronic and synchronic modes 
of dependence.  
Suppose that O’Connor (2000) is correct to claim that emergent properties in 
dynamical systems do not supervene on a set of physical properties, because what 
emergent properties a dynamical system has at t1, e.g., is determined (in part, at 
least) by the immediately prior states of the system at t0. If this account is correct, 
then it follows that the vertical synchronic relation does not exhaustively determine 
the emergent properties of the system at t1. Rather, the relation of determination 
unfolds over time, from t0 to t1. As I argued in chapter 3, if this is the case, then the 
relevant relation of determination holds diagonally over time. But, if the relevant 
sense of determination holds diagonally over time, then this contravenes the 
requirement of the synchronic supervenience relation, since the latter can only hold 
– as Rueger himself states – at a given synchronic time (Rueger 2000, p. 472).  
Turning now to look at Rueger’s second argument for why diachronic 
emergence coincides with the supervenience relation, consider the following figure:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 15 Temporal evolution of a system {A, B} into {A*, B*}, where (I) the old and 
new systems are topologically equivalent (B* is a merely resultant property); in (II) 
old and new systems are inequivalent (B* is a diachronically emergent property); 
SV is the supervenience relation (adapted from Rueger 2000, p. 481)  
 
The diagram to the left, (I), represents Rueger’s first argument; here cashed out in 
terms of topological equivalence. Recall, if the phase space portrait stays 
qualitatively the same under perturbations, then the system is structurally stable, 
ROBUST SUPERVENIENCE AND EMERGENCE 481 
case of diachronic property emergence: a slight change in the base prop- 
erties A -* A* can lead to supervening properties B* which are qualita- 
tively different from the properties B that supervened on the unmodified 
base A. Emergence, in the diachronic sense, is not understood in this 
framework as a violation or breakdown of the supervenience relation it- 
self. Supervenience relations are (synchronic) relations between base and 
supervening properties exist ng at th  same tim . The emergence relation 
to be defined here, by contrast, is a (diachronic) relation between systems 
at successive times.17 The notions of supervenience and emergence become 
connected, however, through the requirement of robustness for the super- 
venience relation. Robust supervenience adds a counterfactual condition 
to supervenience; it specifies what would happen were we to subject the 
system to a temporal evolution of the base properties, i.e., a certain change 
in the base would result in a certain modification of the supervenient prop- 
erties which we then compare to the unmodified supervenient properties. 
If t  modification is radic l en ug , the robustness requireme is vi - 
lated (but supervenience may still hold). For diachronic emergence we 
need an actual, not counterfactual, change in the base resulting in a qual- 
itative change of the supervening properties. A violation of the first clause 
of the robustness requirement for the supervenience relation is therefore 
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for diachronic emergence. Vio- 
lation of robustness says what would happen if there were a modification 
of the base; diachronic emergence describes what in fact happens in that 
case. 
Let B--->B* refer to th  tempo al evolution of a system's behavior 
at one time (B) into the behavior at a later time (B*) such that topological 
equivalence is respected, and let B--II->B* refer to evolution into 
inequivalent properties. We then have the schemas shown in Figure 5 (SV 
B- B* 
svt isv sV I 1sv 
A A * A* 
(I) (II) 
Figure 5. Temporal evolution of a system {A, B} into {A*, B*} where (I) the old and new 
systems are topologically equivalent (B* is a merely resultant property); in (II) old and new 
system re inequivalent (B* is a diachro ically emergent property). 
17. For the case of synchronic emergence, see Rueger (forthcoming). 
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viz., that the trajectory of the old system {A, B} maps onto (that is, is equivalent to) 
the trajectories of the new system {A*, B*}61.  
The diagram to the right, (II), by contrast, is intended to show that when a 
perturbation of the system’s dynamics occurs, the trajectories (behavior) of the old 
system {A, B} fail to map onto the trajectories of the new system {A*, B*}, in the 
sense that the new emergent behavior of the system {A*, B*} is qualitatively 
different and, as a result, topologically inequivalent to the old system {A, B}. 
Diagram (II) represents the diachronic emergence of novel behavior, e.g., the 
diachronic emergence of convection rolls. We know that if the trajectories of two 
physical systems are topologically inequivalent, then this violates the condition of 
structural stability required for emergent properties in individual systems to 
coincide with the supervenience relation. But, according to Rueger, instead of 
looking at topological inequivalence in individual systems, it is possible to define a 
conception of topological equivalence for families of systems, such that even though 
each individual system is structurally unstable, an individual system could 
nevertheless belong to a family of stable systems. As Rueger says: “If it does 
[belong to a family of stable systems], then the bifurcation or instability in the 
system occurs in a structurally stable way: all systems in the family exhibit 
qualitatively the same bifurcation behavior.” (2000, p. 479) If so, then a 
supervenience relation exists between property classes in a system, if “the relation is 
unstable, the instability occurs in a stable way, i.e., the system belongs to a family 
of systems which, as a family, is structurally stable.” (Rueger 2000, p. 479)  
Suppose the supervenience relation holds between families of properties, and 
suppose further that dynamical systems such as those described in the convection 
roll example – which exhibit so-called Rayleigh-Bénard instability – belong to a 
family of systems in which qualitatively the same bifurcation behavior occurs, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Rueger gives this the following formal definition: “A dynamical system Σ, 
considered as the transformations Sp: D → D on the system’s phase space of initial 
conditions x at some times, is topologically equivalent to another system Σ* with 
Sp*: D* → D* if there exists a homeomorphism h (a one-to-one mapping continuous 
in both directions) of the phase space trajectories of the first system onto the 
trajectories of the second such that [(I)] commutes: h [Sp* (X)] = Sp [h (X)].” (2000, 
p. 473)  
! 186 
whenever these systems undergo a specific bifurcation, then it follows, on Rueger’s 
account, that, as a family, Rayleigh-Bénard instability is structurally stable, and thus 
coincide with the supervenience relation. But, this result only follows under the 
specified condition that supervenience holds between classes or types of properties. 
The conclusion does not follow for token systems, where the trajectories of a 
system’s phase space portrait at t1 is topologically inequivalent with the trajectories 
of the new system’s phase space portrait at t2. On the one hand, then, we have a 
violation of the supervenience relation, whereas, on the other, the relation of 
supervenience remains intact. As a first approximation, this result is coherent, 
because when supervenience holds, it holds between types, and when it does not 
hold, it is because the relevant relation is between tokens.  
This result implies that the relation of supervenience only holds in generalized 
cases across entire families of systems, while it does not hold in individual, non-
generalized, systems. That is, claiming that diachronic ontological emergence takes 
the form of a supervenience relation, really boils down to saying that systems that 
exhibit diachronic ontological emergence do so because they belong to an abstract 
family of systems in which the relation of supervenience holds. It does not follow 
that any single concrete dynamical system that exhibits diachronic ontological 
emergent properties does so because such properties are based in a supervenience 
relation.  
 
7.8. An implication for extended cognition 
 
Given the arguments presented in sections 7.5.1, 7.6.1, and 7.7.1 – namely, that 
diachronic ontological emergence does not rely on the supervenience relation – I 
now wish to apply these arguments in order to consider their relevant implications 
for EC. Most defenders of EC conceive of extended cognitive systems as nonlinear 
dynamical systems. Arguments for such views are often grounded in the notion of 
coupling from dynamical systems theory. As Clark & Chalmers state, in cases of 
extended cognition, “the human organism is linked to an external entity in a two-
way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in 
its own right.” (1998, p. 8) Such dynamical couplings may, in the right 
circumstances, result in the emergence of certain cognitive processes such as 
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occurrent remembering. Consider, for example, how Clark defines his preferred 
view of emergence:  
 
“[The] idea is to depict emergence as the process by which complex, cyclic 
interactions give rise to stable and salient patterns of systemic behavior. […]. 
[P]henomena that depend on multiple, nonlinear, temporally asynchronous, 
positive feedback involving interactions will count as strongly emergent. […]. 
Emergent phenomena, thus defined, will […] reward understanding in terms 
of the changing values of a collective variable – a variable that tracks the 
pattern resulting from the interactions of multiple factors and forces. Such 
factors and forces may be wholly internal to the system or may include 
selected elements of the external environment.” (2001, pp. 115-16) 
 
Here the particular kind of dynamical coupling between agent and environment, 
say, involves complex, nonlinear, and self-organizing interactions from which 
certain emergent properties arise. That notion of emergence is, I submit, consistent 
with diachronic ontological emergence. In the literature, this specific kind of 
dynamics is often referred to as continuous reciprocal causation, which Clark 
defines as follows:  
 
“Continuous reciprocal causation (CRC) occurs when some system S is both 
continuously affecting and simultaneously being affected by, activity in some 
other system O. Internally, we may well confront such causal complexity in 
the brain since many neural areas are linked by both feedback and 
feedforward pathways […]. On a larger canvas, we often find processes of 
CRC that criss-cross brain, body and local environment. Think of a dancer, 
whose bodily orientation is continuously affecting and affected by her neural 
states, and whose movements are also influencing those of her partner, to 
whom she is continuously responding!” (1997, p. 163)  
 
In addition to arguing for EC by way of dynamical notions such as coupling, 
through which one can identify instances of diachronic ontological emergence, one 
also finds appeals to supervenience as an attempt to ground the metaphysical claim 
of EC. Consider, again, a passage from Clark:  
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“A recurrent theme in previous chapters has been the ability of body and 
world to act as what might now be dubbed “participant machinery” – that is, 
to form part of the very machinery by means of which mind and cognition are 
physically realized and hence to form part of the local material supervenience 
base for various mental states and processes.” (2008, p. 207; italics added)  
 
Given the arguments presented in this chapter, what should we make of this explicit 
appeal to supervenience? Insofar as Clark conceives of extended cognitive systems 
as dynamical or nonlinearly coupled systems, then it is not clear that it is justifiable 
to make use of both supervenience and emergence by which to ground EC. For 
purposes of explaining the dynamics of how complex and nonlinear dynamical 
systems give rise to higher-level emergent properties, the appeal to supervenience 
will do little work. Indeed, as Mitchell states:  
 
“If we take a snap-shot [synchronic] view of the higher and lower levels [in a 
dynamical system], then the dynamics of how the higher level is constituted 
and stabilized is lost. Contemporary sciences show us that there are processes, 
often involving negative and positive feedback or self-organization, that are 
responsible for generating higher-level stable properties, and these processes 
are not captured by a static mapping [such as supervenience].” (2012, p. 177)  
 
That is wholly consistent with CRC and the notion of coupling from dynamical 
systems theory. The real culprit, it seems to me, is that when explaining emergent 
processes, and how these arise in dynamical systems, the supervenience relation 
fails to properly apply, because the supervenience relation is a synchronic relation, 
while, as we have seen, diachronically emergent properties are determined 
diagonally over time.  
What I do not say is that there are no justified grounds for supervenience talk. 
For example, when Clark mentions that parts of the environment may, in the right 
circumstances, form part of the local material supervenience base of various mental 
states, perhaps he is correct to do so. I will not dispute this here. Nevertheless, I 
submit, the ramifications we can draw for EC given our discussion is the following: 
when addressing emergent cognitive processes, instantiated diachronically in 
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nonlinear and self-organizing dynamical systems, the emergence of such processes 
refuse grounding in the supervenience relation.  
 
7.9. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the phenomenon of emergence. I have argued that 
insofar as we consider dynamical systems, and how the dynamics of such systems 
give rise to diachronic ontological emergent processes, there is no reason to assume 
that emergence in dynamical systems is coincident with supervenience. I have used 
my arguments for diachronic ontological emergence, together with my critical 
arguments of the supervenience relation, to address some implications for EC. That 
is, insofar as most defenders of EC understand extended cognitive systems as 
dynamical systems, and insofar as emergent processes in dynamical systems 
contravene the conditions under which the supervenience relation holds, friends of 
EC should avoid appealing to supervenience when explaining the emergence of 
cognitive processes.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
! 190 
8. Extended cognition & the causal-constitutive fallacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the story told so far I have criticized a number of metaphysical dependence 
relations for assuming ontological synchronicity. In contrast to synchronic views of 
metaphysical dependence relations, I have argued for the idea that metaphysical 
dependence relations need not be conceptualized synchronically but may, in the 
right circumstances, be understood to hold diachronically.  
In this final chapter, the basic approach pursued in the thesis will remain the 
same, although here I examine what we might call a classic in the literature on EC, 
namely the causal-constitutive fallacy leveled against EC by some of its critics. 
Indeed, and for the first time in the thesis, it is now time to be entirely on the side of 
the EC paradigm, and defend EC against one of its central as well as recurrent 
metaphysical objections.  
In the literature, the causal-constitutive fallacy has been widely discussed (see 
e.g., Adams & Aizawa 2001, 2008; Aizawa 2010; Clark 2008; Hurley 2010; 
Kirchhoff 2013a; 2013b; Menary 2006, 2007; Ross & Ladyman 2010; Wheeler 
2010; to name but a few). However, it has typically been discussed in such a way to 
leave unquestioned the very concepts of constitution and causation (Hurley 2010; 
Kirchhoff 2013a; Ross & Ladyman 2010). In this chapter, I offer an analysis of the 
constitution relation, where I show that philosophical accounts of constitution have 
commonly been explicated in terms of synchronic relations between different 
entities. We are already familiar with this particular line of argument from chapter 3 
and onwards, where we in chapter 3, for example, looked at how the relation of 
composition is standardly understood as a synchronic relation, albeit between 
several parts and a single whole. In line with the argumentational template I have 
used throughout the thesis, I then go on to show that Adams & Aizawa, the 
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engineers behind the causal-constitutive fallacy in the EC literature, are using a 
synchronic notion of constitution to ground their universally quantified objection – 
the causal-constitutive fallacy – against EC. Such an application, I will argue, is 
problematic, because common examples of EC are implicitly consistent with a 
diachronic conception of constitution. I made this point back in chapter 1, where I 
mentioned that the diachronic view of dependence relations is implicit in a number 
of arguments provided for EC, especially in second-wave versions of EC. So, the 
causal-constitutive fallacy, I will argue, do not apply to common cases of EC. As a 
result, therefore, Adams & Aizawa are wrong to assume that their argument shows 
that EC per se is incoherent (as a matter of contingent fact).  
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
In metaphysics, the received view of constitution is known as “material 
constitution”. Recall from chapter 2, where I provided a general exposition of 
constitution, that material constitution can be summarized as a synchronic one-one-
relation between spatially and materially coincident objects of different kind, or as a 
many-one relation, where one object or entity is constituted by an aggregate of 
objects or entities (note: although the many-one expression is typically made in 
relation to composition, there are formulations of the constitution relation expressed 
in terms of many-one rather than one-one relations (see e.g., Wilson (2007)). In the 
context of material constitution, “synchronic” implies atemporal such that it is not 
part of the very essence of materially constituted entities that they are dependent for 
their existence on temporal unfolding. That is, material constitution involves a mode 
of constitution between entities in which time plays a role only insofar as it 
becomes possible to specify a constitutive relation at a time instant t – viz., moment 
by moment, snapshot by snapshot.  
For example, as articulated by Gibbard (1975), in the classical case of David (a 
token statue) and Piece (a token piece of marble), both David and Piece are created 
at the exact same time and destroyed at the exact same time; hence, David did not 
evolve over time; rather, David is constituted at a time instant t. Here time is 
reduced to a set of punctuated specifications, with the fact that David is in time – 
just as David has a certain weight – not essential to the constitutive nature of David. 
Furthermore, together with the idea that constitution is atemporal, I emphasized, in 
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chapter 2, that material constitution holds between two entities that spatially and 
materially coincide with one another. That is, if Piece constitutes David, both Piece 
and David exist at the same place at the same time and they share the same material 
parts. 
This chapter offers an alternative to this view of constitution by focusing on the 
dispute between defenders of EC and their critics. As we know, advocates of EC 
state that in orchestration with neural elements, extra-neural bodily, and worldly 
elements partially constitute cases of distributed cognitive processes or modes of 
cognitive processing (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Menary 2007; Sutton 
2010; Wheeler 2010; Wilson & Clark 2009; Wilson 2010).  
But, there are philosophers who claim that the defenders of EC commit the so-
called “causal-constitutive fallacy” (C-C fallacy) (Adams & Aizawa 2001, 2008; 
Aizawa 2010). Because issues such as causal coupling are part of the argument for 
EC, those who think that EC commits the C-C fallacy are arguing that defenders of 
EC make an unjustifiable inference from causal dependence to constitutive 
dependence. The reason for this is that it is commonly thought that causation and 
constitution are independent relations such that facts about causal relations do not 
tell us anything about facts of constitutive relations. Hence, so the critics argue, 
nothing follows about constitution from facts about causation on its own.  
As a first approximation, and if material constitution is the received view of 
constitution, it may seem that the critics of EC are correct in charging the defenders 
of EC with the C-C fallacy. If we consult the case of David and Piece, it makes little 
sense to start with claims about causation and then infer to claims about constitution 
– Piece constitutes David, Piece does not cause David to exist. But first 
approximations are not always accurate. Indeed, it only seems that those who argue 
that the fans of EC are guilty of committing the C-C fallacy are correct, because 
those critics have misunderstood the nature of the constitution relation involved in 
common examples of extended cognitive processes or modes of cognitive 
processing62.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Another critic of the extended cognition framework is Rupert (2009). I omit 
discussion of Rupert in this chapter, because Rupert’s work, even though it takes the 
metaphysics of mind seriously, is focused on integration in terms of mechanisms 
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If I am correct to insist on the need for an alternative conception of constitution, this 
would have ramifications for the metaphysics of constitution, in that, it 
demonstrates the need to broaden how we conceive of the constitution relation 
itself, on the one hand, and what kinds of relata the constitution relation may hold 
between, on the other. This should not come as a surprise to us after the discussion 
of how processes depend for their persistence on spatiotemporal continuity in 
chapters 3, 4, and 5. Also, the need for an alternative conception of constitution 
points to the failure of some philosophers to pay attention to the metaphysical 
baggage their statements carry with them, and, consequently, involve them in. 
Although the issue that I shall argue in this chapter starts within naturalistic 
philosophy of mind (the extended cognition thesis), it ultimately speaks to wider 
issues about constitution in analytical metaphysics. Consequently, and in line with 
one of my primary aims in the thesis, by joining up distinct-ish literatures in 
analytical metaphysics (on constitution) and in naturalistic philosophy of mind (on 
the extended cognition thesis), it is my hope to get audiences from both fields of 
research to contribute to one another’s projects (as shown in figure 1).  
 
8.2. Arguments 
 
The issue that I shall discuss in this chapter is that there is an assumption shared on 
both sides of the EC debate that is misleading and that requires the development of 
an alternative, nonstandard account of the nature of constitution for it to be 
resolved. I identify, first, what the misleading assumption is in the EC literature. 
What is misleading is the assumption that the constitution relation, in distributed 
cognitive processes or modes of cognitive processing, is (a) synchronic and (b) 
fundamentally distinct from causation. This assumption generates two interesting 
implications. First, as a universally quantified argument against all cases of EC, I 
will argue that the C-C fallacy turns on an argument that is wrong, namely that the 
conception of constitution used by the defenders of EC must be compatible with 
how it is characterized in analytical metaphysics. However, common examples of 
EC do not dovetail with the notion of constitution developed in metaphysics, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
rather than on the constitution relation, the latter being the topic of discussion in this 
chapter.  
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vice versa. So, critics of EC such as Adams & Aizawa are wrong to insist that the 
C-C fallacy points to something flawed in all cases of EC. Second, even if common 
cases of EC are incompatible with the standard account of constitution in 
metaphysics, some defenders of EC (e.g., Clark 2008; Rowlands 2010), I will argue, 
misleadingly adopt metaphysical concepts such as constitution without additional 
explanation and scrutiny, thus (potentially) misconstruing the relation of 
constitution in cases of distributed species of cognitive processes. 
As I mentioned above, the diachronic conception of constitution to be 
developed here is (in fact) implicit in some articulations of EC – especially in 
second-wave versions of EC (see e.g. Menary 2007) – even if this diachronic notion 
of constitution has not been explicitly articulated. Thus, part of my project is to 
make explicit what is already in the existing literature on EC. However, the 
diachronic account of constitution on offer here undermines other views of 
constitution that are equally held in the debate over EC – that is why I state that 
Adams & Aizawa are wrong in charging all cases of EC with the C-C fallacy, since 
the claim they advance presupposes the applicability of synchronic material 
constitution to EC. Furthermore, that is why I say that certain defenders of EC (e.g., 
Clark 2008; Rowlands 2010) are wrong to adopt metaphysical relations from 
metaphysics without additional scrutiny.  
To extend on these remarks, this chapter offers a challenge to those who have 
either argued from material constitution to the claim that EC commits the C-C 
fallacy (which I will show that Adams & Aizawa have) or thought it plausible to 
base an argument for EC by appeal to constitution as a synchronic relation of 
dependence between different entities (which I will show that Clark (2008) and 
Rowlands (2010) have), while attempting to articulate a diachronic conception of 
constitution that I think is present in certain formulations of EC.  
For instance, in section 8.5, I refer to Wilson’s recent review of the 
metaphysical literature on constitution (2007, 2009) in order to make the claim that 
the notion of constitution that Adams & Aizawa (2001, 2008) are working with is 
what Wilson identifies as compositional constitution – a species of material 
constitution used in metaphysics. This specification is important, since (as I shall 
argue) this notion of material constitution is incompatible with the constitutive 
nature of distributed cognitive processes. As a result, I argue that Adams & Aizawa 
are wrong to charge all advocates of EC with the C-C fallacy. Wilson also identifies 
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a second species of material constitution, which he refers to as ampliative 
constitution. As with compositional constitution, I shall spend some time 
substantiating the claim that this second form of material constitution is equally 
inconsistent with common cases of EC.  
The alternative to what I shall refer to as synchronic material constitution, 
which covers both compositional constitution and ampliative constitution, I call 
diachronic constitution. To get an initial fix on what this nonstandard mode of 
constitution is, and how it is compatible with most of the constitutive cases of EC, I 
shall start by identifying that extended cognitive phenomena are hybrid, that is, they 
exhibit both causal and constitutive relations. However, even though distributed 
processes are hybrid in this sense, I shall question the assumption inherent in the 
standard notion of constitution, that is, whether it is justified to understand 
constitution as a strictly vertical relation, while understanding causation as an 
exclusively horizontal relation. I introduced a similar worry in chapter 3 and 5, 
where I made the argument that insofar as the composition relation may hold 
diachronically, it follows that this kind of dependence relation holds diagonally 
across time rather than vertically at a durationless point in time.  
Here I argue that one is justified in claiming that the constitution relation that 
holds between Piece and David at t1 does so in virtue of the fact that both Piece and 
David are wholly present at t1, whereas it is due to certain diachronic or causal 
relations that Piece and David persist from t1 to t2. However, if the relata in question 
are processes, and because processes are temporally extended in time, the 
constitution relation cannot hold exhaustively between its relata at any single 
moment in time but must do so across time.  
Furthermore, and as I argued in chapters 3 and 5, processes – whether cognitive 
or non-cognitive – persist by perduring rather than by enduring. This point is 
closely related to why constitution cannot hold in a vertical fashion but must hold 
diagonally in circumstances when the relata in question are processes. Consider, for 
example, the following case by Menary: “X is the manipulation of the notebook 
reciprocally coupled to Y – the brain processes – which together constitute Z, the 
process of remembering.” (2006, p. 334; italics in original) In this example, Z is a 
temporally extended process – just as X and Y are. That is, Z persists through time in 
virtue of its spatiotemporal continuity (Hofweber & Velleman 2011), and at no 
single (snapshot) instant in time is Z exhaustively present (see chapter 5 for a 
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similar argument in the case of transactive remembering). In other words, Z does 
not persist by being wholly present at each time instant t at which Z exists. Indeed, 
Menary provides us with a temporally multifaceted example of EC. That is, the 
timescales that are involved include the time-courses of neural processes, temporal 
dynamics of bodily manipulation, and the temporal dynamics of cultural practices 
within which the overall distributed process unfolds. Also, the time-course of Z is 
longer than some of its components, e.g., Z has a longer time-course than certain 
top-down neural modulations involved in orchestrating Z (see chapter 6). Thus, Z is 
constituted by processes unfolding over different temporal frequencies 
(milliseconds, seconds, and minutes), while Z itself is dynamically unfolding over a 
time interval. That is why neither the constitution relation that holds between X & Y 
and Z nor any of the relata can be wholly present at a particular instant t or at each 
point over an interval t1, …, tn.  
What this tells us about the relation of constitution in EC is that relations of 
constitution do not sit synchronically or atemporally wedged in between higher and 
lower-level entities as in cases of material constitution. Unlike the notion of time 
expressed in synchronic material constitution, where “time” is reduced to a series of 
snapshot instances, and where “time” is not essential to the nature of the constituted, 
distributed cognitive processes are constituted in time continuous dynamical 
systems, and dynamical systems are quantitative in time (van Gelder 1998, p. 618; 
see also Chemero 2009). By “quantitative in time,” I mean that both the constituents 
and the constituted are richly embedded in time such that if we change this 
embedding – e.g., by slowing down some of the processes – we change either the 
behavior of the lower level processes and their components or the higher level 
phenomenon, or both, depending on which of the processes we change (Smithers 
1998, p. 652). As Wheeler points out, in the psychological arena, richly temporal 
phenomena include:  
 
“(i) [The] rates of change within, the actual temporal duration of, and any 
rhythmic properties exhibited by, individual cognitive processes, and (ii) the 
ways in which those rates of change, temporal durations, and rhythms are 
synchronized both with the corresponding temporal phenomena exhibited by 
other cognitive processes, and the temporal processes taking place in the 
cognizer’s body and environment.” (2005, p. 106)  
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If the notion of “time” in synchronic accounts of material constitution implies that 
temporality itself is not essential to the constitutive nature of constituted entities, 
then the metaphysical tool-kit of material constitution will be inappropriate for 
describing and explaining dynamical systems, and the way in which such systems 
give rise to distributed cognitive processes. 
 
8.3. Overview 
 
In section 8.4, the task will be to consider a few examples to serve as a backdrop for 
the discussion that follows in later sections. In section 8.5, I review Wilson’s two 
senses of material constitution, while (a) showing that Adams & Aizawa are 
working with the notion of material constitution known as compositional 
constitution, and (b) develop the argument that whether adopting either 
compositional or ampliative constitution is irrelevant, since neither is compatible 
with cases of distributed cognitive processes. I also develop my second argument, 
namely that Clark (2008) and Rowlands (2010) seem to misleadingly adopt 
synchronic notions of constitution when they should, in fact, be appealing to 
diachronic forms of constitution (or, of course, simply not use such metaphysical 
concepts at all). Now, having done this, I begin to contrast the concept of 
synchronic material constitution with diachronic constitution in relation to the C-C 
fallacy in section 8.6. Finally, in section 8.7, I focus on developing further the idea 
of diachronic constitution.  
 
8.4. Examples  
 
A first task is to sketch and discuss a few examples to serve as a backdrop for the 
discussion that will follow in later sections. I begin with the critics of EC. In his 
“The coupling-constitution fallacy revisited” (2010), Aizawa says: “Once one sees 
that a causal connection between a process of type X and a process of type Y is not 
enough to convert the Y process, or even the conjoined X-Y process, into a process 
of just type X, then one can also see that essentially the same point applies even 
when there is a reliable causal connection between X and Y.” (2010, p. 333) 
According to Aizawa, there are persistent intuitions to the effect that those who 
infer constitution from causation are committing an instance of the C-C fallacy. As 
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one of Adams & Aizawa’s leading cases to illustrate this argument, they provide 
this non-cognitive example:  
 
“The liquid FreonTM in an older model air conditioning system evaporates in 
the system’s evaporator coil. The evaporator coil, however, is causally linked 
to such things as a compressor, expansion valve, and air conditioning 
ductwork. Yet, the evaporation does not extend beyond the bounds of the 
FreonTM. So a process may actively interact with its environment, but this 
does not mean that it extends into its environment.” (2008, p. 91)  
 
Regardless of whether one finds the description “evaporation does not extend 
beyond the bounds of the FreonTM” a bit pseudo-scientific (Ross & Ladyman 2010, 
p. 161), Adams & Aizawa are, of course, correct to claim the following: “a 
compressor and an expansion coil have complementary roles to play in air 
conditioning, although this provides no reason to think that a compressor is an 
expansion coil or vice versa.” (2008, p. x) Indeed, most central air conditioners have 
two separate components: the first is a condenser coil; the second is an evaporator 
coil. The evaporator is typically mounted inside the house. It is an inner coil in a 
heat pump that, during cooling mode, absorbs heat from inside the house and boils 
the liquid refrigerant (e.g., FreonTM) to a vapor, which then cools the house. In 
contrast, the condenser is typically placed outside the house. It is a network of tubes 
filled with refrigerant that removes heat from the hot evaporated liquid so that the 
refrigerant becomes a liquid again.  
There is a serious problem with employing such an example as evidence for the 
unjustifiability of putative cases of EC. As I have mentioned, extended cognitive 
phenomena are hybrid, consisting of both causal relations and relations of 
constitution. Constitution is usually understood as a relation between levels, and is 
therefore typically conceived as an interlevel relation of dependence. In contrast, the 
relation of causation is commonly taken to be a relation that holds at the same level, 
and is therefore usually viewed as an intralevel relation63. In this example, Adams & !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 I should add here that I do not restrict causation to an intra-level phenomenon. In 
chapter 7, for example, I explicit talk of ontological emergence that involves 
downward causation.  
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Aizawa conflate intralevel causal relations with interlevel constitutive relations, in 
the sense that they start by assuming that the evaporator coil and the condenser coil 
are in constant causal interaction and, then, conclude from this that neither the 
evaporator coil nor the condenser coil is constitutive of one another. If Adams & 
Aizawa insist that their example works against EC, they would be deliberately 
twisting the interpretation of cases of EC.  
For simplicity only, consider again the relationship between Z (the distributed 
process of remembering) and its constituents X and Y (the process of manipulating a 
notebook causally coupled to brain processes). By analogy, if the example of 
evaporation in an air conditioning system were to map on to the example of 
distributed remembering, it would follow that defenders of EC were arguing such 
implausible things as: that the manipulation of a notebook extends into the brain 
processes, and, therefore, that X (the manipulation of the notebook) is Y (various 
brain processes). Unsurprisingly, no one on the side of EC has ever made such a 
remarkably strange claim (at least not anybody that I know of). It would be 
consistent with most cases of distributed cognitive processes, if Adams & Aizawa 
were to reformulate their example accordingly: X is the process of absorbing heat 
and thus transforming a liquid refrigerant into vapor (the function of the evaporation 
coil) reciprocally coupled to Y – the process of transforming the vapor into liquid 
refrigerant (the function of the condenser coil) – which together constitute Z, the 
process of maintaining constant room temperature. This reformulation would 
respect the distinction between causation and constitution, with causation occurring 
at the constituent level, and constitution holding between the constituted higher 
level and the constituents at lower levels.  
For an example of a different kind, albeit still non-cognitive, consider these 
points concerning the familiar case from dynamical systems theoretical approaches 
to cognition: the Watt (centrifugal) governor64. First, the Watt governor is a 
mechanism for controlling the speed of a steam engine. Second, Watt solved the 
problem of maintaining constant speed for the flywheel by attaching a vertical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 In the article “What might cognition be, if not computational?” (1995), van 
Gelder recommends that the operations of the Watt Governor, along with a 
dynamical mathematical description of its operations, be understood as a 
prototypical model for cognitive science and for the ontology of cognition.  
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spindle to the flywheel, which would rotate at a speed proportionate to that of the 
flywheel itself. Watt then attached two arms with metal balls on their ends to the 
spindle; both were free to rise and fall and, as a consequence of centrifugal force, 
would do so in accordance with the speed of the governor. Due to a mechanical 
arrangement, the angle of the arms would change the opening of the valve, thus 
having an effect on the amount of steam driving the flywheel. This provided a 
system, the result of which was “that as the speed of the main wheel increased, the 
arms raised, closing the valve and restricting the flow of steam: as the speed 
decreased, the arms fell, opening the valve and allowing more steam to flow. The 
engine adopted a constant speed, maintained with extraordinary swiftness and 
smoothness in the presence of large fluctuations in pressure and load.” (van Gelder 
1995, p. 349)  
Standardly the example of the Watt governor (WG) has been used as a 
prototype of a dynamical system with the grand ambition of establishing a non-
computational and non-representational approach to cognition and cognitive 
science. For the present purpose, however, I bracket these agendas. Instead I use 
this case to further motivate the idea of diachronic constitution between 
dynamically evolving processes. Similarly to cases of EC, the centrifugal governor 
is hybrid, that is, it exemplifies both relations of constitution and causation. Even if 
talk of causation might seem problematic in cases where there is a constitutive 
relation between higher- and lower-level relata (Craver & Bechtel 2007), this is 
unproblematic here. That is, by attending to the constitutive relationship between Y 
(the process of maintaining a constant speed level) and the sub-processes such as 
closing of the valve, the rotation as well as height of the spindle arms, etc., we can 
trace both intralevel processes of reciprocal, mutually influencing causation 
between lower-level processes and their components, while explicating what is the 
constitutive relation between Y and its constituents. Because of this, the correct way 
to causally explain how the centrifugal governor works is to explain the mutually 
modulatory and interconnected character of the components, whereas the engine 
speed is constituted by the overall dynamics of this lower-level activity.  
Before furthering my analysis of how to understand the distinction between 
synchronic material constitution and diachronic constitution, there is an issue that 
needs attention. To begin, then, note that in discussions of constitution, what we are 
presupposing is that we are discussing the nature of some phenomenon, viz., that 
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phenomenon’s ontology. This, however, poses an important question, namely 
whether insights from nonlinear dynamics provide us with an account of 
epistemological constitution, where the constituted phenomenon is merely some 
artifact of a particular model or formalism generated through macroscopic analysis, 
whether we get an account of ontological constitution, which informs us about the 
nature of the system in question, or if we get an account of constitution that 
straddles both categories? In section 8.7.5, I show that dynamical systems are 
ontologically constituted, in that, the relation between higher- and lower-level 
processes is such that it exhibits both bottom-up and top-down constitutively 
mediated effects (Craver & Bechtel 2007; or, “downward causation” (see chapter 
7)). Even if all dynamical systems are instances of what I have termed 
“epistemological constitution,” because modeling is necessary in order to 
understand the behavior of the system – as its interdependent variables unfold over 
time – dynamical systems are also ontologically constituted. This justifies my use of 
systems like the WG in the debate about constitution in EC.  
To continue distinguishing between cases of synchronic material constitution 
and the test case of diachronic constitution (Watt’s governor), unlike the example of 
David and Piece, the relation of constitution in the centrifugal governor does not 
consist in a relation between enduring entities that are wholly present whenever they 
exist. Rather, in the centrifugal governor, the relation of constitution holds between 
processes at both higher- and lower-levels. To persist, in the sense of processes, is 
to persist by unfolding over time, while never being wholly present at any single 
instant t. I have made much of this point already in the preceding chapters, 
especially in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, where we looked at the nature of the relata 
involved in a Mexican wave and writing a cheque (chapter 3), the process of CA 
(chapter 4), transactive remembering (chapter 5), and free energy minimization 
(chapter 6). Even though it may be a conceptual truth (Hofweber & Velleman 2011) 
that processes are temporally extended such that they require spatiotemporal 
continuity for their persistence, it gives rise to a substantial question: how can the 
relation of constitution that holds between processes be atemporal (i.e., synchronic) 
if the relata themselves (at both higher- and lower-levels) are essentially temporal 
(i.e., diachronic)? In other words, if the very nature of a process is to unfold over 
time such that it can never be wholly present at any single instant t, how, then, can 
its existence be exhaustively determined at a synchronic instant?  
! 202 
In the case of David and Piece, where the constitution relation is understood to hold 
entirely between enduring entities, which are wholly present whenever they exist, 
there seems to be no problem with claiming that the constitution relation that holds 
between David and Piece is synchronic. However, insofar as the relata do not 
persist by enduring, it is problematic to insist that the higher-level relatum is 
constituted synchronically – both in the case of the centrifugal governor and 
Menary’s case of distributed remembering.  
Of course, even in dynamical cases like the Watt governor, the constitution 
relation between the higher-level process of maintaining a constant speed and the 
relevant sub-processes and their components at a lower level may appear to hold 
synchronically. But, I submit, this is only because of our need to represent it 
spatially by drawing, for example, a representation of the dynamical system on a 
blackboard or depicting the operations of the Watt governor in a static 
representation. However, this spatial representation is misleading; the spatial 
representation does not map onto the dynamical characteristics of the constitution 
relation when we consider in detail the dynamical evolution inherent in the 
centrifugal governor.  
Thus, specifying the temporal dynamics of higher-level processes, along with 
the temporal nature of lower-level processes, and explaining the constitution 
relation between these, is what I aim to do by pushing for the concept of diachronic 
constitution. This proposal obviously conflicts with metaphysical intuitions about 
constitution. But this conflict is both unavoidable and necessary if we are to explain 
the constitutive nature of distributed cognitive processes.   
 
8.5. Two concepts of synchronic material constitution  
 
A critical step in articulating my first argument – that the C-C fallacy is wrong and 
thus misleading – is to establish what notion of constitution Adams & Aizawa are 
working with. As I have already claimed, Adams & Aizawa are working with the 
specific notion of compositional constitution, a species of what I call synchronic 
material constitution. This specification I now need to spell out in more detail. To 
do so, I piggyback on Wilson’s recent review of the metaphysical literature on 
material constitution (2007, 2009), where Wilson distinguishes between 
compositional and ampliative constitution, both of which are modes of synchronic 
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material constitution. The benefit of surveying this review of material constitution is 
that it allows me to argue that regardless of Adams & Aizawa taking either 
compositional constitution or ampliative constitution onboard – from which to 
justify their claim that EC commits the C-C fallacy – neither of these can justify 
such a critical argument.  
Both compositional and ampliative constitution share two necessary conditions 
that any adequate analysis of synchronic material constitution must satisfy: y is 
materially constituted by x (or the xs) during p only if:  
 
“Coincidence: x is completely material in itself, or the xs are completely 
material in themselves, and y is spatially and materially coincident with x (or 
the xs) during p.” (Wilson 2009, p. 370) 
 
“Distinctness: it is possible for x (or the xs) to exist without there being 
anything of y’s type that is (even partially) spatially and materially coincident 
with x (the xs). (Wilson 2009, p. 370)65 
 
These two standard conditions of material constitution motivate most of Adams & 
Aizawa’s intuitions about the C-C fallacy, I submit. With the case of the air 
conditioning system as our backdrop, consider that the coincidence condition 
requires a specific form of overlap, namely the complete overlap of space and 
material between y and x (or the xs) for the duration of the constitution relation 
(Wilson 2007, p. 5). For instance, it is coherent to say that two or more roads 
partially overlap, since at their spatial intersection, they share the same material. 
Similarly with the case of the air conditioning system, where it seems equally 
coherent to say that the condenser coil and the evaporator coil share parts of the 
same material. However, just as two or more overlapping roads do not share the 
same spatial and material parts completely, the evaporator coil and the condenser 
coil do not share the same spatial and material parts completely. Indeed, if this is a 
necessary condition that all adequate analyses of material constitution must fulfill, it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 I add the distinctness condition here for completeness. While I mention it one 
more time in the discussion to come, my real interest is with the coincidence 
condition.  
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is easy to see why Adams & Aizawa make the claim that the evaporator coil does 
not constitute the condenser coil, and vice versa.  
With this condition explained (although it can be done so in more detail), we 
can already see why Adams & Aizawa are mistaken in arguing that all cases of EC 
commit the C-C fallacy. Recall the schematically defined case of EC by Menary: “X 
is the manipulation of the notebook reciprocally coupled to Y – the brain processes 
– which together constitute Z, the process of remembering.” (2006, p. 334; italics in 
original) In this example, X and Y refer to lower-level processes, while Z refers to a 
higher-level process. Keep this in mind so as not to be confused by my use of X and 
Y above in the example given by Wilson, and my use of X and Y here in the 
example by Menary.  
Once we have this picture – that X and Y combine to jointly constitute Z – it is 
clear why the coincidence condition of synchronic material constitution cannot be 
employed to justify the argument that all defenders of EC commit the fallacy of 
conflating causation with constitution. On the one hand, nowhere does Menary 
claim that X and Y must spatially and materially coincide completely. Indeed, this 
would be a rather bizarre thing to claim. On the other hand, even if it is possible for 
X and Y to exist without there being anything of Z’s type (this is the requirement of 
non-identity stated in the distinctness condition), Z does not spatially and materially 
overlap completely with X and Y, and vice versa. I find it fully coherent to claim 
that the relationship between X & Y and Z is such that the space-time path of Z 
includes the space-time path of X & Y (this corresponds to the definition of 
composition provided in chapters 2 and 5). This is because, if X & Y constitute Z, 
higher-level processes such as Z is built up from X & Y. However, it does not follow 
from this that a higher-level process (like Z) and its lower-level constituent sub-
processes (like X & Y) completely overlap materially with one another. That X & Y, 
on the one hand, and Z, on the other, do not completely overlap materially with one 
another can be illustrated by highlighting that Z and X & Y are embedded 
dynamically at multiple different timescales. That is, neural assemblies run over 
timescales of milliseconds, whereas the practice of manipulating a notebook runs 
over longer timescales. Thus, it makes little sense to insist on material coincidence 
given the dynamical nature of distributed processes, like Z, and their sub-processes 
and components, like X and Y.  
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8.5.1. Compositional constitution 
 
To continue the analysis of material constitution, what Wilson dubs compositional 
constitution, has, in addition to the conditions of coincidence and distinctness, two 
further necessary conditions that it is commonly expressed to imply:  
 
“Intrinsic Necessitation: x is in some intrinsic state(s), or the xs that compose 
y are arranged, during p such that x itself, or the xs themselves, necessitate the 
existence of y.” (2009, p. 371)  
 
“Constituent Necessitation: whenever y exists, there must be something of 
x’s type that is […] spatially and materially coincident with y.” (2009, p. 371) 
 
In the intrinsic necessitation condition the idea that constitution is a compositional, 
part-whole, relation finds its most clear expression. It is now possible to address my 
second argument, namely that certain defenders of EC take for granted the 
applicability of metaphysical notions such as constitution without taking the 
additional step of providing a proper analysis of such terms. Consider, for example, 
these two quotes by Clark (2008) and Rowlands (2009) respectively: 
 
“We thus come to what is arguably the most radical contemporary take on the 
potential cognitive role of nonbiological props, aids, and structures: the idea 
that, under certain conditions, such props and structures might count as proper 
parts of extended cognitive processes.” (Clark 2008, p. 68; italics in original); 
 
“EM is a claim about the composition or constitution of (some) mental 
processes.” (Rowlands 2009, p. 54; italics added; see also Rowlands 2010)  
 
Both authors express a commitment to constitution as compositional – Rowlands 
does so explicitly, while Clark does so by using the notion of “proper part,” which 
refers to the formal theory of extensional mereology.  
It is misleading for defenders of EC to make use of compositional constitution 
for several reasons. First, compositional constitution is a strict partial ordering, like 
the notion of a “proper part” in the formal theory of extensional mereology. A 
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partial ordering is a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric relation (Varzi 2009, p. 
4). In the context of extensional mereology, we can understand transitivity as stating 
that “any part of any part of a thing is itself part of that thing.” (Varzi 2009, p. 4) 
Formally expressed: ((Pxy Λ Pyz) → Pxz). That a partial ordering is antisymmetric 
can be expressed as follows: “Two distinct things cannot be part of each other.” 
(Varzi 2009, p. 4) Formally expressed: ((Pxy Λ Pyx) → x = y). Finally, reflexivity 
implies that “[e]verything is part of itself.” (Varzi 2009, p. 4) This is formally 
expressed as follows: Pxx. There are individual problems with each of these 
conditions. For example, as I signposted in chapter 2, the view that constitution is 
transitive is controversial, because one can observe legitimate senses of “part” that 
are not transitive. Consider, e.g., these two arguments:  
 
1.A. This chain is constituted by metal links. 
1.B. Those metal links are constituted by physical particles. 
1.C. This chain is constituted by physical particles. 
 
In this case, the premises (1.A) and (1.B), together with the criterion of transitivity, 
entail (1.C). But what about the following argument:  
 
2.A. This queue is constituted by a sequential order of people.  
2.B. That sequential order of people is constituted by physical particles.  
2.C. This queue is constituted by physical particles.  
 
This argument appears to have the same form as (1A-1C). However, even if both 
arguments rely on transitivity, unlike (1A-1C), (2A-2C) is controversial, in that, it is 
not clear that (2A-2C) can accommodate transitivity. Specifically, unlike a metal 
chain, which one might think of as nothing more than various entities appropriately 
organized, queues are more than simply their physical parts – regardless of how 
these might be arranged. According to Wilson, if this is correct, then there is a non-
trivial metaphysical difference between entities such as a chain and a queue and 
their constituents. As Wilson puts it: “Consider any chunk of physical matter. If you 
merely add physical matter to this chunk, there will be a way to do so that itself 
creates a chain. But there is no such way of proceeding here that creates a statue.” 
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(2009, p. 369; italics in original) The same is true of a queue. Mere addition, or, for 
that matter, arrangement, will not suffice to constitute a statue or a queue, since they 
are partly individuated by physical, intentional, and socio-cultural relations “that 
pertain in the broader locale of that constituent physical matter.” (Wilson 2009, p. 
369) We can simply note that not all sequential line configurations of people 
constitute a queue (Hutchins 2005, p. 1559). Soldiers standing at attention are in a 
sequential line configuration, yet they do not constitute a queue. Part of what makes 
a sequential line configuration a queue is that that sequential line configuration is 
embedded within cultural practices with appropriate norms (Hutchins 2011a).  
The second problematic element concerning compositional constitution being a 
strict partial ordering – insofar as some defenders of EC use this notion of 
constitution – is that the principle of reflexivity states that everything is a part of 
itself. But it is (prima facie, at least) counter-intuitive to view entities like people, in 
our argument (2A-2C), as parts of themselves (Wilson 2007, p. 7). If it is counter-
intuitive to view people – or objects such as David and Piece – as parts of 
themselves, then it is also (prima facie, at least) counter-intuitive to count a process 
(distributed remembering, say) as a part of itself. Finally, both Clark and Rowlands 
emphasize that they focus on processes in the above quotes. This, however, since 
compositional constitution is a synchronic relation of dependence, and processes are 
diachronic in their very essence, provides Clark and Rowlands with the dilemma I 
outlined earlier: how can the relation of constitution that holds between processes be 
atemporal (i.e., synchronic) if the relata themselves (at both higher- and lower-
levels) are essentially temporal (i.e., diachronic)? In other words, if the very nature 
of a process is to unfold over time for a process to be what it is, then how can its 
existence be determined at an atemporal instant? The answer, we have seen 
throughout the thesis, is that it cannot. Therefore, Clark and Rowlands ought to 
avoid the employment of compositional constitution to argue for EC66.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 In the event that either Clark or Rowlands, or both, claim that they do not employ 
constitution in the form that I have just argued that they do, the ramifications of my 
argument shift from pointing out that they are mistaken in such an employment to 
providing an articulation of what they implicitly endorse. Either way, there are gains 
to be made from this discussion.  
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8.5.2. Ampliative constitution 
 
The second concept of synchronic material constitution identified by Wilson (2007, 
2009) is ampliative constitution. This notion is interesting to consider simply 
because it is not characterized by intrinsic necessitation conditions but rather by two 
conditions that go beyond relations of extensional, part-whole, mereology to 
consider contextual and relational aspects of both the constituents as well as the 
constituted phenomenon. One might think that because of its relational and 
contextual aspects that this relation of constitution is precisely the kind of 
constitution relation defenders of EC should be working with. This can be 
motivated further, since the mode of ampliative constitution explains the underlying 
intuition that the constituted phenomenon is more than simply its internal physical 
constituents – that is, there is more to the constitution of a phenomenon than is 
physically “within” that phenomenon.  
 Unfortunately we have to do much better than appealing to ampliative 
constitution in order to explain the mode of constitution in distributed cognitive 
processes. To get a fix on this, I first need to highlight and explain what ampliative 
constitution is.  
 Let us begin by noticing, as Wilson does, that the concept of ampliative 
constitution has been particularly important in the work of Baker (1999, 2000) – 
with the aim of establishing a constitutive view of persons. For my purposes here, 
the discussion of persons is irrelevant. Instead I shall keep my focus on the example 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the relation between David and Piece. 
For Baker, “x constitutes y at t =df 
 
a) x and y are spatially coincident at t and share all the same material parts at t; 
and  
b) x is in D at t; and  
c) It is necessary that ∀z [F* zt and z is in D at t) → ∃u(G* ut and u is spatially 
coincident with z at t)]; and 
d) It is possible that (x exists at t and ∼∃w[G* wt and w is spatially coincident 
with x at t]); and 
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e) If y has any nonspatial parts at t, then x has the same nonspatial parts at t.” 
(1999, p. 149; see also Baker 2000)  
 
As Wilson (2009) has shown, the case of David and Piece satisfies conditions (a)-
(e). David and Piece are both materially as well as spatially coincident during t. 
Piece is in art-rich cultural circumstances, given a title, and put on display at t. 
Necessarily for anything that has “being a piece of marble” as its modal property 
(i.e., the mode in which a property is had necessarily or possibly by an object) and 
is presented as a figure in art-rich cultural circumstances, given a title, and put on 
display at t, then something exists that has “being a statue” as its modal property 
that materially and spatially coincides with “being a piece of marble” at t. In (d), the 
modal claim made is that it is possible that Piece exists at t and that Piece does not 
spatially and materially coincide with anything that has “being a statue” as its modal 
property at t (Piece and David differ with respect to their persistence conditions).  
According to Wilson, the view of ampliative constitution is based on the two 
following conditions:  
 
“Extrinsic necessitation: x (the xs) is (are) in extrinsic conditions during p 
that themselves necessitate the existence of y.” (Wilson 2009, p. 371) 
 
“Relational/Intrinsic Constraint: y is relationally individuated and x (the xs) 
intrinsically individuated.” (Wilson 2009, p. 371) 
 
With these two conditions defined, we can now assess which notion of constitution 
Adams & Aizawa employ: whether it is compositional constitution; or, whether it is 
ampliative constitution. Since I have already argued that Adams & Aizawa assume 
the soundness of compositional constitution, and that this notion of constitution is 
inconsistent with distributed cognitive processes, I focus on the second notion here. 
I will show that ampliative constitution is equally problematic.  
First, if we attend only to the relational/intrinsic constraint of ampliative 
constitution, this specific constraint is insufficient twofold. It is insufficient for the 
defender of EC to attempt to ground the constitution claim of EC. The fact that a 
process Z (e.g., the distributed process of remembering) is relationally individuated 
will not suffice to establish the claim that environmental elements play a 
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constitutive role in certain tokens of cognitive processes. Put differently, it is not 
enough to show that certain socio-cultural circumstances are causally necessary for 
a process to be extended or not. In fact, in contrast to EC, where some of the 
physical constituents of a cognitive process may be located “outside” the brain and 
body of an individual, the relational/intrinsic constraint specifies that all the 
physical constituents are located internally to the individual in question. Moreover, 
if Adams & Aizawa take this particular form of synchronic material constitution 
onboard, it will not be possible for them to justifiably underpin the charge that 
defenders of EC commit the C-C fallacy. Instead, such an argument would beg the 
question against the relation of constitution in EC. If the constitutive nature of 
distributed cognitive processes does not reflect the kind of constitutive character 
implied by relations of ampliative constitution, then how could critics of EC, like 
Adams & Aizawa, base the argument for the C-C fallacy on ampliative 
constitution? Indeed, they could not.  
Second, in his recent review of material constitution, Wasserman (2009) 
discusses four different problems confronting synchronic material constitution. 
These problems are interesting in this context, since if either Adams & Aizawa or 
(some) defenders of EC adopt the relation of ampliative constitution this carries 
with it its own set of metaphysical problems. Of the four problems that Wasserman 
focuses on, one problem in particular interests me. This is the so-called grounding 
objection raised against the plausibility of synchronic material constitution (for 
various ways of stating this objection, see Bennett 2004; Burke 1992; Simons 1987; 
and Zimmerman 1995). Let us focus again on the case of David and Piece. As we 
know, both David and Piece share the same matter. Also, the two objects share 
many of the same properties (e.g., weight, size, color, etc.). Commonly this aspect is 
taken to imply that David and Piece share many of the same categorical properties. 
Similarly, David and Piece also differ in many non-categorical properties such as 
conditions of existence (they are not identical with one another). But what could 
account for these differences? How can two things that are exactly alike in so many 
respects still differ in other respects?  
Wasserman calls this the grounding objection of synchronic material 
constitution, “since it appeals to the common idea that non-categorical properties 
are grounded in categorical properties.” (2009, p. 6) For instance, Baker (1999) 
attempts to explain this grounding in terms of David being a statue, and Piece being 
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a lump of matter. Because David is admired as a piece of art, there are reviews 
written about David, and David exists as a statue relative to an art community. But, 
as Wasserman says, the “problem with this explanation is that it seems to get things 
exactly backwards, for it is natural to say that David is admired, reviewed, and 
discussed by those in the art community because it is a statue (rather than a mere 
lump of clay).” (2009, p. 7)  
Another possible response would be to attempt to ground the non-categorical 
features of David and Piece in historical facts (Wasserman 2009, p. 7). But such a 
response – even if it might work in the case of David and Piece – will not work 
concerning EC. That is, references to causal-historical facts will not appeal to the 
EC theorist for the simple reason that such an appeal could too easily be utilized and 
altered to work as a critique of EC. In particular, Adams & Aizawa could say that it 
is metaphysically innocent to argue that relational properties can be accounted for 
by appeal to causal-historical facts. This they can infer from the externalist lessons 
on the individuation of mental content from Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979).  
Hopefully it will now be clear why synchronic material constitution, regardless 
of the constitution relation being compositional or ampliative, is inconsistent with 
EC. In the next section, I attempt to contrast synchronic material constitution with 
diachronic constitution, while relating this to the C-C fallacy.  
 
8.6. Synchronic material constitution, diachronic constitution, and the C-C 
fallacy 
 
Lest the reader think that I am straying too far from matters of cognition, let me 
remind you that what is in dispute is the grain of fit between concepts in analytical 
metaphysics such as constitution and the nature of dynamical cognitive processes in 
EC.  I have deliberately selected the most widely discussed examples in 
metaphysics – for instance, the relation between David and Piece – to establish what 
such an example tells us about the constitutive nature of objects, when that 
constitutive relation is supposed to hold synchronically. I have used this case 
contrastfully with cases of dynamical EC – e.g., the process of distributed 
remembering (Menary 2006) and van Gelder’s (1995) case of the centrifugal 
governor.  
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One might wonder, of course, if the move from synchronic material constitution to 
what I term diachronic constitution is simply a bloodless coup? First, if my claim 
turns out to be correct, then this establishes that defenders of EC must avoid any 
blind adoption of the notion of constitution from metaphysics, because of the 
latter’s incompatibility with common EC cases. Second, the need to pursue an 
alternative account of constitution points to something problematic with the concept 
of constitution as this notion is understood in metaphysics. In other words, if the 
relata we are investigating are inherently temporal (if they are creatures of time, as 
Noë would say (2006)) – which all relata are in dynamical systems – the tool-kit of 
material constitution cannot be applied to explain inherently temporal, dynamical 
phenomena. Dynamical systems, however, are ubiquitous in nature (Beer 2000; 
Friston & Stephan 2007; Kelso 1995; van Gelder 1998). Thus, the synchronic 
formulation of constitution as material constitution is applicable to only a small 
number of phenomena. Much more care and additional development of the notion 
of constitution is required to get at the nature of processes and other phenomena, 
where change in time and temporal unfolding is essential. In particular, since 
cognitive processes unfold in time continuous dynamical systems (Spivey 2007; 
Varela et al. 2001), we need to address these fine temporal details in order to 
identify the constitutive nature of just that which evolves over time.  
In case the reader wonders whether the argument I am pursuing implies (a) 
restricting constitution to diachronic processes, and (b) to a relation between 
processes, this is not my intention. For example, I find it coherent to argue that 
constitution holds both (c) synchronically, and (d) between two or more distinct 
objects. The claim I find incoherent is the attempt to explain cases of (a) and (b) by 
applying the metaphysical tool-kit best suited to explain (c) and (d), because the 
relation of constitution that holds in dynamical systems such as cognitive systems is 
incompatible with how the relation of constitution is conceived of in metaphysics. 
Pushing the idea of diachronic constitution is meant to put in bold that we need to 
avoid exactly such a conflation and misapplication of phenomena and explanatory 
templates. 
Before embarking on the task of explaining the idea of diachronic constitution, 
I wish here to map out a few interesting differences. The first of these differences is 
between constitution and causation. In her discussion of metaphysical relations, 
Bennett (2011) notes that causation as well as constitution is irreflexive, 
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asymmetric, and transitive. If so, what differentiates causation, on the one hand, 
from constitution, on the other? Even if both causation and constitution are 
‘directed’ in some relevant sense, these two dependence relations are typically 
understood to be wholly distinct. As I mentioned in chapters 2 and 3, the most 
commonly accepted additional feature of constitution that is not shared by causation 
is that for a relation to count as a relation of constitution it must hold 
synchronically, whereas causation is typically understood as a diachronic relation.  
Although this is a tempting way to discriminate between causation and 
constitution, especially when considering dynamical cases such as distributed 
cognitive processes or modes of processing, on occasions temptation is best 
restricted. I think this is one of those occasions. Although she does not further 
develop this idea, Bennett herself stresses that we “should not require that building 
relations be synchronic.” (2011, p. 94; italics added) As I mentioned, although she 
does not go on to develop this line of thought, it is important for my present 
purposes, in the sense that if some philosophers find my idea that metaphysical 
building relations can be diachronic obviously flawed (in some way), here we have 
a reputable philosopher of metaphysics stating that such an idea might not be so 
obviously mistaken. In fact, when conceivable as diachronically evolving, relations 
like constitution share far more features with certain modes of causation, especially 
what Clark (1997) and Wheeler (2005) call “continuous reciprocal causation” 
(CRC), than one might suspect.  
We already have the idea that both causation and constitution can be 
diachronic, so I will leave this aside for now. What about the property of 
asymmetry? Even if it is standardly accepted that constitution and causation are 
asymmetric, in cases of EC, we should resist this assumption. Consider again 
Menary’s process of remembering: “X is the manipulation of the notebook 
reciprocally coupled to Y – the brain processes – which together constitute Z, the 
process of remembering.” (2006, p. 334; italics in original) This is the specific form 
of causation involved in CRC and nonlinear dynamics, in that, CRC “involves 
multiple simultaneous interactions and complex dynamic feedback loops, such that 
(i) each [process] partially determines, and is partially determined by, the causal 
contributions of larger numbers of other [processes], and, moreover, (ii) those 
contributions may change radically over time.” (Wheeler 2005, p. 260)  
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What, then, about constitution? Craver & Bechtel note that all interesting cases of 
interlevel constitutive relations are symmetrical (2007, p. 553). Focusing on 
mechanisms, they state that: “The relation is symmetrical precisely because the 
mechanism as a whole is fully constituted by the organized activities of its parts; a 
change in the parts is manifest as a change in the mechanism as a whole, and a 
change in the [whole] is also a change in at least some of its component parts.” 
(Craver & Bechtel 2007, p. 554) I will have more to say about the issues of 
temporality and symmetry concerning constitution in the section that follows.  
The second difference that I wish to highlight is between how most EC 
theorists understand relations like constitution, on the one hand, and my account of 
diachronic constitution, on the other. For instance, Sutton (personal communication) 
thinks that constitution is synchronic. Sutton also thinks that constitution and 
causation are different. There is nothing problematic with the latter assumption, 
since what Sutton wants to claim is that if the disparate components are, in fact, part 
of a single cognitive system or process, then those components constitute that 
system or process. The causal interactions are not in themselves the ground for the 
constitution claim, though they are indeed a useful sign for the existence of such a 
distributed system or process. But this assumption is open to interpretation such that 
it is consistent with the one used in metaphysics: that there is a fundamental 
difference between causation and constitution, and that difference is that whereas 
the latter is synchronic, the former is diachronic. The problem, as I see it, is that this 
concedes too much to the critics. If there is a significant difference between 
causation and constitution, with that difference being that causation is diachronic 
(temporal) whereas constitution is synchronic (atemporal), then how does 
something that is inherently temporal (the complex causal relations between 
processes and their component parts at a lower level) atemporally constitute 
something that is inherently temporal at a higher level (e.g., the distributed process 
of remembering)? In the end, then, Sutton’s view is open to the same kind of worry 
that I raised previously: how can the relation of constitution that holds between 
processes be atemporal (i.e., synchronic) if the relata themselves (at both higher- 
and lower-levels) are essentially temporal (i.e., diachronic)? 
This brings me to the final difference I want to focus on in this section, namely 
that between the C-C fallacy and diachronic constitution. Specifically, if a defender 
of EC were to work with diachronic constitution, this defender would not commit 
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the C-C fallacy. First, the C-C fallacy turns on an argument that conflates intralevel 
causal relations with interlevel constitutive relations, in the sense that the C-C 
fallacy works only if an inference is made from causation to constitution, where 
these relations are said to persist on the same level, e.g., that of the constituents. 
Second, the C-C fallacy assumes that constitution is itself synchronic – this should 
be evident since the C-C fallacy turns on compositional constitution. But since cases 
of distributed cognitive processes are temporal, and synchronic notions of 
constitution fail to pick out the fine temporal details essential to what it is to be a 
process, the C-C fallacy is question begging.  !
8.7. Diachronic constitution  
 
To further unravel the notion of diachronic constitution, I will discuss several core 
features of diachronic constitution in turn in this section. 
 
8.7.1. “Small-m” mereology, not “big-M” mereology 
 
It is quite intuitive to associate part-whole relations with relations of constitution, 
and because appeals to the formal ideas of the theory of extensional mereology has 
been quite influential in metaphysics, perhaps, then, we should also think of 
diachronic constitution as consistent with the formal part-whole theory of 
extensional mereology? Burrowing a distinction from Wilson (who modifies this 
distinction from Simons (1987)), I now show why diachronic constitution can (and 
should) be expressed without any appeal to extensional mereology. The relevant 
distinction is that between small-m mereology and big-M mereology, with the latter 
referring to the specific formal theories of Mereology that grew out of Lesniewski’s 
Foundations of a General Theory of Manifolds (1916) and Leonard & Goodman’s 
The Calculus of Individuals (1940). The primary concern with the notion of big-M 
mereology is that it construes the part-whole relation as a partial ordering, viz., as an 
antisymmetric, reflexive, and transitive relation. Recall that in section 8.5.1, I 
argued that regardless of considering the relation between David and Piece, or the 
relation between Z (process of remembering) and X (manipulation of notebook) and 
Y (brain process), neither David nor Piece and neither Z nor X & Y can plausibly be 
thought of as part(s) of itself (themselves). Perhaps even more problematic, the 
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extensionality principle of big-M mereology violates the commonly accepted idea 
that constitution is a relation of non-identity. Given the attention from constitution 
theorists on distinguishing the relation of constitution from a relation of identity, I 
follow Wilson’s advice in thinking that “it would seem prudent to avoid building 
this into one’s view of constitution from the outset.” (2007, p. 7) This is, of course, 
still fully consistent with conceiving of small-m mereology as in line with 
diachronic constitution.  
 
8.7.2. Process ontology ‘yes’, but non-eliminative  
 
While this chapter – and my account of diachronic constitution – is not intended as 
a defense of process ontology and does not offer a comparison of such views with 
alternative ontological models, such as traditional substance ontology, and various 
competitor views, e.g., Whitehead’s event ontology, trope ontology, stage ontology, 
and so on – tasks for another occasion – diachronic constitution shares a kinship 
with some form of noneliminative process ontology. First, unlike certain eliminative 
variations of process ontology such as French & Ladyman’s (2003) account of ontic 
structural realism, who argue that out best physics is incompatible with ontological 
categories such as “individuals,” on my account of diachronic constitution, the very 
idea of processes presupposes that processes have individual parts. A process might 
involve any number of component parts, but it always involves some parts. Even 
though processes themselves may occupy the relata in relations of constitution (as 
in the relation between Z, the process of remembering, and X & Y, the process of 
manipulating a notebook reciprocally coupled to brain processes), we need to be 
aware that our analysis, and subsequently explanation, must stop somewhere. That 
is, even if our best physics tells us that individual entities do not exist – e.g., only 
quantum fields exist – this will not make much sense in the context of cognitive 
science. In cognitive science we want to be able to locate and preferably identify 
entities as well as their activities (Bechtel & Richardson 1993). Note, though, that 
there is an important and non-trivial difference between how process ontologists 
(see e.g., Seibt 2009) conceive of individual parts and how the notion of “part” is 
preserved and propagated in accounts of synchronic material constitution.  
To appropriately characterize “part” in processual terms, we must replace what 
Seibt has recently called the “particularist conception of individuals” – i.e., entities 
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that are intrinsically individuated and which have a determinate unique location – 
with a view of individual parts that focuses not so much on “location but on 
‘specificity-in-functioning’ in the widest sense of ‘functioning,’ i.e., focuses on the 
dynamic role of an entity (e.g., an activity) within a certain dynamic context.” 
(2009, p. 484; italics added). This is a crucial difference between accounts of 
synchronic material constitution and the idea of diachronic constitution for a couple 
of reasons. First, both compositional constitution and ampliative constitution 
presuppose that the physical constituents are intrinsically individuated – this we can 
see in the intrinsic necessitation constraint and in the relational/intrinsic constraint. 
If processes, according to process ontologists, are individuation-dependent upon the 
larger context within which they are embedded for their dynamical function, 
processes cannot be intrinsically individuated (for similar points, see chapters 6 and 
7). Second, moving from a particularist notion of individuals to a view of 
component parts as individuated qua their specificity-in-functioning is indicative of 
a shift away from focusing on the material as well as spatial co-location of relata in 
constitutive relations to a practice of individuating aspects of nature in terms of 
dynamic function – viz., in terms of what is happening or is going-on in situated 
context.  
Framing the constitutive thesis of EC in terms of ontological frameworks akin 
to noneliminative modes of process ontology is consistent with particular strands of 
EC theorizing. For instance, Menary (2012) distinguishes between “artifact 
extension” (AE) and “enculturated cognition” (EnC). AE is the version of EC 
advocated by Clark & Chalmers (1998), Clark (2008), and Wheeler (2010). EnC, on 
the other hand, appeals to the idea that cognitive processes are driven and partly 
constituted within a species of cultural practices (Hutchins 2008, 2011a; Menary 
2007, 2009), and motivates a shift away from a focus on “things” to an enactivist 
approach to cognition as the unfolding of dynamical processes and/or patterns (see 
also Chemero 2009; Di Paolo 2009; Hutchins 2011b; Varela et al. 1991). As far I 
can tell, EnC is process-based. It is in virtue of this that cognitive processes involve 
multiple feedback loops and organizing activity across the boundary of the 
organism itself, which reveals incoherence in the notion of “intrinsically 
individuated constituents”.  
To proceed further with my analysis of why diachronic constitution shares a 
kinship with specific strands of noneliminative process ontology, what we need, to 
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get a firmer grip on these issues, is an example to analyze. Let us consider, then, the 
dynamical system I foregrounded in section 8.2, the Watt (centrifugal) governor. It 
is not too surprising, I think, that dynamical systems (and distributed processes such 
as processes of remembering) do not dovetail with explanations in terms of 
synchronic material constitution, because analytical metaphysics is not well 
equipped to deal with dynamic phenomena in general. The insights from dynamics 
throw into question how we should understand the notion of “part,” if indeed we 
keep (as I have argued) the requirement that processes involve component parts as 
an element of our ontology of processes. Unlike synchronic views of material 
constitution, where constituent parts are particulars (i.e., “entities that (i) each have 
a determinate unique spacetime location and (ii) have this location necessarily since 
they are individuated in terms of [their] location.” (Seibt 2009, p. 484)), processes 
are best understood as having non-particular component parts.  
To appropriately describe parts in processes, we must move away from what 
Seibt calls the “particularist conception of individuals,” and replace it with a 
perspective that puts emphasis “not on location but on ‘specificity-in-functioning’ 
[…], i.e., focuses on the dynamic role of an entity (e.g., an activity) within a certain 
dynamic context.” (2009, p. 484; italics added) Applying Seibt’s (2009) model of 
processes to the Watt governor, we can say the following. First, processes are 
temporally extended, i.e., there is no such thing as an instantaneous process. In the 
case of the Watt governor, the process of maintaining a constant speed of the 
flywheel does not take place at a time instant t; rather, it is the unfolding of a 
complex pattern or process over time. Second, processes do not necessarily occur in 
a unique spatiotemporal location – ontologically speaking, a process is not a 
particular. Albeit mechanically organized, which of course limits the freedom of 
movement in the Watt governor, the throttle valve, the arm angle, the spindles, the 
pulley belted to the flywheel, and the collar slides are all in continuous and mutually 
influencing interaction. Third, processes must be individuated in terms of their roles 
in a dynamic context – that is, because they are non-particulars, they must be 
individuated so. In dynamic systems theoretic terms, we can explain the relationship 
between the steam engine and the governor system such that the arm angle of the 
governor, call this θ, is a parameter of the engine system, whereas the engine speed, 
call this w, is a parameter of the governor system (van Gelder 1995, p. 357). This 
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relationship between θ and w is known as coupling, which enables us to explain the 
dynamical behavior of θ and w as comprising what van Gelder refers to as a “single 
dynamical system in which both arm angle and engine speed are state variables.” 
(1995, p. 357)  
Similarly to θ and w, we can think of the relationship between an agent (a brain, 
perhaps) and its environment as two dynamical systems A and E dynamically 
coupled to one another, and where both A and E are time-continuous dynamical 
systems. Beer represents this coupling as follows: S is a sensory function from 
environmental states to agent parameters, and M is a motor function from agent 
state variables to environmental parameters, with S(XE) standing in for an agent’s 
sensory inputs, and M(XA) corresponding to its motor outputs. As Beer shows, this 
gives us the following equations: XA = A(XA; S(XE); U’A), and XE = E(XE; M(XA); 
U’E) (1995, p. 181). Given the continuous reciprocal coupling between A and E, 
Beer emphasizes that we can see – just like the case with θ and w – “the two 
coupled nonautonumous systems A and E as a single autonomous dynamical system 
U whose state variables are the union of the state variables of A and E […].” (1995, 
pp. 182-83).  
How does this relate to the C-C fallacy? First, if a process x occurs in y and y is 
causally interacting with z, it does not follow (so Adams & Aizawa argue) that x 
“extends into” z. This is the form of Adams & Aizawa’s example of the air 
conditioning system: if evaporation occurs in an evaporation coil and the latter is 
causally linked to a compressor coil, it does not follow that evaporation “extends 
into” the compressor coil. Nobody, I believe, would dispute this. But, as I argued, 
this template is deeply problematic for the simple reason that most defenders of EC 
do not argue in a way corresponding to that template. Indeed, having made the 
distinction between a “particularist conception of individuals” and a “non-
particularist conception of individuals,” it is easy to show that Adams & Aizawa are 
indeed committed to the former conception of individual entities as particulars. 
This is a serious point, since it is an incoherent assumption when applied to 
processes as relata in relations of constitution. Consider that “something is a 
particular if by necessity it occurs in one entity only.” (Seibt 2010, p. 29) In other 
words, x occurs in y if by necessity it only occurs in y – evaporation occurs in y if by 
necessity it only occurs in y. But, as we have seen, processes cannot be explained by 
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reference to such necessitation and location-exclusive requirements. Thus, working 
with particularist assumptions presents a problem for Adams & Aizawa.  
 
8.7.3. Counterfactual dependency 
 
To further highlight some of the similarities between causation and a diachronic 
notion of constitution, together with providing an answer to a possible objection 
from Adams & Aizawa, I will now consider the issue of counterfactual dependency.  
There are many ways by which to attempt to discriminate between causal 
dependency and constitutive dependency. One way, presented in this chapter, is to 
assume that only causation is temporal, whereas constitution is atemporal. Of 
course, this may hold only in cases where we contrast synchronic material 
constitution with causation – it does not hold, I have argued, once we contrast a 
diachronic and process-based notion of constitution with causation, since both of 
these are temporal. Another possibility seems to be to explain causal dependency in 
terms of counterfactual dependency, and from this try to show that only causal 
dependency can be explained counterfactually, whereas counterfactual dependency 
is insufficient to justify constitutive dependency. This, I suspect, is yet another 
assumption that is driving Adams & Aizawa’s insistence that defenders of EC 
commit the C-C fallacy.  
In this section my aim is to establish that diachronic constitution is immune to 
such an accusation. I shall show that one cannot appeal to counterfactual 
dependency in order to discriminate between causation and constitution.  
The basic idea of analyzing causation in terms of counterfactuals is that causal 
claims can be made understandable as well as explained in terms of counterfactual 
conditionals of the form: if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred. But 
why think that causation (or causal claims) is conceptually linked with 
counterfactuals? According to Menzies, one “reason is that the idea of a cause is 
conceptually linked with the idea of something that makes a difference and this idea 
in turn is best understood in terms of counterfactuals.” (2008, p. 4) Or, in the words 
of Lewis: “We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the 
difference it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it. 
Had it been absent, its effects – some of them, at least, and usually all – would have 
been absent as well.” (1973, p. 161)  
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Consider, firstly, the following schematic claim: a cognitive process Z causally 
depends on two other processes, X and Y, just in case if X and Y had not occurred Z 
would not have occurred. Consider, secondly, our familiar example: this process of 
remembering is constituted by processes of manipulating a notebook jointly and 
reciprocally coupled to brain processes. This statement can be causally explained in 
terms of counterfactual conditionals of the following form: Z causally depends on X 
and Y just in case if X and Y had not occurred Z would not have occurred. Insofar as 
the counterfactual conditional “if X and Y had not occurred, Z would not have 
occurred” entails the causal statement “X and Y cause Z,” it seems that Adams & 
Aizawa could argue: given such an entailment of the counterfactual conditional, the 
defender of EC is still committing an instance of the C-C fallacy, since it is not 
enough to show that Z is causally dependent on X and Y if the target is to establish 
that Z is constitutively dependent on X and Y.  
However, for Adams & Aizawa to justifiably make this claim, they need to 
establish the additional claim that the dependency expressed by counterfactuals is 
limited to causal dependency. But such a claim they will be unlikely to construct 
successfully. In his (1973), “Causes and counterfactuals,” Kim points out that the 
“sort of dependency expressed by counterfactuals is considerably broader than 
strictly causal dependency and that causal dependency is only one among the 
heterogeneous group of dependency relationships that can be expressed by 
counterfactuals.” (1973, p. 570) There are cases involving processes, whose 
persistence is dependent on spatiotemporal continuity, and in which one event is a 
constituent part of another. Consider, for example, the case from chapter 3, namely 
Hofweber & Velleman’s example of the process of writing a cheque:  
 
“A process of writing a cheque is a temporally extended process, with 
temporal parts consisting in the laying down of each successive drop of ink. 
What there is of this process at a particular moment – the laying down of a 
particular drop – is not sufficient to determine that a cheque is being written, 
and so it is not sufficient to determine which particular process is taking place. 
[…] Not only, then, is the process not present in its temporal entirety within 
the confines of the moment: it is not fully determined by the events of the 
moment to be the process that it is.” (2011, p. 50)  
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In this case, my laying down of each successive ink drop, I1, …, In, is a constituent 
event in the overall process of writing a cheque; and, following Kim, it is probably 
true to say: ‘If I had not laid down each successive ink drop, I1, …, In, I would not 
have written a cheque’. But, it is unlikely that my putting an ink drop down 
followed by another drop of ink causally determines me writing a cheque. Hence, 
the first key point is: “counterfactual dependency is too broad to pin down causal 
dependency.” (Kim 1973, p. 571)  
If this is the case, then Adams & Aizawa cannot straightforwardly identify the 
case of distributed processes of remembering with the C-C fallacy. Recall: “X is the 
manipulation of the notebook reciprocally coupled to Y – the brain process – which 
together constitute Z.” (Menary 2006, p. 334; italics in original) This statement can 
be given both a causal and a constitutive explanation, and both of these can be 
analyzed in terms of counterfactuals. In contrast to ‘Z causally depends on X and Y 
just in case if X and Y had not occurred Z would not have occurred,’ this statement 
can also be understood as saying ‘Z constitutively depends on X and Y just in case if 
X and Y had not occurred Z would not have occurred. Therefore, Adams & Aizawa 
cannot use counterfactual analysis to pin down a distinction between causal 
dependence and constitutive dependence.  
 
8.7.4. Hybridity  
 
Suppose Adams & Aizawa accept the claim that counterfactual dependency cannot 
motivate (underpin) the C-C fallacy. Nevertheless, in the context of my claim that 
distributed cognitive phenomena are hybrid, consisting (among other things) of both 
causal and constitutive relations, Adams & Aizawa could still argue that if 
diachronic constitution does not rely on “inferring constitution from causation (or 
coupling), then that is not a defense of what other extended cognition theorists have 
said.” (Adams & Aizawa 2008, p. 104; italics in original) Rather, it “seems to be an 
abandonment of the coupling [causation] to constitution arguments, […].” (Adams 
& Aizawa 2008, p. 104) First, they would be absolutely correct to specify that 
insofar as the defenders of EC adopt the account of diachronic constitution, they are 
not making an inference from causation to constitution. This is because causal 
relations are horizontal relations, whereas the constitution relation, at least when 
understood to hold diachronically, is neither horizontal nor vertical but rather 
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diagonal. Second, Adams & Aizawa might also be correct to point out that such an 
account might not qualify as a proper defense of what other (previous) EC theorists 
have said. But why is that a problem? Indeed, the C-C fallacy itself turns on there 
being a fallacious inference from causation to constitution. If there is no such 
fallacious inference on my account, this is not a problem for me; rather, it is a 
problem for Adams & Aizawa. In particular, it seems that Adams & Aizawa have a 
problem with any account that abandons such an inference, since such an account 
would overcome (and therefore be immune to) the accusation of unjustifiably 
inferring from facts about causation to facts about constitution.  
 
8.7.5. Top-down and bottom-up constitutively mediated effects 
 
Many assumptions about causation and constitution turn on the idea that both of 
these relations hold asymmetrically. However, even though this might imply that 
causes precede their effects (that is, there is an asymmetric relation from a cause to 
an effect), it does not follow that an effect could not have feedback effects on its 
cause. This is precisely the view of causation that Clark (1997) and Wheeler (2005) 
refer to as CRC. The same can be said about constitution. In distributed 
remembering, X and Y constitute Z asymmetrically, in the sense that X and Y 
constitute Z and Z does not constitute X and Y. However, once constituted, Z may 
display top-down effects on its constituents (a point I made much of in chapter 7).  
What I hope to have shown so far is that if Adams & Aizawa argue that 
defenders of EC confuse constitution with causation, it is in fact Adams & Aizawa 
that violate the central idea that causation is an intralevel phenomenon, whereas 
constitution is an interlevel phenomenon. In their discussion of why it is erroneous 
to suppose that causation works across different levels, Craver & Bechtel (2007) use 
an example from Patricia Churchland (1993), who expresses a similar worry 
concerning causation as an interlevel relation. The example of choice is from the 
Betty Crocker Cookbook. As Craver & Bechtel re-iterate Churchland’s claim:  
 
“Betty correctly explains that microwaves work by accelerating the 
component molecules in the food. However, she takes a decidedly wrong turn 
when she explains further that the excited molecules rub against one another 
and generate heat through fiction. Betty’s error, of course, is in supposing that 
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heat is causally produced by the increase in mean kinetic energy when in fact 
heat is constituted by their mean kinetic energy. The causal reading in this 
case is simply erroneous.” (2007, p. 555)  
 
Similarly with our case of Z, the process of distributed remembering. The flaw that 
Adams & Aizawa commit is similar to Betty’s error, in that, they charge the 
defenders of EC with the claim that X (the process of manipulating the notebook) 
reciprocally coupled to Y (brain process) is what generates (i.e., causes) Z, when, in 
fact, Z is constituted by X and Y.  
How can we express the idea that constitution, as an interlevel relation, is 
symmetric? Enter the second non-cognitive example, the classical example from 
dynamical systems theory of a fluid heated from below and cooled from above. In 
the previous chapter, we looked at this particular example in detail; hence, here I 
briefly describe the example again, and pick out what is of important given the 
subject matter being discussed here.  
The phenomenon in question is convection rolls. Of course, I do not want to 
claim that EC simply is like a fluid composed of homogenous elements. Far from it, 
since most cases of EC consists of a multiplicity of heterogeneous elements. But 
this dynamical, non-cognitive, example highlights in an easy to understand way 
what the dynamicists refer to as a collective variable, which is the kind of 
mechanism that will allow me to show just how constitution can be symmetric. 
Here is how the example goes. Take some oil, put it in a pan, and apply a heat 
source from below. As the heat is applied it increases the difference in the 
temperature between the top and the bottom of the oil layer. At a critical threshold, 
an event called “an instability” occurs such that the liquid begins to self-organize a 
coherently rolling motion. This motion is a convection roll. What happens is that the 
cooler liquid at the top is denser (and heavier), thereby falling, whereas the liquid at 
the bottom is warmer (therefore less dense and lighter), thus tending to rise to the 
top. The resulting convection roll is called a collective or cooperative effect in the 
language of dynamical systems theory. The temperature gradient itself is referred to 
as a control parameter, yet it is not a parameter that encodes or pre-specifies the 
pattern of convection rolls. What is fascinating here is that a pan of oil may contain 
something on the order of 1020 molecules (Kelso 1995, p. 8) all subject to random 
disordered motion. However, once the rolling motion begins, the convection rolls 
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ensure that “all parts of the liquid no longer behave independently but are sucked 
into an ordered, coordinated pattern that can be described precisely using the 
parameter concept [viz., by using the order parameter or collective variable 
concept].” (Kelso 1995, p. 8) The collective variable (viz., the rolling motion of 
convection rolls) is constituted by the collective cooperation of the individual parts 
of this dynamical system, here the fluid molecules. Yet the collective variable 
“governs or constrains the behavior of the individual parts.” (Kelso 1995, p. 8) On 
the one hand, the component parts constitute the whole, yet the whole can affect the 
behavior of its parts, on the other. On my view, then, the interlevel relationship is 
constitutive, and because the constitutive effects run from both bottom-up and from 
the top and down, this is why diachronic constitution is symmetric. Because of this, 
by applying the distinction between constitution as an interlevel relation and 
causation as an intralevel relation, we can identify the interlevel constitutive relation 
as between the convection roll (or rolls) and its component parts without having to 
fallaciously appeal to this relationship as a form of causation.  
Such mediated top-down and bottom-up effects between diachronically 
unfolding processes can be usefully applied to cases of distributed cognitive 
processes. Hence, I now turn to the third, and this time cognitive, example.  
Here I consider the example of transactive memory that I dealt with in chapter 
5. Recall, Wegner (1987) introduced the concept of “transactive memory systems” 
(TMSs) in an attempt to explain how individual members in long-tenured groups, 
intimate couples, and so on, rely on each other to obtain, process, and communicate 
knowledge from different domains. As Harris et al. state, remembering “often 
occurs jointly in social groups” (2011, p. 268; see also Barnier, Sutton, Harris & 
Wilson 2008). As Harris et al. go on to say: “People in close relationship are likely 
to be behaviorally, emotionally, and cognitively ‘interdependent’ […] – that is, in 
collectives such as couples, families, […], and work teams, remembering is an inter-
active activity where memories are dynamically and jointly constructed […].” 
(2011, p. 268)  
Often, yet not always, such dynamically and collaboratively constructed modes 
of remembering result in both a division of labor and a specialization of knowledge 
between couples, friends, work teams, etc. Lewis puts this nicely, when she says: 
“According to transactive memory theory, group members divide the cognitive 
labor for their tasks, with members specializing in different domains. Members rely 
! 226 
on one another to be responsible for specific expertise such that collectively they 
possess all of the information needed for their tasks.” (2003, p. 587) Transactive 
memory theory describes both the processes involved in actual instances of 
transactive memory and the benefits for memory that may occur when remembering 
is shared between two or more individuals (see e.g., Barnier et al. 2008; Harris et al. 
2011; Lewis 2003; Theiner & O’Connor 2010; Wegner 1987). A TMS, then, is a 
cooperative and mnemonic division of labor in learning, remembering, and 
communicating within dyads, triads or larger social groups.  
Where there is a mnemonic division of labor, the differentiation and socially 
distributed processes of retrieval, encoding, and sharing of autobiographical 
memory, may result in an integrative process of socially distributed remembering. 
Furthermore, collective remembering – just like convection rolls, the Mexican 
wave, the workings of the centrifugal governor, and so on – depends for its 
existence on spatiotemporal continuity. For transactive remembering to persist it 
must persist as a dynamical unfolding in real time. Of course, even in dynamical 
cases such as transactive remembering one might insist that despite the process of 
transactive remembering being time continuous this does not prevent one from 
describing or explaining such a phenomenon synchronically.  
For instance, dynamical systems theory conceptualizes systems geometrically, 
that is, in terms of regions in a state space (i.e., distances and trajectories in a space 
of possible states). A cognitive scientist, for example, may use the mathematical 
paradigm of dynamical systems theory to point to the position of a system in a 
dynamical state space, locating the system at T2 over an interval T1, …, Tn. This is 
an example of what Spivey calls a “kind of coarse grained averaging measurement” 
(2007, p. 30), in the sense that synchronic explanations – metaphysically understood 
– can at best be an abstraction or a product of a particular model enabling a scientist 
to describe or explain that phenomenon as existing somewhere on a dynamical 
trajectory at a particular clock time T2. But we should not mistake this as genuine 
evidence for the system actually resting in a discrete state at T2. As. Spivey says: 
“[Claiming] that a system was in a particular “state,” X, at a particular point in time, 
really boils down to saying that the average of the system’s states during that period 
of time was X. This kind of coarse averaging measurement is often a practical 
necessity in science, but should not be mistaken as genuine evidence for the system 
actually resting in a discrete stable state.” (2007, p. 30; italics in original) 
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According to Barnier et al. (2008, p. 38), transactive memory theory predicts that 
recalled memories by individuals in diachronically unfolding retrieval processes 
would be more than the sum of individual memory. That is, the constituted process 
of successful transactive remembering should have emergent properties that are not 
only greater than, but also different from the sum of individual memory – either in 
quantity (amount of information remembered) or in terms of quality (e.g., the 
emotional richness of the particular jointly remembered event) – see Chapter 5 for 
more detail on these diachronically emergent properties.  
Once the process of transactive remembering is initiated between, for example, 
two individuals, they will begin to collaborate in a coherent fashion. The TMS is no 
longer merely two separate individuals with their individual memories. Instead, they 
cooperate to create a coherent and dynamically shared pattern of collaborative 
memory unfolding over time. This new version will affect, in a top-down fashion, 
their individual memories of the event, and it is “quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from what each remembered alone.” (Barnier et al. 2008, p. 38) In the 
language of dynamical systems theory, we can say that the parts (the individuals, for 
example) no longer behave independently but “are sucked into an ordered, 
coordinated pattern […].” (Kelso 1995, p. 8), and this pattern has top-down 
constitutively mediated effects on the component parts. It is important to mention 
here that such top-down effects are operative in both occurrent instances of 
transactive remembering – such as the dialogue between the husband and the wife 
surveyed in chapter 5 – and in long-term, nonoccurrent modes of individual’s 
transactive memories. Consequently, in transactive memory, we come across top-
down constitutively mediated effects in the here-and-now and across developmental 
time.  
 
8.8. Conclusion  !
The empirical and theoretical approach I have developed in this chapter departs 
from much of the core and mainstream literature in both metaphysics and EC. I 
have argued that if we wish to understand and explain the constitutive relation in 
cases of distributed cognitive processes, we cannot rely on the traditional 
framework of material constitution in metaphysics. Instead, what is needed is a 
notion of constitution that shares a kinship with noneliminative process ontology 
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and that is inherently diachronic. I have argued that this notion of diachronic 
constitution breaks with how constitution is typically considered in the debate about 
EC. In relation to this debate, I have attempted to show that the critics – Adams & 
Aizawa – are wrong to criticize defenders of EC with committing the C-C fallacy, 
because Adams & Aizawa are working with a notion of synchronic compositional 
constitution that is inconsistent with common cases of EC.  
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9. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I began this thesis by setting out two research aims. The first aim, in particular, 
concerned the extended cognition thesis (EC), where I advanced the claim that it is 
possible to radicalize EC further than it is already considered to be. Indeed, despite 
EC’s groundbreaking implications for where cognitive processes and processing 
may be instantiated or exemplified – expanding the traditional view of the brain as 
the locus of cognition to include parts of the non-neural body and local environment 
– I put forth the claim that there is a tendency within the EC literature to adopt – 
without further scrutiny – key notions from metaphysics such as composition, 
constitution, supervenience, realization, and emergence. With respect to this 
adoption of metaphysical concepts, I have attempted to show throughout the thesis 
that these concepts of metaphysical building relations, insofar as they are simply 
redeployed in EC without significant reformulation, carry with them conceptual 
baggage unsuited to analyze the relata and systemic dynamics in many examples of 
EC.  
As a result, and in relation to the first research aim, the thesis has been an 
attempt to establish the need for a reformulation of the metaphysical foundation of 
EC by (a) pointing to inconsistencies between the received synchronic view of 
metaphysical relations of dependence, on the one hand, and dynamical cognitive 
systems and processes, on the other, and (b) by developing an alternative diachronic 
account.  
Overall I have argued that the DIACHRONIC perspective developed in the 
thesis finds a congenial environment in contemporary dynamical systems theoretic 
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approaches to cognition, including second-wave versions of EC (Menary 2007, 
2010a; Sutton 2008, 2010), certain strands of enactivism (Di Paolo 2009; Engel 
2010; Varela et al. 1991) and dynamical cognitive science (Chemero 2009; Spivey 
2007; van Gelder 1995, 1998). Common for all of these accounts of cognition is 
that they start from the premise that cognitive processes are embedded within and 
instantiated by self-organizing, nonlinear, and temporal activity in dynamical 
systems, whose interdependent components may include, in the right circumstances, 
neural, bodily, and local environmental elements.  
On these accounts, then, and supported by DIACHRONIC, every cognitive 
function, from perceptual-motor behavior to advanced forms of problem-solving 
and kinds of remembering, arise through concurrent integration and transformation 
of functionally distinct as well as topographically different neural regions, together 
with regions distributed across neural, bodily, and worldly resources. With respect 
to this, the central issues occupying me throughout the thesis – especially 
concerning how to think about metaphysical building relations – has been the 
following: that the integration of these disparate regions occur over multiple 
different timescales of duration, ranging from the very short (milliseconds, seconds) 
to the much longer (minutes, hours). Insofar as both the relata in dynamically 
distributed cognition and the mechanisms through which the relata jointly combine 
to produce cognitive outcomes are inherently temporal, the question that has 
motivated the development of DIACHRONIC was: how can a metaphysical 
building relation – e.g., constitution or composition – that holds between processes 
be atemporal? That is, if the very nature of a process is to unfold across a region of 
spacetime for a process to be what it is, then how can the existence of a process be 
determined at an atemporal instant? Throughout the thesis, I argued that it is this 
particular dilemma that defenders of EC face insofar as they keep intact the received 
synchronic view of metaphysical relations of dependence.  
With so much evidence in support for the view that cognitive processes are 
continuously dynamical and richly temporal, crisscrossing levels and boundaries, 
there is no principled reason for why we should keep endorsing the static 
metaphysical framework expressed by received views of constitution, composition, 
emergence, supervenience, and realization. Indeed, the central claim of the thesis 
has been that if cognitive systems and cognitive processes are ineliminably 
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temporal, then any robust metaphysics of such cognitive systems and processes 
must reflect such inherent diachronic characteristics.  
By developing a diachronic metaphysical framework, it has been my aim to move 
the EC research forward into a third-wave of EC theorizing, where a clear 
conceptual framework for a dynamical ontology underpins genuinely dynamical 
relations. That is what the project of reformulating the metaphysics of EC has been 
all about.  
Despite its congeniality with dynamical systems theoretic approaches to 
cognition, the proposed DIACHRONIC account, however, finds significantly less 
congeniality in analytical metaphysics insofar as the received view of metaphysical 
building relations (in this area of philosophical inquiry) is most commonly 
expressed in terms of SYNCHRONIC. This was what motivated the second aim of 
the thesis, namely to broaden the boundaries of metaphysical theorizing about 
dependence relations to not only include SYNCHRONIC but equally 
DIACHRONIC. What I have not done is to argue that the standard synchronic view 
in metaphysics is false simpliciter; rather, my ambition has been to show that when 
certain conditions are operative – for example, when both relata in question are 
processes, and because processes require for their persistence spatiotemporal 
continuity – the received synchronic account of metaphysical building relations is ill 
equipped to analyze the specific relations of dependence involved. Note, though, 
that insofar as all physical systems are dynamical systems, this carries with it the 
implication that the synchronically motivated view of metaphysical dependence 
relations does not apply to physical systems qua dynamical systems. That is a 
controversial claim, especially because of the inferences that I have drawn from it in 
this thesis. For example, in chapter 6, I argued that when considering the 
relationship between the free energy minimization and the realization relation, it is 
far from certain that the realization is the appropriate relation by which to 
understand the relationship between free energy minimization and the mechanisms 
instantiating free energy minimization. Also, in chapter 7, where I argued that the 
standard view of emergence as a supervenience relation is problematic insofar as 
our explanatory target is to understand how emergent properties arise in dynamical 
systems.  
In spite of these implications for SYNCHRONIC, I have not shown that 
DIACHRONIC is the only true account about metaphysical dependence relations 
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insofar as dynamical systems are concerned. I do not think that DIACHRONIC is 
the only true account for the simple reason that it is has not been possible to address 
all the relevant issues in the thesis. For example, there is still much work to be done 
in terms of understanding the parthood relation in dynamical systems. Also, we 
need an account of time. That is, if, as I argued in chapter 4, the notion of an 
ontological synchronic conception of time is problematic, since even the here-and-
now involves a temporally rich unfolding of activity, this raises the question of how 
we should understand synchronic statements in cognitive science, since most 
cognitive scientists would insist that it is correct to describe a system as being in a 
certain state, say, at a certain point in time. Furthermore, insofar as DIACHRONIC 
turns out to be correct, we still require an explanation of how DIACHRONIC is 
different from causation given the fact that DIACHRONIC is not a relation of 
causation. In other words, if DIACHRONIC is a non-causal relation of dependence, 
yet a temporal relation, how, then, does DIACHRONIC differ from the relation of 
causation? These are just a few questions that I think needs to be settled before we 
can say that DIACHRONIC is the account in town – issues to be addressed in 
another project.  
Nevertheless, what I hope to have done is to have made a convincing case for 
the need to move away from the received synchronic view of metaphysical 
dependence relations and towards a diachronically infused alternative. Furthermore, 
that doing so will prove fruitful for an understanding of metaphysical relations of 
dependence in dynamical cognitive systems and dynamical cognitive processes.  
 
Michael D. Kirchhoff 
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